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Abstract
From 1920 to 1961, B. Carroll Reece served a then unprecedented thirty-five
years in the United States House of Representatives. Reece grew up in the povertystricken area of eastern Tennessee, one of thirteen children. He attended college at
Carson-Newman College and New York University but felt called to enlist in the army
during World War I. He earned numerous commendations for his service and returned to
the United States with an increased animosity towards communism. He returned to
education, but an opportunity presented itself for Reece to fulfill his dream of entering
politics. He ran for and won the First District seat in the House of Representatives in
1920. During his tenure, his hatred of communism and devotion to the Republican Party
led him to become a central figure in the debates over the Muscle Shoals, Alabama,
nitrate plants, the 1946 congressional elections, and the 1954 Special Committee to
Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations. Reece’s loyalty to Robert Taft and his
conservative stance on international involvement, communism, and economics influenced
the decision of the Republican Party to name him chairman of the Republican National
Committee in 1946. He resigned this position after he was unable to use his influence to
secure the presidential nomination for Taft, but he remained devoted to Taft and Taft’s
desire to become president. After Taft’s death, Reece turned his attention more fully on
the crusade to eradicate communism within the United States and its government. He led
an investigation into large foundations for fostering subversion through their grants to
leftist organizations and universities. Although this did coincide with his conservative
ideology, Reece had begun to see the decline in power of the “Old Guard” faction of the
Republican Party and strove desperately to prevent liberals from taking over the party.
The investigation garnered much condemnation, and its report became widely criticized
within Congress. His investigation contributed to the increasing animosity towards
foundations and large concentrations of wealth that continues today. Reece maintained
his position that communism posed a threat to the security of the nation and the
Republican Party until his death in 1961.
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Introduction
Between 1920 and 1961, Tennessee Republican B. Carroll Reece served a then
unprecedented thirty-five years in the House of Representatives. During his tenure, he
became involved in major legislation regarding the foundations of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) and became the face of a political party attempting to regain a majority
in the federal government. Outside of East Tennessee, however, he is known for little
other than his two-year term as chairman of the Republican National Committee. His
career presents the opportunity to examine the unique dynamics at work in the political
sphere on a local, state, and national level. Elected to the House in 1920, Reece served
through the after-effects of the Red Scare, suffered the trauma of the Great Depression
and World War II, and witnessed the rise of anti-communist sentiment within the nation.
Reece’s record reflected a deep concern for local and state issues as well as the
security and safety of the nation. During his early years in Congress, Reece worked to
increase compensation and pensions for war veterans and to reduce high freight rates for
farmers. The proposed government operation of the Muscle Shoals, Alabama, nitrate
plant occupied most of Reece’s time during the 1920s. He fought a bill advocating
federal operation in favor of private operation. Reece’s district desired the advantages of
public operation, and his highly conservative stance resulted in his first and only election
loss to the House in 1930. He regained his seat two years later with the understanding
that his district placed its own interests above that of the Republican Party on the Muscle
Shoals issue. Through the remainder of the Great Depression, Reece voted along
Republican Party lines by opposing much of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.
1

Reece’s selection as chairman of the Republican National Committee came as a
shock to a number of leading Republicans in the nation. Many wondered how a
congressman from a little-known area in East Tennessee with no major legislation
bearing his name became the leading figure of the Republican Party in 1946. A number
of newspaper articles reported Reece to have been a poor public speaker, even though he
debated in high school, and he most likely had a stutter.1 The answer to Reece’s selection
lies in shrewd political maneuvering by Reece and the desire of the Republican Party to
regain a majority in the nation’s capital. Reece made strategic political allies with men
like Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft and placed himself in view of many of the nation’s
leading political figures. His ineffectual oratory forced him to compensate with other
strengths, such as his firm grasp of economics, his organizational skills, and his keen
ability to relate to people on a basic level. More importantly, the Republican Party saw
Reece as a tool that could break the Southern stronghold and usher a return of “Negro
voters.” Reece’s private income became the decisive factor after he volunteered to serve
in the position without pay. Unable to use his position to secure the presidential
nomination for Taft, Reece returned to his district in 1948 without political office after he
lost the race for Tennessee senator.
Reece resumed his political career in 1950 by defeating the successor to his
House seat. The friendship that Reece developed with Senator Robert A. Taft motivated
him to work on Taft’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination in 1944. His
1

This cannot be validated with certainty, but two of the Articles in the Reece scrapbooks clearly stated that
Reece stuttered. This may explain his method of speaking slowly—in order to hide his stutter—and
probably led to the conclusion that he was simply a poor speaker. “Reece Turns His Stutter to Good Use in
Winning Confidence of Midwest Leaders,” Des Moines, Iowa, Morning Register dated 16 June 1946 in
Scrapbook 16, B. Carroll Reece Papers, 1889-1961, Archives of Appalachia, East Tennessee State
University, Johnson City, Tennessee (Hereafter designated BCR Papers), Box 34.
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position as Republican National Chairman prevented him from openly canvassing votes
for Taft, but almost everyone knew that Reece supported him. In 1952, Taft appointed
Reece as his Southern campaign manager, and he traveled the country actively soliciting
support for Taft. Taft’s death the following year left Reece without his strongest political
ally, but Reece remained at the forefront of the party through 1954.
At this time Reece became involved in the prolonged congressional hunt for
subversives. The anticommunist fervor that had began with the first Red Scare
intensified during the 1950s. Reece served on the Cox Committee, commissioned by the
House in 1952 to investigate tax-exempt foundations for subversive activity. The
committee’s report found no evidence of subversion within foundations, and Cox’s death
in 1953 ended the investigation. Later that year, however, Reece introduced a bill to
reopen the investigation on the premise that the Cox Committee had failed to complete its
work. The House commissioned the Reece Committee in 1954 to investigate foundations
and grants given to educational institutions. The Reece Committee’s public hearings
lasted less than two months, during which time Reece accused well-known foundations—
including the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation—of
fostering subversion. The Reece Committee Report generated large amounts of criticism,
some of which suggested that Reece intended to weaken Eisenhower by illustrating that
liberals had infiltrated his administration.
Intense fear and hatred of communism appeared in America long before Reece
entered the political fight. The apprehension originally began during the First World War
with the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. This prompted the passage of the
Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918, attempts to suppress interference with
3

the United States military and public dissention against the government. A series of
bombings in 1919, followed by the discovery of bombs mailed to the over forty
prominent politicians, sparked what became known as the Red Scare in America. A.
Mitchell Palmer, the recipient of one of these bombs and the Attorney-General,
authorized raids against anarchist, socialist, and communist groups in an endeavor to
stifle radical sentiment and curb the threat of Bolshevik ideas within the United States.
The intensity of the fervor subsided as the nation entered an era of prosperity during the
later part of the 1920s, but the fear lay dormant in the minds of many in Congress.
The anxiety over an internal threat to the safety of the nation surfaced through a
series of committees within Congress during the Great Depression. The first,
commissioned in 1930 and popularly known as the Fish Committee, investigated
communist activities within the United States. Although the Fish Committee concluded
after a brief investigation, Congress again authorized a Special Committee to Investigate
Un-American Activities in 1934. The instructions of this committee, known as the
McCormack-Dickstein Committee, included investigating Nazi propaganda, on the rise
with Adolf Hitler’s ascension to Chancellor in Germany. After the committee’s one-year
investigation, Congress did not sanction any other investigation until 1938, when
Representative Martin Dies of Texas insisted that a special committee needed to resume
the investigation into un-American activities and propaganda. The Dies Committee
convened until 1944, when Dies decided not to seek reelection to the House. American
involvement in World War II and the threat presented by communist power in Russia
virtually guaranteed that internal security would remain foremost among the minds of
congressmen, even with the departure of high-profile figures such as Dies.
4

Although other more prominent political figures became more closely associated
with the anti-communist fervor, Reece emerged as a diligent opponent of the Communist
Party during his career. While he served as chairman, the Republican Party successfully
promoted the nation’s security as a vital issue during the 1946 congressional elections in
order to win a majority in both Houses. Subsequent actions by Congress seemed to
validate his position that communism posed a real threat to the security of the nation.
During the opening session of the 1945 House of Representatives, John Rankin of
Mississippi had proposed an amendment that created the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities (HUAC) as a standing committee of the House. A series of
investigations into labor, Hollywood, and government employees prompted the passage
of several acts to curb the growth of communist sympathy within the United States and
make it increasingly difficult to express radical viewpoints or associate with communist
groups. The Senate created the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) in 1950,
the same year that Senator Joseph McCarthy accused the government of harboring
subversives during his speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. Reece’s investigation seemed
a natural continuance of these proceedings.
Reece’s constant struggle to maintain a balance between the Republicans in his
home district and their distrust of an expanding federal government characterized much
of his political career. Reece lived in East Tennessee—politically defined as the First and
Second Districts, stretching from Knox County eastward to the state line. Nestled in the
Appalachian Mountains, most of the area remained skeptical of the strong federal
government established after the Civil War. The economic and social problems that
resulted from the war led a number of Americans to turn to local leaders to defend
5

themselves from the many changes that occurred. This attitude intensified during later
crises, including the Great Depression and World Wars I and II, lending to the hostility
that surfaced to the New Deal and to those considered outsiders. The region desired the
money that came with programs but found the changes in social structure that came with
the money intolerable. East Tennessee remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War,
but it placed heavy emphasis on local autonomy. Once East Tennessee became
associated with the Republican Party it rarely split its vote, which was characteristic of
many Appalachian regions. This allowed local leaders to become almost immovable as
long as they maintained community approval.

2

Reece learned to protect the district that kept him in office, and his local political
prominence grew tremendously. Reece occasionally faced opposition from the
Democratic Party, especially in Greene County, home of President Andrew Johnson. The
Republican majority, however, gave Reece much of his strength and consistently
reelected him to office with expectations of patronage and other political benefits.
Congressmen in East Tennessee tended to serve for long periods of time in office, and
this only became dangerous if constituents perceived that their elected leader neglected
their community. Reece masterfully balanced local and national politics for his first ten
years in office. He then learned the hard lesson that came when his district felt that
Reece placed business interests in the Tennessee Valley Authority over local interests.
This mistake cost him his first and last election loss to the House of Representatives.
A note of irony exists in that much of what Reece worked so diligently to
accomplish eventually destroyed or displaced what he loved. His focus during his early
2

Gordon B. McKinney, Southern Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: Politics and the Appalachian
Community (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 5-7.
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years to promote the interest of farmers and veterans caused him to advocate the
development of Tennessee through the TVA, the very same institution that flooded his
hometown of Butler. His attempt to direct the operation of Muscle Shoals in the hands of
private enterprise to promote the interests of his home state cost him his seat in Congress.
His desire to ensure the security of the nation and its educational systems prompted him
to lead an investigation the same year that McCarthy and his supporters became
discredited in the eyes of the nation. Reece worked hard to make a name for himself and
to honor Tennessee, yet as late as 1955 local newspapers and colleges continued to
misspell his name.
History chronicles the deeds of the most influential and important people of the
1950s. Joe McCarthy, Pat McCarran, Dwight Eisenhower, J. Edgar Hoover, and the
communist influence on media, the FBI, and universities has been written and revised.
Little has been recorded on the effect that the fear of communism had on lesser-known
politicians or how these people made use of anti-communism to advance their careers.
Reece is an excellent example of both. Upper East Tennessee had relatively little to fear
on a local level from communism, but he manipulated the existing fear to maintain a
stronghold in his district by emphasizing the connection between national concerns and
local areas. He also used his connection to Robert Taft and Joe McCarthy to influence
votes for himself and the Republican Party.
The history of the Tennessee Valley Authority describes Reece as a hindrance to
the development of the Tennessee Valley. From Reece’s viewpoint, he worked to protect
the area from socialism and to ensure that local governments and municipalities were not
shut out of the profit gained from developing the valley. From an objective viewpoint,
7

his tactics were obstructionist and politically driven. Reece’s intense focus on selling the
Tennessee Valley Authority to a business prevented a bill from being passed for a
number of years, delaying development of the area.
Reece’s life and career reflect the complexities present in United States history
throughout the twentieth century. Articles that supported Reece portrayed him as a cleancut person who refrained from smoking or drinking. They lauded his military record, his
family, and his faith in the Republican Party. Pictures of Reece during his tenure as
chairman always showed him with a laugh or smile on his face. Those who opposed
Reece depicted him as unintelligent, a bad speaker, and loyal to the fault of blind
servitude. The truth of Reece’s life and career lay somewhere in the middle. Reece’s
career reveals how a combination of local and national political factors merged to boost
the political career of a relatively unknown politician. A look at Reece’s life is a step
back from the high profile figures of men such as McCarthy, who often dominated the
public image, to focus on lesser known but important secondary participants. It is a look
at how both local and national politics merged to create a distinct political culture that
had been building for decades.

3

3

One limitation to the study of Reece’s life is the absence of many of his personal papers. After his sudden
death, his wife was forced to vacate his Congressional office within one week, resulting in the destruction
of many of the documents before she had a chance to review them. Letter from Louise Goff Reece to
ETSU dated 1961 in Dossett Papers, Archives of Appalachia, East Tennessee State University, Johnson
City, Tennessee, Box 23:19. Louise Reece made over 60 scrapbooks with newspaper Articles,
photographs, and other memorabilia from his career. The newspaper Articles come from all over the
country, but many of them do not include the name of the paper or the specific date of the Article. These
are part of the B. Carroll Reece Papers.
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Chapter 1
Reece, who are you?
Thirteen is not an unlucky number
A belief in hard work propelled the Reece family from humble beginnings to
numerous accomplishments. In 1871, Rev. L.L. Maples founded Aenon Seminary in a
remote area of Tennessee known as Butler. His daughter Sarah Emmaline Maples
attended Aenon, where she met John Isaac Reece.4 They married with only two assets:
$150 in savings and a determination to raise a family. In 1876 seventeen-year-old Sarah
bore John the first of their children, and in the following twenty-five years, Sarah gave
birth to thirteen more children. Of the fourteen, only one failed to make it past his first
year at a time and place of high infant mortality. A local paper interviewed John about
his large family and the challenges associated with it. “Thirteen is not an unlucky
number,” John replied. He and Sarah prided themselves on their ability to raise their
children in what they considered to be comfort and informed the reporter that they had
given “each a good education, at the same time saving sufficient money to buy a farm
and build a house affording ample room for such a family.” John owned 130 acres of
land that he farmed to support his family. He made the children’s shoes, and some had to
go barefoot until well into the fall when he had time and money to complete them. All of
the children worked on the farm and at other jobs to help support the family. Eight of the

4

Newspaper Articles in Butler (Tenn.) Loose Folder, Archives of Appalachia, East Tennessee State
University, Johnson City, Tennessee (Hereafter Butler Folder).
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thirteen children attended college by the start of World War I, a remarkable feat for such
5

a poor and uneducated area.

Butler’s origins trace back to the Revolutionary Era. Cherokee Indians named a
river in northeastern Tennessee Watauga, meaning “beautiful river.” According to
legend, Daniel Boone passed through this area in 1769 on his way to Kentucky. On his
journey, Boone’s favorite horse became lame, and he released her on the banks of a
stream to fend for herself. The next year, this same horse, fully recovered and healthy,
met Boone as he passed back through the area. Boone then named the creek “Old Roan,”
after his horse. Roan Creek flowed into the Watauga at the lower end of Butler. The area
possessed many of the characteristics of an Appalachian region—families centered on
kinship ties and residents placed an emphasis on face-to-face interaction. Most worked to
make ends meet rather than to make a profit. They often taught their children to hunt at a
young age in order to help support the family.6
Butler remained a small town in the corner of upper East Tennessee. It consisted
of mostly private homes, and many of the families had lived there for generations. The
area contained few opportunities for industry until the railroad came in the early 1900s.
The Whiting Lumber Company, J. Minish Furniture Company, John B. Wilson Casket
Company, and Cozier Wood Package Company furnished Butler with factory jobs. The
other businesses in the town consisted of cafes, a general store, a drugstore, a post office,
a filling station, barber and beauty shops, the Bluebird Tea Room, and Shupe’s Hotel.
5

Newspaper Article in B. Carroll Reece Loose Folder, Archives of Appalachia, East Tennessee State
University, Johnson City, Tennessee (Hereafter BCR Folder); Press Release titled “Story of Carroll Reece”
published 1948 in BCR Papers, Box 13:5; Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 34, BCR Papers, Box 43.
6
Newspaper Articles in Butler Folder; Thomas Plaut, People, Politics, and Economic Life: Explaining
Appalachia with Quantitative Methods, with an overview of the Appalachian Region by Susan Emley Keefe
(Dubuque: Kendall / Hunt Publishing Company, 1999, 1996), 14-15.
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Residents could attend Butler Christian Church, Butler Baptist Church, or Butler
Methodist Church. The town had one school and two water fountains.

7

The Reece family claimed a long history of military service both in Tennessee
and in the nation. A great-great-great-grandfather, Captain Jacob Brown, reportedly
founded the Nolachuckey settlement, the first in the East Tennessee section of the Great
Smoky Mountains. Local historians credit Brown with the first store in this area,
supplied with goods brought by packhorses from the Carolinas. Captain Brown fought
with John Sevier, the first governor of Tennessee, in the Battle of King’s Mountain
during the Revolutionary War. Major General Brazilla Carroll McBride, the namesake
and great-great uncle of Brazilla Carroll Reece, fought in the War of 1812 and married
the sister of Revolutionary War hero Nathaniel Greene. John Reece’s family continued
this military tradition with five of the ten boys serving in the military: Wilson Landrine
and John Eggers during the Spanish-American War, Brazilla Carroll and Lemuel in the
Army during World War I, and Raleigh Valentine in the Army Air Corp during World
War II.8
Born on December 22, 1889, Brazilla Carroll Reece entered the world at a time
when America still nursed fresh wounds on its way to recovery from its most devastating
and deadly war to date. The government in Washington officially declared the end of
Reconstruction, but the nation did not yet embrace its new citizens as equals. The South
maintained a strong Christian heritage combined with a growing respect and nostalgia for
the past. Both of these are evident in the names of the Reece children. The name

7

Special Edition of The Elizabethton Star on Butler dated 2 December 1983 in Butler Folder.
Newspaper Articles in BCR Loose Folder, Archives of Appalachia, East Tennessee State University,
Johnson City, Tennessee; Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 24, BCR Papers, Box 37.
8
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Brazilla most likely comes from the Old Testament name Barzillai, meaning “iron” or
“strong.” The Bible records Barzillai as showing hospitality to the future king David
when he fled from Absalom, but Barzillai declined the king’s offer to spend his last days
at court.9 Although his Christian name inspired thoughts of integrity and strength, B.
Carroll Reece chose not to be known by the name of his ancestor in order to make a name
for himself. His actions and writings during his first thirty years indicated the
perseverance and dedication that would later characterize his career in the United States
House of Representatives.
Education is what develops savage man into civilized man
Reece held a firm belief in learning, both as a student and as a teacher. He began
his formal education in the same school where his parents met. By the time Reece started
his education, his grandfather had sold Aenon School, which was named Holly Springs
College in 1886. After being purchased by the Watauga Baptist Association, it officially
became Watauga Academy in 1906. Although Reece’s parents had been able to send him
to a public school five miles away, he had to work summers in the woods peeling tan
bark for eighty-five cents per day in order to attend Watauga Academy. Twenty cents of
that income supported the food and education costs for eight of his siblings. Despite the
difficulty of working while attending school, Reece became one of the first two graduates
of Watauga Academy in 1908.10 His first teaching position paid him a salary of thirtyfive dollars per month. After less than two years of teaching, he decided to further his
education at Carson and Newman College. He enrolled in a variety of courses, including
psychology, debate, German, French, and pedagogy. Reece played basketball and served
9

II Samuel 17:27, 19:32-39.
Butler Folder; Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 1, BCR Papers, Box 24.
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as captain of the football team. He earned high grades and graduated as valedictorian of
his class in 1914 with a Bachelor of Arts degree.
The work Reece completed during these early years revealed much about his
developing character, idealism, and sense of morality. In a speech debating the question
of nature versus education in forming the character of man, he took the position of
education over nature, arguing that once prisoners were educated they became law
abiding citizens. “Education is what develops savage man into civilized man,” Reece
wrote, because “nature without education is blank.” In one essay he recognized the need
for many rural schools to incorporate advances in agriculture into their curriculum
because of the monotonous nature of farm life where “the girls will become discouraged
and the boys will become restless and leave for the city.” Reece revealed his pride in
being an American when he commended Theodore Roosevelt as “an example of the most
modern Americanism” and lauded adversity as “the gateway to success and to greatness.”
Reece described education as a privilege, of which the recipient bore the responsibility to
convey their knowledge to others.11
In various undated essays on the nature of war, Reece identified a number of his
conflicting ideas. Pointing to various wars in history, including the Peloponnesian War
and the Boer War, he wrote that “taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best
protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to
adopt a peaceful economy.” In another essay he described war as “one of the greatest
evils that has ever been intentionally maintained by man” because it separated the family,
often took the lives of young men, and drained a country of its resources. In a third,
11

Reece essays and speeches in BCR Papers, Box 1:7 and 1:8.
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Reece expounded on both of these views and wrote that God must have given man a
spirit of war, though Reece questioned whether God “intended for man to rule by force of
arms.” Citing the Revolutionary War, he reasoned that some wars for independence were
justified, but asserted war was no longer necessary because intelligent people responded
to reason. “Now it is that all international disputes should be settled by arbitration and
the people ought to no longer be burdened by war . . . they ought no longer in this new
era of learning and civilization be forced to endure the attendant miseries of war.”12 This
viewpoint became increasingly evident during the opening years of World War II, when
Reece advocated isolationism rather than participation in what he often described as
Europe’s war.
Reece’s essays also revealed his emerging viewpoint on government and
America’s position in the world. He called for support for America from all nationalities
living within the United States and prophetically wrote that he could not “imagine any
greater misfortune that can befall mankind than to have any two of the great nations of
the world feel that their interests necessitate a trial of strength with each other.” He
predicted that this would involve all other nations of the world in a manner never seen.
In an essay comparing the English system of government with the American republican
system, he concluded that the cabinet form could not exist anywhere outside England
because of specific conditions that existed only within that nation. He concluded that the
American form of government was much better and was the model towards which other
nations looked. “Thus do we set the mark in legislation and government, and thus do we
lead the world by reason of the able enterprise and sure judgment of the Fathers of our
12

Reece essays and speeches in BCR Papers, Box 1:7 and 1:8.
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Government.” This idealism about American government influenced his ideas regarding
communism and its spread throughout Europe and Asia during the later years of his
career. Although written in his early years, Reece maintained these principles during his
years in Congress.13
After graduating from Carson and Newman, Reece continued his teaching career.
Letters of recommendation written by faculty conveyed their high opinion of Reece and
his abilities as a teacher and student. Former teachers described Reece as “an excellent
instructor,” “a young man of Christian ideals, of real worth and strength of character,”
14

“an unusually brilliant young man,” and “a man of splendid ability and high ideals.”

He made inquiries into a position as a high school principal in Cookeville, Tennessee, in
1914, and received a job offer from the Central Education Bureau in St. Louis, Missouri,
in 1915 to teach mathematics and German at an annual salary of $1,200. He declined this
position, as well as one in Mooresburg, Tennessee, to enroll in New York University
(NYU) in 1915 to pursue a Master’s Degree in economics and finance. At the same time,
he received a Master of Arts degree from Carson and Newman in philosophy and English
literature, although the school delayed reporting the official designation until 1920.
When he graduated from NYU in 1916, Reece continued on at the school as Assistant
Secretary and Instructor through 1917. After the United States entered World War I,
Reece took a leave of absence from his post to enlist in the army. Once his service ended
in 1919, he returned to NYU to serve a brief term as Director of the School of Business. 15
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Our company commander, well, ain’t he a fine fellow!
Europe maintained a precarious peace during the first years of the twentieth
century. Years of economic competition, a surge in nationalism, and a complicated
system of alliances kept many European nations cautiously aware of their neighbors. On
June 28, 1914, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist upset
this delicate balance and became the catalyst for war. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire
declared war on Serbia, alliances among Russia, Germany, Britain, and France drew most
of Europe into the conflict.
The war that most assumed would end quickly turned into an impasse that lasted
three years. New technology and weapons made this war more deadly than any previous.
Following the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the Sussex in 1916, President
Woodrow Wilson considered calling for American entrance into the war. In February
1917, Wilson received a copy of a telegram that Britain intercepted from the German
foreign minister, Zimmerman, that promised Mexico the territory in the Southwest that
had been ceded to the United States if Mexico entered the war on the side of Germany.
The telegram, combined with the March 1917 revolution in Russia, removed the last
obstacle to American participation. Wilson appealed to Congress to declare war on
Germany, and the United States officially entered World War I on April 6, 1917.
America then faced the challenge of mobilizing an economy, the population, and a large
army. Because of the immediate need for officers, the Army rushed many through
training in the Plattsburg style. The training was very basic, and troops did not always
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1955 (Doctor of Laws). Incidentally, Tusculum College misspelled Reece’s name in a letter commending
his military and congressional record.
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get to finish training because of bad weather or lack of supplies.

16

Most of the soldiers

arrived unprepared for the battles to come. Both soldiers and leaders had to learn “on the
17

job,” at the risk of high casualties.

Reece followed in the footsteps of his older brothers as the United States entered
the world conflict. On April 24, 1917, eighteen days after the United States officially
declared war, he enrolled into the Plattsburg Reserve Officers Training Camp in New
York. At twenty-seven, he weighed only 135 pounds and measured five-feet-nine-inches
tall. At his graduation from training on August 10, 1917, Reece took an oath as 2 nd
18

Lieutenant, Infantry Section, Officers Reserve Corp.

In September, he received orders

th

that assigned him to the Rainbow Division, 166 Infantry, Company A, under command
of Major General Mann. The Rainbow Division deployed the following month to serve
with the American Expeditionary Force in Europe.
Reece’s keepsakes from the war reflect both his hurried training and his lack of
experience. Among the tokens that survived were booklets issued by the army on visual
signaling and the role of a Platoon Commander. The latter included important questions
a commander should ask himself before taking over a trench, before an attack, and after
gaining the objective of an attack. The necessity of this guide reflected the absence of
combat time for officers and troops. One of the more interesting booklets was a personal
notebook that Reece kept with military figures, lists of officers, times, and a personal
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note of caution: “Do not deficate (sic) around kitchen.”

19

He remained with the 166

th

nd

Infantry throughout 1917 and into 1918 when they entered the front on February 22 .
th

nd

st

He then transferred to the 26 Division, 102 Infantry on May 1 and continued as part
of their offensive until the war’s end.
Reece dedicated himself to both the military struggle and his men. A June patrol
order from the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, 102nd Infantry, ordered Reece to
command an exploring patrol into enemy territory in order to locate an enemy
observation post and take prisoners, but his first true experience in battle came at AisneMarne on July 18-26, 1918. His combat experience grew as General Pershing led
American troops, including Reece, at St. Mihiel from September 12-16 in an attempt to
drive the Germans away from Verdun. Before they could succeed, the Allied forces
persuaded Pershing to reduce his objectives and turn his attention to the Meuse RiverArgonne Forest region. The drive at St. Mihiel proved less successful than Pershing had
hoped, but the troops learned much about war on the Western Front.20 Reece earned the
nickname “Pop” among Company M because of the way he tended to look after them.
One report stated that after fighting at St. Mihiel, Reece roused his men for a return to the
front with “Men, we are making history. Forward!” They demonstrated their fatigue
with the war with responses of “The hell with history!” and “Go swipe us some chow,
Pop.”21
The Allied forces made a massive assault at the Meuse-Argonne front that became
the decisive battle of the war. The delay in transporting weapons and soldiers to the front
19
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caused fighting to stalemate, inflamed by General Pershing’s insistence that the American
troops remain separate from those of the other Allied forces. The troops’ dependence on
the French for supplies and weapons, however, forced Pershing to finally agree to
officially serve under Marshall Petain. After recapturing Verdun, the German forces
withdrew to their second lines of defense. The job of attaining a key sector, Hill 360, fell
to the 26th Division on October 24th. Woods covered the top of the hill, and remnants of
trees destroyed by battle shadowed its slopes. German troops dug into pillboxes and
trenches and continually rained heavy shells on the road leading to this hill, giving the
area the nickname “Death Valley.” American troops fighting from shell holes slowly
gained the slopes of the hill, with heavy casualties. The battle raged during daylight, and
troops attempted to recover their wounded under cover of dusk. The German flares and
subsequent machine guns increased the difficulty of the rescues.22
On October 27th, the 102 nd Infantry received a handwritten field order from
headquarters to gain possession of Hill #360 in Bois d’Ormont after an artillery
preparation against German forces. Reece and his men faced a hidden danger during this
assault. Germany first used gas attacks on April 22, 1915, on an unprepared French and
British military. Britain’s retaliation caused Germany to develop a more toxic gas in the
form of a liquid poison that could penetrate clothing. This mustard gas remained active
for weeks on the ground or on bushes, and Allied forces had to be careful when they
advanced. On October 12th, the Germans began a thirty-four hour bombing of Bois
d’Ormont with mustard gas shells. Reece and his men most likely suffered exposure to
remaining traces of this gas. Reece led the offensive to the crest of the hill, but bursting
22
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shells threw him to the ground twice and knocked him unconscious. When he regained
consciousness, he reorganized his command and held firm to his position. He braved the
machine gun fire several times to crawl in advance of the Allied front line on order to
rescue wounded men hiding in shell holes. The strength of the German entrenchment and
its intense artillery fire finally forced the army to issue an order to draw back despite their
advance.23
Reece’s actions during this assault earned him the Distinguished Service Cross,
the Distinguished Service Medal, the Croix de Guerre with Palm, and citations from
Marshall Petain and the Division Brigade and Regimental Commanders. Marshall Petain
described Reece as “an officer of great bravery . . . He gave proof of the finest devotion
by going to look for the wounded of his Company left between the lines.” The fighting
temporarily placed him in command of the 3rd Battalion, which the commendation for the
Distinguished Service Medal described as “a task of great difficulty” because the
battalion became disorganized with high casualties. Despite these difficulties Reece
“displayed marked ability and determination in reorganizing his command and moulding
(sic) it into a good fighting unit, able under his leadership to achieve valuable results.”
th

He also received a commendation from the Major General of the 26 Division, who
entered Reece’s name and actions in the record of The Yankee Division. Reece retained
command of the 3rd Battalion through the end of the war.24
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The Armistice designated November 11, 1918, as the end of fighting in Europe.
Many in the military, however, lacked confidence in this agreement. Reece received
th

orders on November 10 to take his men “over the top”—out of the trenches toward
enemy lines—at 9:15 the next morning. Rumors of the armistice, to take place at 11:00
that morning, made him hesitate leading his men to possible death. He thus faced the
dilemma of risking the lives of his men or openly defying a military order, an act that
could have resulted in a court martial if rumors of the armistice proved false. Reece’s
solution entailed telling his men to go over the top but to find the nearest shell-hole and
stay there for the next hour and forty-five minutes. Reece spent that time wondering if he
would still be court-martialed for failing to take his objective. At the designated time,
both sides laid down their arms, and Reece and his men survived without loss of life or
honor.25
Reece’s reputation extended past his commanders to his fellow troops. After
fighting in the Argonne Forest, Sergeant Ramsay wrote to his brother Jack that “our
company commander, well, ain’t he a fine fellow! Gosh! Jack he is a prince. He takes
such great pains in his men. When we went over the top the last time, he was right there
with a bayonet and rifle, and I said to myself the first Dutchman that gets him does not go
back to tell about it.”26 The loyalty that Reece inspired in his men lasted long after the
war. When he decided to run for a congressional seat, the surviving men from his
company submitted a letter to be used in publication. They described Reece as “like a
father to us . . . a great fellow.” They cited both his bravery and his loyalty as
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characteristics that set Reece apart from other candidates for office.

27

Reece reportedly

never cursed at the men he led and told them that he would rather resign his commission
than speak to them in the manner other officers spoke to him.

28

Reece maintained a degree of modesty about his specific actions during the war.
Although his military record did appear in most of his election propaganda, Reece
omitted any exceptional emphasis on his actions. An interviewer in the early 1920s
pointed out that Reece maintained the honor of being the only known soldier at that time
to have received the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and
the Croix de Guerre with Palm. “A fellow don’t deserve a medal for doing something
anybody would do under the circumstances,” Reece reasoned. At another interview, he
maintained the same analysis of his actions. “That wasn’t anything so very unusual . . .
You didn’t see it happen every day, but you did see it once in a while. The concussion of
a bursting shell would simply knock a man over . . . Then he’d get up and start again.”
The leadership experience Reece gained during World War I and his ability to place his
actions in the greater context of the war proved invaluable to Reece in his congressional
29

service and later appealed to top men in the Republican Party.

Demobilization of troops signaled a new problem for the American government.
For many soldiers, morale became a problem because of long delays before they could
return home. After unsuccessful attempts with drills and sports contests, the army
offered to provide instruction to those wanting to learn basic skills, such as reading and
writing, as well as subjects ranging from elementary grades to college level.
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Approximately one and a half million troops took advantage of this by enrolling in
courses at universities in both Britain and France while still on duty with their units.

30

Reece capitalized on this opportunity and headed to the University of London
School of Economics in March 1919. The journey itself proved somewhat precarious,
evidenced by Reece’s handwritten memo to the Board on Claims and Lost Personal
Property at the end of April for lost items, including a uniform, shoes, boots, bed roll,
blankets, etc. totaling $263.31 Reece secured a pass allowing him to travel at his own
expense outside the university and visited much of Britain. This permitted him to see the
effects of the war on Britain’s people and countryside.
Following the armistice, the American military placed a temporary halt on all
promotions. While in London, Reece asked his former commander Colonel Lewis about
the status of his promotion based on his actions at Bois d’Ormont and Lewis’
recommendation letter. In a prompt response, Lewis wrote a letter from Paris describing
Reece as “a gentleman of the highest character . . . As regimental commander it was my
intention at the first opportunity to recommend Lieut. Reece for promotion to Captain and
later to Major.” The war’s end and Lewis’ absence from the division prevented him from
following through with his intention. Lewis added that “I consider Lt. Reece to have
been deprived of well won promotion.”32 Despite his commendable military record,
Reece never received another promotion while on active duty.
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After more than a year abroad with the army, Reece finally returned home. On
June 23, 1919, special orders relieved him from duty and ordered him to proceed to Brest,
France, as the Port of Embarkation for return to the United States. Keeping in line with
progressive ideals, the camp hospital certified Reece “free from vermin of any sort and
all Venereal and Infectious Diseases,” and allowed him to proceed to Camp Dix, New
Jersey. On July 26th, he wrote the Commanding General to request a formal discharge
from the military in order to assume a position at NYU as director of one of its schools.
He explained that remaining in active service would force him to “assume financial and
professional risks” that he preferred to avoid. He offered to remain on the discharged list
th

of officers or to go into the Reserve Corps. Two days later the 50 Infantry accepted his
recommendation and honorably discharged Reece from Camp Dix and the army on
August 16, 1919.33
Reece maintained his affiliation with the military through the next ten years. On
May 27, 1924, the Adjutant General appointed him Major, Staff Specialist of the Officers
Reserve Corp of the Army of the United States for the duration of five years. The next
March, he received appointment as Lieutenant Colonel, Specialist in the Army, to enter
34

active duty when specially ordered.

More than six years after the end of hostilities,

Reece finally received his promotion.
Ten Years in Congress is Long Enough for Any Man
One main party dictated the politics of most southern states after the Civil War.
Once the Democratic Party overthrew Reconstruction governments, it presented a solid
33
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front to the nation on most issues, especially those regarding race. According to historian
V.O. Key in Southern Politics in State and Nation, the South may not have been a very
important region in national politics, but politics were very important in the South. With
one-party dominance, the primary election became the main contest in the southern states
because the party nominee rarely faced opposition in the November election. In Dixie
Demagogues, the authors described the primary election as an entertainment and “an
exchange of personalities in which the pot calls the kettle black.” Within the Democratic
Party, rival factions fought for the nomination on local levels and sought the support of
35

the regional political boss.

Tennessee followed this political model of the South with one important
exception. The Democratic Party dominated the central and western parts of the state in
the years after the Civil War, but the eastern part of the state remained loyal to the
Republican Party both during and after the war. E.H. Crump of Memphis emerged
during the first half of the twentieth century as the local Democratic political boss, and as
a result of the limited number of Republicans in the state, he often garnered enough
support from his district and those surrounding it to elect his favored candidate into state
office. An informal agreement between the Republican and Democratic leaders of the
state allowed East Tennessee elections to proceed unhindered by the Democratic Party in
return for little or no opposition from Republicans in the senatorial and gubernatorial
campaigns. This permitted East Tennesseans to elect Republicans from the First and
Second Districts to the United States House of Representatives on a consistent basis. The
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political scientist William C. Havard characterized Tennessee politics as a double one36

party state.

After he left Fort Dix, Reece returned to serve as Director of the School of
Business at NYU and maintained contact with men from the war and his home state.
Reece wrote to Sergeant Alvin C. York to request a meeting when he returned to Butler
in early April and provided York with a copy of his war record as incentive for the
meeting. Reece also corresponded with his former commander, Captain Lewis, to
discuss the actions of the 102 nd Infantry on the day of the armistice. Sustaining his
connection with Tennessee, Reece announced his approval that Sam R. Sells, the
Republican congressman from the First District, insisted that delegates from the district
support General Wood at the National Convention.37
Unhappy with their current Republican representative, a delegation from
Tennessee visited Reece in 1920 asked him to consider running for Congress on the basis
that Sells had agreed to step aside if a war veteran wanted his seat. Shortly thereafter, he
requested a leave of absence from NYU to return to Tennessee. This move seemed
uncharacteristic for a person who had spent his life in academia, but in later interviews
Reece disclosed that at the age of thirteen he told his brother Jim that he had decided to
go into public office. He wanted to help people, but he had to wait for the opportune
moment to enter the political sphere. This moment came in 1920. After a local
newspaper announced Reece’s candidacy in the primary for the Republican nomination
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for the First Congressional District seat in the House of Representatives, tempers flared
between Sells and Reece. When the two met to discuss their candidacy, Sells denied
stating he would resign his seat. He then reportedly looked at Reece, and asked, “Reece,
who are you? You haven’t any chance to win against me.”38
The primary elections in East Tennessee involved heated campaigns for the few
positions of power within the state left to Republicans. In 1920, when Reece decided to
campaign for the representative seat from the First District, Sam R. Sells had occupied
the position for ten years. Playing off the report that Sells would step down if a real
soldier desired his seat, Reece supporters touted his military record, recapped the actions
that won him many medals, and used a snapshot of Reece in uniform as his campaign
portrait. When Sells denied making the statement and refused to withdraw from the
primary, Reece’s supporters began to attack Sells’ legislative record and his credibility.
In a sworn statement published in local newspapers, Reece accused Sells of telling Reece
that he would pick his own successor to office and it would not be Reece. According to
the statement, Sells declared that no man could break his organization and his eventual
retirement from office did not mean a political enemy would succeed him.

39

The contest between Sells and Reece presented the first challenge to a primary
nomination and the first real election campaign in a number of years. Reece stated he did
not want to run at first, but after hearing that Sells would not run if a soldier entered the
primary, he acquiesced. After local papers printed a number of attacks against Sells for
his promise to step aside for a real soldier, he acknowledged the comment but stipulated
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that at the time he had a Major Caleb Hathaway in mind as his successor. Sells informed
40

Reece that a candidate needed more than simply a military record to qualify for office.

Sells’ decision to remain in the race for the primary nomination prompted a new
wave of attacks against his suitability for office. A large circular distributed to residents
of Greeneville, Tennessee, listed a number of reasons why Sells should not be the choice
of the people. The circular reminded residents that Sells’ position as a manufacturer
meant he would not vote for the farmer, the laborer, or the poor. It asserted that Sells
lacked a critical understanding of educational issues that Reece, a former teacher,
possessed. One of the most damaging accusations was that Sells made more money
during World War I than he had during his entire life, whereas Reece volunteered to
fight. A campaign pamphlet titled “Can Anything Good Come Out of Sodom” attacked
Sells’ military record, cited court records that showed Sells as having been charged with
public intoxication and disorderly conduct, and accused him of infidelity.41
Reece supporters attacked Sells’ legislative record. They charged him with
selling the people of the First District to General Wood at the Republican National
Convention in Chicago for $8,000 by switching his vote at the last minute. They also
condemned Sells for using public money in the campaign by sending out campaign
materials from his office in Washington with the aid of his clerks rather than volunteers.
Campaign flyers described Sells’ legislative record for the previous ten years as a failure
and claimed Sells missed or was absent for approximately 500 votes. The flyers pointed
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out that Sells continually voted against or missed measures in the interest of the farmer
42

and laborer and hinted that he took money as a purchase for his nomination.

Retaliatory attacks from Sells forced Reece to defend his qualifications for office
and his dedication to the district. Reece used his military record to refute accusations that
he had never voted or paid a poll tax in the district. He claimed his absence was for the
nation’s safety and that such accusations insulted all soldiers. Advertisements reminded
constituents that Reece had no commercial interests to handicap him or divert his
attention and promised Reece would “stay on his job for 365 days in the year.” Reece
described being a congressman as a childhood ambition and vowed to “free the party
from bossism and build up an efficient, just, and successful organization which will have
in mind to preserve only the interests of the people.” The campaign centered more on
attacks against the candidates’ suitability for office rather than issues, but in one speech
Reece touched upon political concerns important to the district. He advocated
improvement in public schools, better pay for teachers, federal aid for public roads, and
rewards for “honest labor.” “Ten years in Congress is long enough for any man,” cried
Reece supporters. Sells failed to bring enough benefits to the district, and the Reece
campaign capitalized on this by attributing it to a length of time in office that had made
Sells negligent to his district. The campaign tactics proved effective, and Reece won the
Republican primary nomination in August, assuring him of the election win in
November.43
During his first year in office, Reece attended a social function that became a
pivotal point in his life. In 1921, the thirty-two-year-old Reece attended a dinner party at
42
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the home of Mr. and Mrs. Eugene Pomeroy in Washington, D.C. There he met Louise D.
Despard Goff, a graduate of The Spence School in New York—an elite elementary and
high school founded by Clara Spence in 1892 for women—who had spent six months
abroad working on a committee for devastated France after World War I. Both would
later admit that neither had wanted to attend the party, but it was the beginning of a
relationship that would last more than forty years. On October 30, 1923, the two married
in what newspapers called the social event of the fall. Reports of the event described
Reece as the “baby member of the House” and Louise as a “successful debutant.” The
Washington Post considered the event “one of the most important of the autumn
weddings.”

44

Reece’s marriage connected him to a Republican family that had firmly
established itself in national politics. Louise’s grandfather, Nathan Goff, Jr., came from a
wealthy West Virginia family. He served in the Army during the Civil War and was
taken prisoner by Confederates. His war experiences helped him gain a strong local
support base for his entrance into politics. Residents of his state referred to him as
“General Goff,” even though he only attained the rank of Major during the war. Goff
maintained friendships with President Rutherford B. Hayes and President William H.
Taft. President Andrew Johnson appointed Goff as United States District Attorney for
West Virginia, a position he held—with one brief respite as Secretary of the Navy under
President James A. Garfield—until President Chester Arthur’s administration forced him
to resign in 1882 because of disagreements with President Arthur.45
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Goff then returned to West Virginia and built up dominance among Republicans
in the state. He ran for congressman in 1882 and served for three terms. He received a
huge family inheritance in 1885, which removed any worries about personal finance. In
1888, friends convinced Goff to run for governor of West Virginia. His ultimate dream
was a Senate seat, but he decided to listen to his friends and won the gubernatorial
election by 110 votes. Democrats contested the election and after a lengthy investigation
seated their own candidate. This loss did not decrease his prominence, and he accepted a
position as a judge of the United States Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial District from
President Benjamin Harrison in 1891. He served in this position until President Taft
urged Goff to run for the United States Senate seat in 1912, a seat he held until his death
in 1920.46
Nathan’s son and Louise’s father, Guy Goff, also built an impressive political
resume. Guy Goff left West Virginia at the age of eighteen to attend Kenyon Military
Academy in Ohio. He then attended Harvard Law School and opened his own practice at
Boston to avoid practicing in his father’s judicial circuit. After he moved to Milwaukee,
he received a 1911 appointment as United States Attorney in Wisconsin from President
Taft. Close family ties between the Taft and Goff families played a role in the
appointment, but Guy Goff also maintained a distance from factional disputes in
Wisconsin politics that appealed to the president. At the end of his term in 1915 he
returned to private law practice and then offered his services to the government at the
outset of World War I. He served with General Pershing as acting Judge Advocate

46

McKinney, Southern Mountain Republicans, 112-122; G. Wayne Smith, Nathan Goff, Jr.: A Biography
with Some Account of Guy Despard Goff and Brazilla Carroll Reece (Charleston: Education Foundation,
Inc., 1959), 207-8, 225, 277-8.

31

General for the AEF from 1919-1920. He then returned to Washington, and in 1921
President William Harding asked him to serve as assistant to the Attorney General.
47

While there, he worked to appoint William Taft as chief justice.

The death of his father and brother forced Guy Goff to return to his home state,
where he continued the political dominance created by his father. West Virginia law
required him to reside in the state in order to administer the estates of his father and
brother. In the process, he became known to a number of influential people. In 1924, he
ran for and won the race for United States Senator from West Virginia. Residents viewed
him as wealthy, experienced in Washington, D.C. politics, a good speaker, and removed
from past West Virginia political frays. He established himself as a conservative voter
and maintained the support of his state, but failing health prevented him from running for
a second term in 1930.48
Guy Goff became a national figure in the Republican Party and maintained a high
degree of animosity towards communism. His views became evident in a series of letters
that he wrote during his service in World War I. In them, Goff wrote numerous passages
about the destruction caused by Bolshevism and its proponents. He remarked that the
“only way to meet Bolshevism is to crush it without the fear of what a noisy minority in
England or America might say. Verily, this is not a tea party, it is neither Boston nor
pink.” The Goff family presented a bound copy of these letters to Reece, indicating the
importance of Goff’s viewpoints to him.49 Between a desire to impress his father-in-law
and the recognition of Goff’s political prowess, Reece most likely thought it wise to
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listen to Goff’s beliefs. Reece already had an aversion to the teachings of communism
from his own war experience. Goff had seen more of the destruction caused by World
War I, and his letters probably intensified Reece’s belief that communism was an
impossible system of government. Reece gained the example of how to channel these
beliefs into an effective political platform.
Reece’s background in finance and economics also influenced his political
philosophy. His later personal business interests enabled him to become sufficiently
wealthy to spend time in a political career that provided only a small income and rooted
him firmly within his home district. This allowed him to garner enough prestige and
support to win his district’s seat for the United States House of Representatives. In order
to understand how Reece translated this local influence into a force that seated him at the
head of the Republican Party, it is important to understand the relationship between the
local elections and Reece’s specific actions during his first years of service in the House.
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Chapter 2
Pass Public Office Around
What He Expects to Do That Counts
Reece’s first term in office indicated an attempt to follow through with campaign
promises to improve conditions in the First District. Reece recognized that the people of
the district would scrutinize his first term since he founded his campaign on his
predecessor’s inability to secure benefits and patronage. He had encouraged the district
to “pass public office around” in 1920, and he hoped to prevent them from wanting to do
so again in 1922. The House assigned him to the Civil Service Reform Committee, the
Committee on Roads, and the Committee on Expenditures in the Treasury Department.
In April 1921 he formally introduced a bill to appropriate money and donate surplus war
materials, including trucks and tankers, to states for use by their highway commissions.
Republican Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas introduced a similar bill in the Senate, and
the two bills merged into the Capper-Reece Road Building Bill. Under its provisions,
Tennessee received $729,000 in machinery for road improvements. President Harding
did not want the money appropriated to states to extend beyond his present
administration, so Reece amended the bill to allow money given to states for highway
construction to extend for only three years, granting Tennessee around $15 million during
that period. Reece called himself a “fanatic” about good roads because of the lack of
good roads in his hometown of Butler.50
As the 1922 primary elections approached, Reece temporarily shifted focus to
secure a second term in office. Opposed by W. B. Ellison, the Johnson City Mayor,
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Reece asked his constituents for another two years in office based on the custom of
allowing a new representative a second term. He quoted Abraham Lincoln’s adage of it
never being a good idea to swap horses in the middle of the stream. Reece achieved the
position of a ranking member on all committees on roads, which he advertised as a great
benefit to his district. Reece also extended his campaign to minorities. In one
advertisement for a speech he made in Johnson City in August 1922, the bottom noted
that space had been provided for colored men and women. His attitude towards
minorities later played a part in his selection to chair the Republican National Committee.
With more than a 12,000 vote majority, Reece defeated his opponent in the primary
election and returned to Washington for another two years.
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In his second term, Reece continued his many efforts to improve the lives and
living conditions of military veterans. Few of Reece’s bills and proposals passed, but he
won the support and vote of veterans for his efforts. In January 1922, at the end of his
first term, Reece announced a bonus bill for veterans to be his first priority. The House
acted on the bill later that month, but members reduced the cash payments and increased
the offers of insurance and home and farm aid in an effort to reduce the amount of initial
revenue needed. In late 1923 he worked to pass a bonus bill so veterans could receive
their bonus before the Christmas holiday, but the president vetoed the bill. Perhaps
recalling the slight in not receiving a promotion at the end of World War I, he introduced
a bill to extend the time frame that Distinguished Service Medals could be given to three
years beyond the approval of the act. Many World War I soldiers enlisted before
reaching the age of eighteen, and law dictated that they had to be issued a dishonorable
51
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discharge. Reece proposed a very popular bill allowing for honorable discharges for
these men based on their service to the country. Reece campaigned for a Veterans
Administration at Mountain Branch Soldiers Hospital in Johnson City, Tennessee, and on
June 6, 1950, the House passed a bill for $650,000 of expansions to the Soldiers Home.
The American Legion thanked Reece for his attempts to stand by service men and women
against “sordid and selfish opposition,” and a campaign pamphlet for veterans described
Reece as “a friend to all veterans of all wars.”52
In addition to his proposed federal legislation, Reece also worked with veterans
on an individual basis. In 1930 Reece supporters sent a mailing to notify veterans of
Reece’s success in getting a bill passed that allowed any veteran with a twenty-five
percent disability to receive a disability allowance without providing service connections.
The mailing included an application for the allowance along with a campaign letter.
Supporters sent another mailing specifically to Spanish-American War veterans with an
application for an increase in pension.53 Reece began a twenty-year correspondence in
1924 with veteran S.C. Slagle of Jonesboro, Tennessee. The initial letters involved minor
issues, such as Slagle’s concern that he could not drive his tractor on the highway
because of possible damage from its weight and its claws. Shortly thereafter, Slagle
became concerned with laws regarding the amount of his veteran’s compensation and its
continuance. Reece assured Slagle that he would stand by him to ensure his continued
compensation and thanked Slagle and his friends for their actions on his behalf during his
1930 campaign. In the later years of the Great Depression, Reece expressed sympathy at
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the closing of Slagle’s mill as a result of competition, illness, and hard times. Reece’s
letters demonstrated a concern for various aspects of the veteran’s lives, not just those
54

concerning legislation.

Reece felt comfortable with his growing command of First District politics and
decided to extend his career in the House. In 1923 Reece had stated he would rather run
unopposed in the primary but recognized the right of anyone to be a candidate. Those
opposed to Reece sought an opponent for the 1924 primary and settled on their former
congressman, Sells. By the middle of March, ten of the twelve county conventions
supported Reece as the Republican candidate, and Sells withdrew from the race. Sells
claimed an offer to be Coolidge’s campaign manager in Tennessee would have created an
embarrassing position if he remained in the contest.55
Shortly thereafter, a Claiborne County resident, Will Jones, announced himself as
a candidate for Reece’s seat. Jones accused Reece of staying in Washington so long
during the sessions that he became a stranger to his home. Reece vehemently denied the
charge and became angered over attacks directed toward his wife and his reportedly
lavish residence in Washington. “My home is on the Watauga at Butler . . . and I pray it
may always be my home,” Reece avowed. He reaffirmed this when he shortly thereafter
purchased his childhood home in Butler and built a house in nearby Johnson City,
Tennessee.56 The hostility of Appalachian voters towards congressmen in Washington
arose less from an aversion to long tenure than from the perception that extended
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residence in the capital caused a representative to neglect the needs of his district. The
residents believed that correspondence only told a portion of the story and that a person
holding political office needed to interact with his constituents to truly understand their
needs. The stress placed on personal interactions often proved an effective tool to
generate hostility among voters and win an election.57
Reece attempted to combat these accusations of neglect by traveling across the
district to speak at rallies, but a sudden accident altered his plans. On July 27th, Reece
and his wife drove from Newport, Tennessee, to a speaking engagement at Tazewell in
Claiborne County. As Reece drew to the side of the road to let another car pass, his car
skidded into a ravine and overturned. Reece and his wife, trapped in the car, had to be
extricated with the help of onlookers. Louise broke her shoulder and Reece, knocked
unconscious, suffered injuries to his face and back that kept him hospitalized until August
13th. With the help of his supporters, Reece won the primary election from the hospital
and carried nine of the twelve counties in the district. The only other candidate in the
November election, an independent, failed to break Reece’s momentum in his endeavor
58

to return to the House.

Reece remained out of front page news during his next term of office but
reappeared as the 1926 elections approached. In August 1925, O.B. Lovette, the
Greeneville Attorney General, and Joel N. Pierce, the Greene County School
Superintendent, announced their candidacy for the Republican primary. Pierce obtained
the support of former Congressman Sells and political leaders in both Knoxville and
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Memphis to exert pressure on voters by demonstrating his statewide appeal. He hoped
this would produce enough support to defeat the Reece machinery. Reece bristled at the
interference of outsiders and accused Pierce of contributing to a drastic increase in the
price of textbooks while serving on the Tennessee Textbooks Commission in 1925. The
campaign soon became two-sided, as Reece and Pierce attacked each other’s credibility.
During the 1926 contest, Pierce became the first person to make a campaign speech in
Reece’s hometown of Butler since 1920.59
Personal problems plagued Reece throughout the campaign but had little effect on
his popularity. In August 1925, Reece’s younger brother Raleigh accepted a position as
science teacher and athletic coach at Rhea County High School in Dayton, Tennessee.
He replaced former teacher John T. Scopes, who lost his job after being charged with
violating the Butler Act by teaching evolution in school. In January 1926, Raleigh
resigned his position in anticipation of dismissal from the school board after an incident
at a party. The school did not release specifics of the incident, described by a local paper
as a prank, but the resignation news appeared in the New York Times. Reece’s health
became an issue and he spent more than two weeks in the hospital during the campaign in
July for an undisclosed illness that his campaign managers attributed to gas attacks he
endured in World War I. Reece’s doctors announced that Reece simply needed to rest in
order to regain his strength. In early September, however, Reece collapsed shortly after
he won the primary and remained in the hospital through the November election. Reports
originally attributed his weakness to physical ramifications from the World War I gas
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attacks, but doctors later discovered symptoms of a goiter and operated on November 8

th

60

at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington.

Reece and his supporters structured their campaign on legislation he had proposed
to benefit his district. One campaign pamphlet advocated his reelection on the basis that
most districts kept a person in office ten years or more. In stark contrast to his 1920
campaign, the pamphlet reasoned, “Why send a new man to Congress who would have to
begin at the foot of the class?” Reece worked in early 1926 to pass a proposed bill
establishing the Smoky Mountain National Park and provided funding for its
development, which earned him significant support in the district even though it did not
officially pass. Supporters reminded constituents of efforts he made in his first three
terms of office to allocate money for better roads and pensions for veterans. Reece won
the primary by more than 6,500 votes, with a majority in all but two counties. Lovette
finished third without carrying any county. Unhappy with the outcome, Pierce supporters
tried to petition the vote, but the GOP primary board declined their request.61
Reece continued his efforts to enact legislation to benefit his district. In
September 1927, he presented a bill to open up West Point to appointees from the
Citizens Military Training Camps to recognize them as a source for regular service
officers. Reece believed the measure would bring the army closer to the people, although
it never came before a vote. Later that year, he proposed a bill that passed the House the
following January to expand the 6th Circuit United States Court. This allowed a
Tennessee judge to be appointed to the court since the state did not have a representative
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on the circuit. He continued his efforts to improve local transportation with his 1928
Good Roads Bill, which provided federal aid in construction of secondary farm-to-market
roads traversed by rural carriers. Both the Farm Bureau and National Association of
Rural Letter Carriers endorsed the measure, which passed with similar measures from
other congressmen.62
Reece became an avid proponent for the creation of a Merchant Marine. In a
March 1928 speech, he appealed to Congress to maintain a Merchant Marine as an
auxiliary to the Navy. Citing the cost of constructing transport ships during World War I,
he lauded the Merchant Marine Act of 1928. Reece stated that although he resided in an
interior state, he knew the importance of a Merchant Marine for the transport of surplus
products to overseas markets. Aside from his support of these bills and proposals, Reece
authored little substantial legislation. In an interview covering his war experiences,
Reece explained his slight legislative record and perhaps his political philosophy when he
stated, “It’s not what a fellow might have done, but what he expects to do that counts.”63
Although Reece failed to gain notice on the legislative floor, he maintained an
active and happy personal life. Presidents Harding, Hoover, and Roosevelt all invited
Reece and his wife to receptions at the White House. His first and only child, Louise
Goff Reece, was born on May 18, 1928, and had the distinction of being the only child
who had both a father and grandfather in Congress at the same time. She later attended
Stephens College, a women’s liberal arts school in Columbia, Missouri. By the age of
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nineteen, she earned her pilot’s license and flew her father to numerous campaign
meetings and conventions. She named her plane—a graduation gift from her parents—
“The Flying Elephant” and painted a white elephant and “Vote Republican” on the side.
Louise continued her family’s political legacy in college when she and a friend organized
a pre-voting age political group to help the Republican candidate from Missouri get
elected to Congress.64
The Entire Proposition Originated in Red Russia
Before the First District elected Reece to Washington, Congress began the debate
over what to do with the hydroelectric and nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. The
area of Muscle Shoals extended thirty-seven miles along the Tennessee River in northern
Alabama, and the history of efforts to develop the area stretched as far back as 1824
when Secretary of War John Calhoun requested a survey of the area for military
purposes. Over the next several years, the federal government surveyed and worked to
improve navigation of the region. Congress authorized the Muscle Shoals Power
Company to develop Muscle Shoals for power and navigation in 1899, but the company
never took advantage of the privilege. In 1907, the Muscle Shoals Hydro-Electric Power
Company, a subsidiary of the Alabama Power Company, submitted a proposal to build
three dams at Muscle Shoals to develop power. In a 1909 report, a special board of army
engineers expressed disapproval of the proposal because they believed it involved a
government subsidy in an endeavor not commercially practical and beyond the
government’s responsibility to develop waterways.65
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World War I intensified the need to resolve the issue of who would develop
Muscle Shoals for transportation and power. The Army Chief of Engineers supported a
new proposal from the Muscle Shoals Hydro-Electric Power Company in 1914, but the
National Defense Act of 1916 suspended negotiations between the two. The Defense Act
authorized construction of nitrate plants to lessen the country’s dependence on Chilean
nitrates and appropriated twenty million dollars for construction. It did so because one of
the major types of explosives used during World War I contained nitrate, and command
of the seas by another nation would have greatly hindered production of explosives in the
United States. In July 1916 the Muscle Shoals Association formed at Nashville,
Tennessee, to promote Muscle Shoals as a location for power, navigation, and fertilizer
development. In 1917 a committee appointed by President Wilson determined water
power to be the best method for developing nitrates, and that September the president
authorized the construction of Nitrate Plants One and Two at Muscle Shoals. The
government finished building both plants in 1918, the same year Europe and the United
States signed the Armistice.66
World War I ended before the plants could be of great use to the government,
raising the question of what to do with the nitrate plants that cost more than $100 million
to build. President Wilson originally intended to use the plants for government
production of nitrates for explosives during war and production of nitrates for fertilizer
during peacetime. The latter idea became very popular among farmers and agricultural
groups as construction began on Dam Two, also called Wilson Dam in honor of the
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president. Unable to solicit private interests for operation of the nitrate plants, Nitrate
Director A.G. Glasgow recommended the Wadsworth-Kahn bill for government
operation of Muscle Shoals. The Senate passed the bill in May 1920, but the House
adjourned before considering it. By April of the next year, a lack of funds forced a halt to
construction of Wilson Dam.67
Henry Ford presented the first hope for private operation of the facilities and with
it the first in a long series of battles over Muscle Shoals. According to the historian
Thomas McCraw, the Ford name in the 1920’s was “magic.” His 1921 offer to lease the
plants from the government for 100 years stipulated that the government had to complete
Wilson Dam. Other than a proposal to use Plant Two to produce nitrates for national
defense and cheap fertilizer, his offer was vague and did not contain any binding
provisions. The only promise Ford made involved building a city in the Muscle Shoals
district that would become a great industrial center, prompting land speculation in the
area. The same year, the Alabama Power Company submitted the only other proposal for
private operation of the facilities. In 1922 both the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
the House Military Affairs Committee visited the area. The Senate agreed on a bill
presented by Senator George Norris of Nebraska that provided money for army engineers
to complete work on Wilson Dam. The House accepted the bill but wanted to delay the
availability of funds until later in the year. By June, the House Military Affairs
Committee reported the Ford bid via the McKenzie Bill, but Congress adjourned before
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the Senate voted. The next month the Senate Committee on Agriculture recommended
68

rejecting all bids to operate Muscle Shoals.

Reece realized the implications of the Muscle Shoals debate for his district and
positioned himself to be a central part of the process. At the beginning of his second term
in office, he had declined a position on the House Appropriations Committee to serve on
the House Military Affairs Committee. Reece recognized that construction of dams in
the Muscle Shoals area and river system would have a major impact on power supply for
the Tennessee Valley. Without becoming an integral part of the discussion process, he
would be prevented from guiding the project to the benefit of his district and the resultant
political support from his district. The debate over the Ford offer continued into 1923,
and Reece, an advocate of the Ford bill, stated that it appeared Ford’s offer would be
accepted barring any better offer with a fertilizer guarantee. Reece never gave exact
reasons as to why he supported Ford so vehemently, but it is likely that he felt that private
operation would be more beneficial and feared that government operation lent itself too
closely to communism. His father-in-law’s aversion to communism may also have
influenced his actions. Fearful of Ford’s potential profit and citing the Water Power Act,
the Tennessee Electric Power Company, Memphis Power and Light Company, and the
Alabama Power Company presented an offer to lease the facilities early in 1924. Their
offer made little headway because Reece used his weight in the Military Affairs
Committee to influence the House to pass the McKenzie bill in March 1924.69
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Congress seemed to be making progress in the Muscle Shoals debate, but a series
of setbacks forced continued debate for many more years. When the House bill reached
the Senate, the Senate Committee on Agriculture amended it by removing Ford’s offer in
favor of a federal power corporation operating Muscle Shoals. By October 1924, Ford
tired of the delay and changes and withdrew his entire offer. Senator Norris, a member of
the Committee on Agriculture, presented an amended bill to the Senate, but the measure
failed to garner enough support to pass. While Norris worked to amend the McKenzie
bill, Senator Underwood presented a substitute offer. Approved by President Coolidge,
the new bill allowed the Secretary of War to lease Muscle Shoals for not longer than fifty
years and stipulated that a government corporation would operate it with production
requirements for fertilizer and nitrogen if no suitable lessee could be found before 1925.
The Underwood bill passed the Senate but emerged from the House a much weaker bill,
which allowed Norris to kill it with a filibuster. Following a 1925 recommendation of the
House, Coolidge appointed a committee to determine the best solution to produce
nitrates. The committee strongly recommended private operation.70
With the completion of the Wilson Dam in 1926, the foremost question shifted
from nitrate and fertilizer production to the development of power. Building the dam
created a power source, even if it was not the main intent of the dam, and Norris viewed
it as an “economic sin” and a waste of resources not to use the power. The option of
selling the power wholesale to private companies for distribution allowed companies to
profit from the development of public-owned resources. At the end of World War I,
public disfavor of utility companies grew because utilities enacted rate increases at a time
70
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when other businesses improved service and lowered prices. In response, utilities created
public relations companies to combat the negative image promoted by anti-utility groups.
Utility magnate Samuel Insull created the Illinois Public Utility Information Committee,
soon followed by others such as the National Electric Light Association (NELA).71
A 1926 joint congressional committee failed to reach a consensus on Muscle
Shoals as various companies, including the American Cyanamid Company, proposed bids
to lease the facilities. NELA lobbyists quietly tried to support a proposal by the Alabama
Power Company to lease Muscle Shoals, but when the proposal became publicized,
Norris tried to prove that the Alabama Power Company belonged to a huge power trust
managed by General Electric—one of Insull’s companies. Norris argued that the
government should expand Muscle Shoals rather than lease it to fight this power trust.
Reece opposed the American Cyanamid Company bid and authored his own bill to lease
Muscle Shoals to Farmers’ Federated Fertilizer Corporation for power distribution. The
bill also allowed for the production of fertilizer to be sold to farmers at absolute cost
through a board composed solely of farm representatives who determined what made up
the cost. He believed the cost would have been ten to fifteen dollars per ton lower than
the current rate. The Military Affairs Committee disagreed and rejected both the Reece
bill and the Cyanamid bid, the last major private offer.72
With the remaining private offer gone, Norris appeared to have the best solution
for operation of Muscle Shoals. In late 1927, Norris presented a compromise plan in
which the Secretary of Agriculture operated Muscle Shoals for power production and
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fertilizer research while any surplus power produced in the process would be distributed
to the public. The Senate passed the measure in March 1928, but in May the House
Military Affairs Committee amended the Norris bill to change the operator of Muscle
Shoals from the Secretary of Agriculture to the Muscle Shoals Corporation of the United
States. The corporation consisted of three members appointed by the president. The
amended bill also included two additional sections that allocated for the construction of
Cove Creek Dam across the Clinch River, twenty miles northwest of Knoxville,
Tennessee. The Military Affairs Committee intended the Dam to produce 200,000
73

horsepower and to provide navigation channels.

The Cove Creek Dam provisions became a major point of contention in Congress.
Kenneth McKellar, the Democratic senator from Memphis, Tennessee, became the first
senator to be elected by popular vote in Tennessee in 1917. Previously, the state
legislature determined senators, and McKellar thanked his voters by dedicating his career
to handing out patronage. He also understood that if he broke with the Crump machine
he would need the support base he could generate from patronage appointments,
especially those that the TVA would generate. McKellar expected that he would be able
to name the Tennessee employees, which would be a blessing since the Republican
administration allowed for few patronage opportunities for Democrats. He predicted low
current rates, a manufacturing boom, and cheap fertilizer for the Tennessee Valley with
government operation.74
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McKellar attempted a filibuster to remove construction of Cove Creek Dam from
the bill. He argued that neither senator from Tennessee asked for the measure because
they realized it allowed the federal government to exercise eminent domain to condemn
the land necessary for construction. McKeller stated the federal government did not have
the right to take property, which would have amounted to the size of an entire county,
from the state. When another senator pointed out the potential compensation, navigable
waterway, and reservoir that would be constructed at government expense, McKellar
responded that Tennessee did not consent to the seizure of their land. Norris added that
only Reece wanted the dam constructed. In spite of the disagreements over Cove Creek,
the measure passed both the House and Senate and waited only for President Coolidge’s
signature to enact the legislation. Coolidge allowed Congress to adjourn before he signed
the bill, and his pocket veto forced the Muscle Shoals debate to continue into the next
presidency.75
The 1928 presidential election brought out a host of candidates after Coolidge
decided to abstain from seeking the Republican nomination. Reece, with no opposition
announced by March 1928 in his own primary, devoted his energy to the 1928
presidential race. Herbert Hoover emerged as the strongest Republican candidate, but
opposition came from within the party in the form of “favorite son” candidates that hoped
to gain control of enough delegates to stop the Hoover movement. Reece’s father-in-law
had contemplated seeking the Republican nomination since January, and in April Senator
Goff formally announced his candidacy at the behest of many West Virginia delegates in
Congress and what he described as other “prominent persons.” Hoover assumed that
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West Virginia delegates would go uninstructed to the national convention and neglected
to enter the West Virginia primary. Goff won by a wide margin and insisted that he was
a “bona fide candidate” and not a tool of any other candidate. Reece, however, supported
Hoover for the presidential nomination. He asserted he did not take the senator’s race
seriously and viewed his candidacy as one of the favorite son movements designed to
take away momentum from Hoover. In addition, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Robert A.
Taft, and James R. Garfield—all sons of former presidents—spoke on behalf of Hoover.
Taft, a Goff family friend and close personal friend of Reece, most likely influenced
76

Reece’s decision to support Hoover as well.

Hoover’s campaign committee took advantage of Reece’s support and actively
sought his help in the campaign. The Ohio Hoover Committee telegrammed Reece on
April 18, 1928, to ask for a handwritten response in 100 words or less why he supported
Hoover. Reece replied that Hoover possessed qualifications of training and experience to
carry out the policies of Coolidge and that Hoover maintained integrity that would allow
him to withstand attacks by Democrats. Hoover’s campaign committee requested that
Reece visit Ohio to make three speeches for Hoover since many of Reece’s fellow
th

veterans from the 166 Infantry Rainbow Division lived in Ohio. Rumors spread that
Hoover wanted Reece to succeed James W. Good as Secretary of War, but Reece did not
promote the idea. With the support of the Tennessee Republican Convention, Reece
easily won the 1928 primary and election, and Hoover ascended to the presidency.77
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The new year brought with it a new round of debates over the operation of Muscle
Shoals. The American Cyanamid Company again proposed leasing the facilities in a bill
sponsored by Reece. Reece excluded the chairman and any members opposed to the bill
in a “rump” meeting of the Military Affairs Committee and favorably reported the bill.
His report contained amendments to the original Cyanamid bill that guaranteed fertilizer
production, limited the profit on fertilizer operations, and also included construction of
Cove Creek Dam. Around the same time, the Federal Trade Commission began an
investigation of utility companies that revealed graft and payoffs, which damaged any
hopes for acceptance of the Cyanamid bill. Hoover still wanted to lease the power and
fertilizer capabilities, but Norris reintroduced his resolution for government operation.
The Senate approved Norris’ bill in April 1930.78
The Republican-dominated House Military Affairs Committee appointed a
subcommittee headed by Reece to draft an alternative to the Norris bill. In an effort to
carry out Hoover’s wishes, the Reece Bill allowed the president to appoint a three-person
committee to lease the property for fifty years. The bill contained a number of
stipulations regarding the lease: a requirement to manufacture commercial fertilizer; a
limit of eight percent profit on fertilizer operations; prohibition against selling surplus
power to private power companies until the demand of local municipalities and public
agencies in the Muscle Shoals area had been met; the construction of Cove Creek Dam;
and separate leases of the power and nitrate plants. Republicans influenced the House to
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accept the Reece Bill in late May 1930. The opposing Reese and Norris Bills forced a
joint congressional meeting to work out the deadlock.

79

The conflict over Muscle Shoals promoted hostilities between Norris and Reece.
Norris and his supporters in the Senate charged Reece with being a mouthpiece for
Hoover. Reece attempted to further discredit the Norris Bill by generating fear that
would lessen its popular support. He asserted that it contained un-American ideas spread
by Norris “and his small group of radicals,” and that “the entire proposition originated in
Red Russia.” He further added that Bolsheviks spent millions to promote government
competition with private industry. He reminded the Norris supporters that the Russian
government owned all power plants and farms in that country. The NELA also
characterized government ownership as “Bolshevistic, socialistic, inefficient, and
generally odious.” Reece contended that his bill focused on helping farmers. When he
returned to Tennessee to campaign for the 1930 primary, Reece realized that the Muscle
Shoals issue threatened his hopes of an easy victory. 80
A Man in Public Life Must Expect Defeat
The ten-year debate in Congress over Muscle Shoals proved to be a valuable
weapon for Reece opponents. As late as May 1930, one local newspaper predicted no
opposition for Reece as a result of his long record in Congress and his political strength.
The next month, Republican Sam W. Price, a local attorney, announced his candidacy in
the Republican primary on the platform of government ownership of waterpower projects
like Muscle Shoals. Price advertised his campaign slogan as: “I am in favor of giving
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every man a fair chance, but surely ten years is time enough for experimenting.” Reece’s
1920 campaign to oust Sells by declaring ten years long enough for any man in Congress
came back to haunt him. In 1928 Reece declared that development of Tennessee hinged
on increased farm production through avenues such as cheaper fertilizer production via
Muscle Shoals, construction of rural highways, and better school systems. Two of these
elements became vital in the election results.81
During the summer campaign Reece fought a heated battle to defend his actions
in Congress on the Muscle Shoals issue. The Norris bill promised $45,000,000 in federal
money to the area for Cove Creek, and some constituents blamed Reece for delaying the
project with his alternate bill. The irony of their bitterness towards Reece lay in the fact
that Cove Creek Dam did not fall within Reece’s First District, but in the Second District.
By 1930, the Great Depression heightened interest in the power industry and desire for
economic relief through public works. Although the poverty of East Tennessee made the
depression barely noticeable in its early years, constituents saw the potential opportunity
of large-scale construction and development of power to restore prosperity to their area.
Price accused Reece of having nothing to do with the House bill and voting against
Muscle Shoals in alliance with the power trust. One local article charged Reece with
trying to destroy the Norris bill of government operation based on several rumors
regarding his father-in-law. The article reported speculations that Goff feared money
leaving his home state, that he held stock in American Cyanamid Company, and that he
expected a diplomatic post if Reece killed the proposal. Reece defended his actions with
assertions that he first introduced the construction of Cove Creek Dam and only his bill
81
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guaranteed fertilizer production. He further added that government owned power plants
would be non-taxable, forcing farmers to make up the property tax loss, and asserted that
the propaganda being spread against him had originated in Soviet Russia.

82

The campaign in East Tennessee soon gained national attention. The New York
Times summarized the contest in an article titled “East Tennessee Has Hot Election
Ahead.” Acknowledging that East Tennesseans tended to take state and local politics
more seriously than national elections, the paper agreed that Reece’s vote against the
Norris compromise created bitterness towards Reece. The article attributed much of the
blame placed on Reece to bygone days of prosperity during the Coolidge administration.
Reece reiterated his position that Hoover supported his bill and that only radicals and
Democrats supported the bill conceived in Russia. This last remark produced a sharp
reprimand against Reece from one of his constituents in a local editorial for labeling
Norris’ bill as socialistic. Even with the heated campaign, the New York Times still
expected Reece to win the primary.83
Reece became concerned as the election drew nearer and sought help from his
th

Republican allies. On June 4 John Tilson, the Republican majority leader in Congress,
sent Reece a letter for publication that lauded his actions on Muscle Shoals as the only
practical measure and called an attack on Reece’s bill an attack on the Republican Party.
The letter did not convince all of his constituents of his dedication to the Muscle Shoals
project, evidenced by an article that appeared in the LaFollette Press on June 19th calling
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Reece another “Benedict Arnold” and a “Judas to be dispised (sic).” In July President
Hoover stepped in with a personal letter to Reece that applauded his efforts on Muscle
Shoals and called the Reece bill “the only one that will secure an advancement of this
development in the interest of the people of Tennessee.” Hoover stated that the House
would not pass the Senate plan, and if it did pass Hoover promised to veto it. Tilson
included a personal note with Hoover’s endorsement that advised Reece to wait until
after the Senate adjourned session to publish the letter to prevent some of the senators
and congressmen from attacking both Hoover and Reece.84
Once the Hoover letter became public knowledge, the campaign and the Muscle
Shoals issue took on heightened importance. In 1925 President Coolidge declared that
the issue had grown out of proportion with its actual importance. By 1930 the Senate
attempted to force Reece’s hand when some members threatened to block Reece’s bill on
appropriations for improvements to the Soldier’s Home in Johnson City unless he
approved the Norris bill. Reece then charged Senator McKellar with trying to force
socialism on the government as a means to dispose of Muscle Shoals. In response
McKellar interpreted Hoover’s endorsement of Reece as favoring the power interests
over the people. Reece claimed to be startled by Hoover’s letter because presidents
rarely intervened in elections and often regretted it when they did. The national press
debated the correctness of the president interfering in a local primary but continued to
reprint the letter and printed a “thank you” letter from Reece. The push from his
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Republican allies turned out to be enough for Reece to win the party nomination over
Price in August with eight of twelve counties.

85

Reece’s primary election win gave him confidence he would retain his
congressional seat, but he soon found himself in another fight to maintain control in his
district. His Republican opponent, Sam W. Price, claimed the party nomination for
himself amid accusations of fraud and corruption in voting. He charged Reece supporters
with changing actual totals in favor of Reece between the poll closings and the official
count and refused to concede defeat. One week later he announced his candidacy in the
November elections as an independent candidate. Reece responded by calling Price a
bolter from the party and pointed out that independent candidates rarely won elections.
He also stated that Price did not bring official charges with the party because Price knew
that his own wrong-doings would be brought to light. On October 17th, Price withdrew
from the race in the interest of party harmony to help the chances of Republican victory
in the state in the 1932 presidential election.86
The Republican unity lasted only a short while before voters dealt a devastating
blow to Reece. Republicans and Democrats opposed to Reece urged O.B. Lovette, the
Republican Attorney General in Greeneville, to oppose Reece in the November election
as an independent based on a platform much the same as Price’s. Since Lovette entered
the race less than two weeks before the election, Reece did not take his campaign
seriously. Reece believed his new opponent would not take it seriously either since
Lovette’s first attempt in 1926 garnered only about 2,000 of the 36,000 votes cast.
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Supporters made a last minute push to encourage votes for Reece, but when the polls
closed, Lovette had defeated the ten-year incumbent. Reece made a futile attempt to
explain his stunning loss. He argued that snow kept many voters in the mountains from
traveling out because they assumed Reece would win. He asserted that more Democrats
lived in urban areas and could vote in higher numbers despite bad weather. Reece found
it hard to accept that his complacency toward his district’s wishes on the TVA power
plants resulted in his loss. His concession speech to Lovette revealed integrity and
perhaps a comment on Price’s primary campaign when he stated that “a man who cannot
accept defeat graciously is not entitled to victory. A man in public life must expect
87

defeat.”

The election outcome symbolized the importance of Muscle Shoals and the power
issue in America. The Washington Post described the November election as a “stupid
vote” by the district and claimed that the Reece bill could have had men already working
in the area. The chairman of the Republican National Committee called the 1930
elections a “crazy quilt” because of anomalies like East Tennessee, where for the first
time the regular nominee for Congress lost in an area that had been Republican since the
nomination of Lincoln. An article in the New York Times considered two nation-wide
principles to be of utmost concern: whether the federal government could operate the
power plant and sell the product in direct competition with privately operated public
utility interests; and the growing political battle between the private utilities—
pejoratively called the Power Trust—and their enemies, which took on a new importance
as it moved from local to state and national elections. The article predicted that the
87
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movement against private utilities would play as major a role in the 1932 presidential
88

campaign as it had in the 1930 elections.

Some Things Are More Honorable Than Being Elected to Office
After his 1930 defeat, Reece continued to work on the Muscle Shoals project
during his lame duck administration. The structure of Congress meant that his session
continued until March 4, 1931, so Reece began work on a new compromise bill in
December 1930. Reece intended to amend Norris’ bill to guarantee fertilizer production
rather than promote government experimentation with production. It allowed the
government to lease the power production with strict controls and stipulated that the
government would construct Cove Creek Dam if no lessee could be found to build it.
The compromise contained four major parts: the government operated the dam and power
generating facilities without the ability to create power transmission lines; the
government leased the nitrate plants for fertilizer production with the encouragement of
cheap fertilizer for agriculture; the government sold surplus power with preference to
states, counties, and municipalities; and a definite provision for the creation of Cove
Creek Dam. Even with Reece’s work on a compromise, Congress still deadlocked at the
end of 1930 over how to come to an acceptable solution.
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The following year brought temporary agreement in Congress regarding Muscle
Shoals. In January 1931 the House conceded its main contention against the Senate plan
and agreed to allow government construction of transmission lines out of the profit
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received from the sale of power. Reece still opposed government construction of
transmission lines but believed there would be so little surplus power that the lines would
not be needed. In consenting to this point, Reece and the House laid the burden on the
Senate to agree to the compromise. By February both the Senate and the House came to
terms with each other at a joint conference committee. Their proposal mandated the
government to find a lessee within one year to operate Muscle Shoals for a fifty year
lease or the government had to operate the nitrate plant itself. It gave the lessee
preference on power produced for manufacture of nitrates and additional power up to
fifteen percent of that used in manufacturing nitrates for other purposes. It also
appropriated for the construction of Cove Creek Dam and created a board of three
managers, appointed by the president, to build power lines and sell power to communities
and other purchasers. The ten-year impasse in Congress over Muscle Shoals finally
seemed to be at an end.90
Reece hoped to secure passage of a Muscle Shoals bill before his term expired.
He and Representative Harry C. Ransley of Pennsylvania initially refused to sign the
compromise. Aware of his district’s strong feelings about the subject, Reece reported he
would reluctantly endorse it as the best possible solution at that time. Hoover, however,
disagreed and vetoed the bill, which many Reece supporters claimed as a vindication for
Reece. In reality, the veto prolonged the controversy over Muscle Shoals and prevented
Reece from claiming credit for resolution of the issue.91
Reece left office with the belief that he had worked for the best interests of his
constituents. The day after Reece’s term expired, Representative Ransley—the same
90
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man who had refused to sign the compromise along with Reece—prepared a speech for
the House that praised Reece’s career and gave him credit for the idea of building Cove
Creek Dam. He believed the constituents of the First District had been misled by
propaganda and a “socialistic phantom,” otherwise they would have realized the many
advantages of the Reece bill for the South. Comparing Reece to Abraham Lincoln,
Ransley described his 1930 loss as a fluke caused by snow-bound Republican voters in
the mountains. As Reece expressed gratitude to his district and state, he asserted he held
no bitterness, for “in this instance I felt honored in defeat. Some things are more
honorable than being elected to office.” He declined acceptance of any position that
might have taken him out of his district and expressed his desire to live at his home
“among my own people who have trusted and honored me and where I have found so
much pleasure in serving.” Reece avowed that the only means by which he would return
to public office would be by the will of the people and not by party appointment.92
Reece’s first ten years in office produced little legislation but left him with a
valuable political lesson. Reece worked hard to secure funding for public buildings and
to build roads in his district, cooperated to build national forests and the Great Smoky
Mountain National Park, and attempted to pass legislation for the benefits of veterans.
This work ensured him local support, and his conservative voting record served him well
until the issue became one of private-versus-public power. Reece then learned one of the
contradictions inherent among Appalachian voters. They opposed government
interference and control unless it brought money to their area, and only then if it did not
bring policies that altered their existing social balance. Reece tested the tactic of labeling
92
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the Norris bill socialistic but learned that in 1930 his district cared more about potential
prosperity for their area than what they considered a foreign threat. Reece remembered
these lessons in his later campaigns. In 1930, however, the people of the First District
decided to heed Reece’s 1920 advice and passed public office around.

61

Chapter 3
Upon Safe Leadership
I Was Duly Elected to Said Office
After his defeat, Reece turned to his father-in-law for political support. Reece
asked Goff to write to Speaker Tilson and request that Tilson to go to President Hoover
or the secretary of war to secure a position for Reece. Goff and Reece believed that
Reece lost the election primarily because he supported the president’s views on the
Norris Bill and felt the president needed to assist Reece. Goff reported that Reece
worked hard to secure pensions for his constituents and to ensure construction of the
Soldier’s Home in Tennessee and therefore deserved recognition. Goff called for
“coordinated leadership in the Republican Party,” which meant a helping hand for his
son-in-law after his defeat.93
The Democratic surge that put Reece out of office allowed his older brother to
enter politics. Joseph, one of the only two Reece children to identify themselves as a
Democrat, received the appointment of Tennessee Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking in July 1931. The appointment came from Gordon Browning, the Democratic
governor who was elected to office in 1930. Joseph also graduated from Carson
Newman College and spent almost thirteen years in educational administration before he
returned to Johnson City to work in the insurance business. Joseph stated he never took
an active part in public politics out of respect for his Republican family. The
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appointment angered many Democrats because they blamed Carroll Reece for the defeat
of the Norris Bill.

94

Reece’s supporters gathered momentum for Reece to enter the 1932 Republican
primary within one year of his return to Tennessee. Lovette knew that Reece maintained
a large support base and realized that since he had campaigned on the Norris Bill, he had
to follow through on getting it approved. He suffered a political setback in January 1932
when President Hoover appointed Reece’s nominations for local postmaster positions.
Shortly thereafter, close to 1,200 Reece supporters met at a Morristown, Tennessee, rally
and formally asked Reece to run for his old House seat. The Tennessee Republican
Convention broke into chaos as Reece received their official recommendation. Lovette
supporters responded with a walk-out in an attempt to conduct their own simultaneous
meeting.95
The 1932 primary election resembled the heated campaign of 1930. Lovette had
declared that he did not know if he would side with Democrats or Republicans once
Congress convened in 1931. This proved to be a dangerous statement in a staunchly
Republican area. Reece accused Lovette of siding with Democrats once he discovered
Republicans to be unfriendly to him in Congress. Reece attacked Lovette’s legislative
record and his vote against the amendment to the Federal Farm Loan Bill that advanced
loans to farmers in their area. Lovette responded with a reminder to the First District that
Reece’s brother received a state appointment from a Democratic governor, an insinuation
against Reece’s Republican loyalty. Reece argued that had he been reelected in 1930,
there could have been hundreds or thousands of workers already on the Cove Creek Dam
94
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project. Reece also charged that Lovette lost most of the appropriations that Reece had
secured for the Soldier’s Home. In the final count, Reece won the primary election by
96

less than 2,000 votes.

Lovette followed the example of Price in the 1930 primary and charged Reece
with voting fraud. Lovette contested Reece’s win with the claim that “I was duly elected
to said office.” He accused Reece of submitting fraudulent poll-tax receipts and ballots
marked with illegal voters and bribing voters with money and large quantities of whiskey.
Reece denied all charges and added that the charges were vague rather than specific, as
required by law to mount an official protest. Lovette once again talked of bolting the
party to run as an independent, which some considered an unwise move in a presidential
election year. The GOP asked him to withdraw in September and again in October, but
Lovette refused on the basis that he won the primary. He believed massive fraud at the
polls gave Reece the win. Lovette claimed he could not file an official protest because of
the difficulty involved in gathering evidence and claimed his withdrawal hurt the party
more.97
Reece believed that the lack of official charges meant Lovette had decided to
support him in the November elections. He soon realized that he faced another difficult
fight to win the election. Reece criticized Lovette for promising to support the winner of
the primary and then going back on his word. In the days before the November election,
Reece and his supporters covered practically the entire First District in a motorcade to
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garner support. Their efforts proved successful, and Reece regained his old seat in the
House against minimal Democratic opposition.

98

A Period of Broken Promises
Democrats won vast majorities in national elections because the people blamed
President Hoover for the continuing depression. Hoover attempted to restore confidence
in the American economy by increasing public spending to counter drastic cuts made by
business leaders. Public dissatisfaction grew as his efforts failed and the depression
extended to the international economy. Cadres of homeless and poor gathered in makeshift towns known as Hoover-villes. The Democratic candidate for president, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, offered a new age of government and politics. Roosevelt won the presidency
in a landslide and surged into office in 1933 with a program to increase government
assistance to the suffering and restore confidence in the federal government.
Reece faced personal tragedy in the months before he returned to office. His
father-in-law, Guy Goff, announced in 1930 that his failing health prevented him from
seeking reelection. He and his wife traveled to Europe and the Far East in an attempt to
improve his health. He returned to the United States and worked to elect Republican
candidates in the 1932 elections. His health took a sharp decline shortly after the
elections, and he moved to Thomasville, Georgia, where he resided with his wife and
Louise Reece in an attempt to recuperate. On January 7, 1933, Goff died at his home
with his daughter by his side. Condolences from President Hoover followed two days
later. Reece lost not only a close family member, but also a strong political ally. Reece’s
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wife and daughter inherited a large part of the Goff estate, which allowed him greater
99

financial independence later in life.

Reece’s family also experienced a devastating blow in early 1933. In late
January, the Tennessee Insurance Department discovered a $100,000 shortage in bonds
from the Blue Sky Division and charged Joseph Reece with their theft. Authorities in
Washington, D.C. discovered $22,000 in cash in a safe deposit box in Lem Reece’s name
and accused him of conspiracy to dispose of the bonds. The state believed that a third
party—later identified as J.P. Bowers of Florida—sold the bonds in New York under the
impression they belonged to a Memphis insurance company wanting cash. Joseph stated
that the division had the bonds when he left office in January under the new
administration and claimed Lem had nothing to do with the bonds. The Department later
found $10,000 of the bonds behind the office safe, but $73,000 had been sold and
Guaranty Trust Company in New York possessed the remaining $17,000. Joseph waived
extradition after his arrest in Washington, D.C., and pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Tennessee’s Assistant District Attorney issued a warrant for his arrest, along with three
others, on the assertion that they “conspired to defraud the State of Tennessee.”
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Joseph’s trial began in February 1934 in Nashville, Tennessee, and lasted almost
two months. He originally declared the whole incident a set-up to frame him, but he later
declared that he acted with the knowledge of the governor and claimed to be under the
impression that the department did not own the bonds but kept them in trust. He asserted
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that the $22,000 found in New York belonged to campaign funds he collected for Hill
McAlister’s Democratic campaign for governor and for Carroll Reece’s campaign.
Carroll refused to comment on the situation, which left people wondering if he would
defend his brothers or remain silent. Joseph suffered a slight heart attack during cross
examination on March 7 and spent the remainder of the day at the home of a relative.
Nashville papers claimed that Carroll Reece’s failure to testify for his brother refuted
Joseph’s explanation of his actions. Tennessee convicted Joseph and sentenced him to
three to six years in prison. The judge later issued a warrant for the arrest of Lem,
Joseph, Joseph’s secretary, and J.P. Bowers for perjury on the stand. The judge placed
Joseph in jail for pleading not guilty on the perjury charge, but Lem remained free on
bond. Joseph offered a motion for a new trial in May 1934 with Lem as his attorney, but
when he failed to appear at the court hearing to hear the decision on his appeal, a
Nashville judge affirmed his conviction and ordered his arrest. On July 6, 1935, Joseph
entered the state penitentiary in Nashville. 101
Roosevelt’s first days in office marked the beginning of his New Deal
Administration. He passed a series of acts and measures aimed at providing relief
through public works projects and reorganization. This came into direct conflict with the
Republicans who had spent the previous decade fighting government involvement in the
private sector and Muscle Shoals. This also presented a new dilemma for Reece. His
stance against government operation of Muscle Shoals proved too conservative for those
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in his district who wanted the benefits that the completion of the dams would bring.
Reece had to balance what his district wanted against his desire to adhere to the
Republican platform on the New Deal.
In April 1933 the debate over operation of the Muscle Shoals facilities became a
principal issue in Congress. Newsweek described it as a “post-armistice white elephant.”
Conservatives held that the federal government could not produce power as cheaply as
the private industries that already existed. To succeed, the government would be forced
to sell power at a low rate regardless of production costs, which would put private
industry out of business. Roosevelt wanted a government-owned “yardstick” to
determine the appropriate cost private companies should charge. Norris amended his bill
to include Roosevelt’s wishes to develop the Muscle Shoals Corporation and issue bonds
to finish Wilson Dam. The amended bill provided that power would be transmitted
through new transmission lines, that the government would produce nitrogen and
fertilizer, that surplus power beyond manufacturing needs would be sold to states,
counties, and municipalities, and that Tennessee and Alabama would be paid five percent
of sales to make up for the loss in tax revenue. Private industry argued it could transmit
power faster and at a lower rate than the government, which would keep private securities
from plummeting. In the end, Roosevelt superseded all opposition when his New Deal
administration passed the Tennessee Valley Authority Act and developed the entire
Tennessee River system.102
Reece attributed many of the nation’s social and economic problems to New Deal
Administration policies. He blamed defense strikes on Roosevelt’s inability to deal with
102
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the labor issue and a lack of courage. He hinted that Roosevelt packed the federal courts
by citing that Roosevelt appointed almost two-thirds of the 300 judges in the courts. The
problem of big government, according to Reece, was that it regulated the actions of its
citizens as well as its businesses. He described the New Deal psychology as “raise less
and earn more; work less and prosper; do nothing and go forward; cheat and succeed;
plant nothing and gather much; sleep all day and laugh at your neighbor who works in the
sun; save nothing and retire on a pension; be lazy and thumb your nose at your energetic
neighbor.” In 1939, Reece asserted that eight years of New Deal policies had shown no
record of prosperity, and he advocated a focus on the United States’ prosperity over
foreign entanglements. Reece declared that under the New Deal, the federal government
became one entirely of checks, as opposed to checks and balances.103
Reece’s experience in banking and economics fueled much of his criticism. In
one Lincoln’s Day address, he described the New Deal Era as “a period of broken
promises, betrayal of trust, and of economic and political bondage.” He calculated that
although one-third of American income went towards the cost of government, the
government spent only one dollar out of six for relief. Reece believed the government’s
increase in taxes for businesses resulted in high unemployment rates and that government
competition in industry increased worries about business security. Reece asserted that
this caused businesses to reduce the amount of private capital they invested, which halted
expansion and let investment capital pile up in banks. The government, he argued, had
embarked on a “business-witch hunt.” In an address to NYU alumni at a 1940
anniversary dinner, Reece claimed that New Deal policies prolonged the depression. He
103
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reiterated his belief that government regulation harassed business and industry and that
the government had become a competitor to private enterprise. He believed the
administration’s complacent attitude toward sit-down strikes encouraged bad labor
relations.104
Reece always remembered to convey his opinions in a manner that his
constituents understood. Few residents in the First District possessed both the money and
opportunity to attend college. Most of these farmers appreciated the education of those
who did continue their education, but they resented those who characterized them as
ignorant. Reece learned to strike a balance in his speech between complex political
jargon and local vernacular. When he described the government’s response to business
leaders that proved untrustworthy, he described the situation as “a few of the cows in the
business barn” that “gave sour milk.” He asserted that the government had put
businesses in a straight jacket and pointed out that a man could not work in a straight
jacket—he needed overalls.105
No Tennessee Congressman Stays in Office if He Does the Other Thing
Aside from his disparagement of the New Deal, Reece avoided major conflicts
during his second tenure in the House. This ensured that local opponents had little
ammunition to challenge him in First District politics, and as a result Reece faced no real
primary opposition until 1946. Many accredited this to his good service to the district,
but others considered it the result of a Reece machine no better than that of Mr. Crump in
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Memphis. Reece denied ever personally allying with Crump or telling his constituents to
106

vote for Crump Democrats.

East Tennessee remained a Republican area with little significant challenge from
Democrats in local politics. After the 1942 elections, many in Reece’s district considered
it only proper that he retain his seat in the House. The Johnson City Times credited
Reece’s win to “the avalanche of public approval” given to him. The paper deemed the
district lucky that it chose a man with Reece’s good judgment and ability for Congress.
The paper cautioned that the nation’s destiny relied solely “upon safe leadership” such as
that provided by Reece. By 1944 another local paper reported that under Reece’s
leadership Tennessee voters had proven that the Republican Party was no longer “chattel
to be traded to Democratic bosses for the political advantage of a few party leaders.” The
article prided the state on its withdrawal from the political activity that characterized its
“sister states” and credited Reece with advocating a true two-party system in
Tennessee.107
The lack of local primary opposition permitted Reece to dedicate more time to
national elections. In 1934 and 1938, Republican challengers withdrew from the local
primary in the interest of party harmony after Reece supporters pointed out a new
Republican would not have the seniority on committees that Reece possessed.
Democratic candidates posed little challenge and in some instances actually aided Reece.
In 1934 the Democratic National Chairman erroneously sent out letters endorsing Reece
as the Democratic candidate in the First District. In national elections Democrats proved
more successful, with Roosevelt winning reelection in 1936 and becoming the
106
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Democratic nominee again in 1940. In a 1936 article Reece attempted to harm
Roosevelt’s popularity by attributing his success to the support of the Russian
government. He called for a withdrawal of American recognition of the Soviet
government and opposed a third term for Roosevelt as contradictory to the tradition set
by Washington and Jefferson.108
Reece’s loyalty to the Republican Party garnered increasing attention in national
politics. In 1937 the National Republican Congressional Committee chose Reece as a
member of its executive committee, made up of Republican congressmen from each state
to further the interest of the party in campaigns. In November 1939 the ranking
Republican in Tennessee, Representative J. Will Taylor of the Second District, died and
left Reece as the only Republican congressman from Tennessee. On December 2, the
Tennessee Republican Committee unanimously nominated Reece to succeed Taylor on
the Republican National Committee. Reece promised he had no personal ambitions but
thought only of the good of the party. Reece’s appointment made him head of Tennessee
Republicans and gave him power to pick virtually all federal appointees in the state not
tied up by civil service regulations. Many feared a concentration of too much power and
hoped he would not create his own political machine or forge an alliance like that of
Taylor and Crump. Taylor secured many favors and road improvements for East
Tennessee but gave up primary votes for Crump candidates to accomplish this. In 1940
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the Republican National Committee placed Reece on a committee to study publicity and
109

considered him the high command in Tennessee Republican politics.

Reece refrained from allowing his political strength to determine Tennessee’s
vote in the 1940 presidential nomination. Tennessee leaned towards a Dewey
nomination, but Reece informed the New York delegate, Russell Sprague—from
Dewey’s home state—that Tennessee would send an uninstructed delegation to
Philadelphia to cast votes. He asked Sprague not to interfere because other southern
states believed Tennessee votes could be sold to the highest bidder and Sprague’s
presence, followed by a Dewey endorsement, would leave a wrong impression regarding
control of the state. After Wendel Wilkie received the 1940 presidential nomination,
Reece reported that since the Republican National Committee selected Wilkie by an
overwhelming majority, he would support the candidate with as much energy as Wilkie
put forth in securing the nomination. Newspapers praised Reece for not using his
influence to sway Tennessee votes at the convention.110
Reece took a leading role in the next presidential campaign as well. His local
popularity became apparent when the Chattanooga Times conducted a state poll in 1943
and reported that Reece received two votes for the 1944 presidential nomination. John
W. Bricker, the Ohio governor, emerged as a leading candidate, and speculation began
that Reece would serve as his campaign manager. Tennessee endorsed Thomas Dewey,
governor of New York, for president, and Reece predicted a Republican win. In July
1944, Dewey named Reece as one of fifteen executive committee members directing his
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presidential campaign. According to The Knoxville Journal, Reece’s appointment
constituted recognition of Reece as a national figure after twenty-five years of service in
Congress. Two years later, this support promoted Reece to an even more prominent
position in the Republican Party.111
Reece served on a number of committees during these years that allowed him to
improve his legislative record without endangering his political standing. His
involvement ranged from legislation that directly benefited his district to international
councils. In 1937 he applauded the Great Smoky Mountain National Park in East
Tennessee and expressed thankfulness that he served in a position to help enact the bill
rd

that created it. Later that year, Reece and six other congressmen traveled to the 33
Conference of the Inter-parliamentary Union that opened in Paris on September 1.

British and French parliamentarians founded the union in 1888 to further the cause of
democracy in the world. Delegates from twenty-three nations attended the conference,
although the rise of dictatorships in the world made this number ten less than the last
meeting held in 1927. The union claimed that a number of institutions resulted from their
meetings, including The Permanent Court of International Justice and The League of
112

Nations.

Reece’s background in economics led President Roosevelt to appoint him as the
only Republican member of his Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in
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1938.

The president urged creation of the committee, passed by a joint resolution of

Congress on June 16, 1938. The committee included members from both the Senate and
the House, as well as representatives from several executive departments. Also known as
the monopoly committee and anti-trust investigation, the TNEC studied all lines of
business and industry and their relationship with the federal government. Reece added
that they would study the needs of producers and distributors of commodities to see if
stronger industries squeezed out weaker ones. The members insisted that the committee
would avoid mud-slinging in their investigation. Business Week reported that the future
relationship between private industry and the federal government lay in the fifteenmember committee and believed the committee, expected to take two years to complete
the study, could present new legislation to clarify anti-trust laws. Reece considered it an
honor to be named to the commission and attributed his appointment to his long-standing
membership on the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and his experience at
NYU.114
Reece feared the rise of communism and fascism in the world and their possible
threat to the security of the United States. Shortly after his appointment to the TNEC,
Reece asserted that the New Deal administration had formed an alliance with the
Communist Party, made possible by the large number of Communists in the national
government. Two committees investigated communist and Nazi activities in the United
States in 1930 and 1932, but the House did not seriously consider the recommendations
of either committee. In 1938, the House approved an investigation led by Representative
113

One other Republican also served on the committee, but his anti-monopolist views caused most other
Republicans not to consider him a true Republican.
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Martin Dies of Texas that continued until 1944. The Dies Committee soon began
attempts to undermine the New Deal policies and faced accusations of attacking only
Communist subversives while ignoring Hitler and Nazism. The committee investigated
the CIO, Hollywood, and numerous government agencies.115
Reece gave his full support to the work of the Dies Committee. In 1942 he voted
to extend the committee. He commented on the Dies Committee in his weekly
newspaper column and noted that its extension in the House resulted from public favor in
support of the investigations. He pointed out that the Justice Department found radicals
in government service two years prior to Dies and warned against allowing these radicals
to involve the government in foreign entanglements. Reece’s actions and remarks on the
committee indicated his belief that a degree of popular support justified the narrow focus
of the committee. He thought that the threat of communism necessitated such
investigations to combat subversion.116
Reece maintained his focus on domestic legislation as the world moved toward
war. In 1940 Reece and Senator Robert Reynolds sought legislation to scientifically
determine the degree of intoxication for drunk drivers, but criticism of its inadequacy
prevented its acceptance. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
began consideration in October 1943 of the Lea Bill that proposed Federal control of
aviation and airports and excluded ground transportation companies from aviation.
Reece countered with a minority bill that allowed corporations to participate through

115

Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 6, BCR Papers, Box 28; Walter Goodman, The Committee: The
Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 1968), 1-20.
116
Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 6, BCR Papers, Box 28; Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 13, BCR
Papers, Box 32.

76

railroads owned by the companies. The minority bill asserted that the Lea Bill gave a
monopoly of aviation control to the federal government whereas the Reece Bill protected
and preserved states’ rights. The next year Reece joined a bipartisan group that
sponsored a bituminous coal bill that fixed minimum and maximum price levels in an
attempt to end profiteering. The group designed the bill to aid in coal production for the
war and to assure production at fair prices when the demand ceased without a pattern of
government regulation of the industry. None of the above bills passed, but they revealed
Reece’s determination to maintain focus on problems within the United States. 117
Reece deviated from the Republican Party agenda in matters involving the
Tennessee Valley Authority. He realized the importance of the project to his district and
often solicited votes for TVA projects. Having learned from his earlier defeat, Reece
explained his actions of going against the Republican Party with his “theory being simply
that no Tennessee congressman stays in office if he does the other thing.” In 1940 the
TVA proposed construction of a dam to control flooding after one of the many floods that
plagued the Watauga Valley washed away numerous homes in the nearby city of
Elizabethton and the railroad tracks that led to Butler. TVA approved the Watagua Dam
and Reservoir Project in 1941, but a focus on World War II temporarily halted work on
the project.118
From late 1943 to early 1944 Reece repeated requests for resumption of work on
both the Holston and Watauga Dam projects for flood control. The area contained key
war industries—Holston Ordinance Works in Kingsport and American Rayon
117
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Corporation in Elizabethton—and Reece asserted dams could provide additional power
possibilities and storage. The delay on constructing the dams continued through June
1946 when the House removed a nine million dollar appropriation for them. Both Reece
and Senator McKellar promised to do what they could to restore the appropriation in the
Senate. Work resumed on the projects in 1947, and TVA completed the dams the
following year. Reece had obtained the dam for his district, but in the process lost his
home town. The construction of Watauga Dam created Watauga Lake right over the
location of Butler. On December 1, 1948 the flood gates closed and what became known
as Old Butler sat beneath Watauga Lake.

119

One of the Most Consoling Compensations
Reece maintained his commitment to help veterans and soldiers. His work most
likely stemmed from a true concern for those who served as well as a recognition of the
political support veterans provided. Reece supporters published a campaign pamphlet
after his 1932 return to Congress titled “Republicans Provide Veterans with Benefits;
Democrats Take Them Away!” In 1936 Reece received letters of thanks for his actions
in obtaining additional benefits for disabled veterans. Reece announced to his district
that “one of the most consoling compensations of being in office is the opportunity which
it has given me to be of service to my disabled comrades and their dependents.”120
Major Paul E. Divine of Johnson City, Tennessee, sought Reece’s help in 1935
with a land appraisal. That March, Reece wrote to Divine that he appealed to the Deputy
Land Bank Commissioner for a reappraisal of his farm after the commissioner reported
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the reappraisal unjustified. Reece asked for the second appraisal on the basis that the
appraiser came from an outside area and did not comprehend all the factors that
influenced appraisals in Washington County. Reece contended that these factors made
the estimate too low. The fact that Reece expressed interest in obtaining Divine’s “upper
farm” most likely played a part in his request as well. Reece responded to letters from
Divine’s friends for personal requests, such as a bill that provided a memorial cemetery
for Union supporters killed by Confederate soldiers and a recommendation to enter the
military or naval academy. Reece often took advantage of opportunities such as these to
121

aid his constituents and, as an added benefit, garner political support.

In 1942 Reece began an earnest effort to help one of his constituents secure a
discharge from the Army. Dayton E. Phillips of Elizabethton, Tennessee, received his
draft notice in 1942 at the age of thirty-two. World War II threatened to cut short his
eight-year term as Tennessee Attorney General, so Phillips wrote to Reece for assistance.
Shortly thereafter Reece explored the possibility of Phillips’ assignment to a Counter
Intelligence unit. Reece encouraged Phillips to continue with basic training while he kept
in contact with the Counter Intelligence office and the Judge Advocate General’s office.
Reece requested that Phillips continue writing him even if nothing significant occurred
and promised to update Phillips as the army processed Reece’s requests. He advised
Phillips that another man, badly in need of money, had been appointed to serve in

121

Letters from Reece and Divine dated 7 March 1935 in Divine Family Papers, 1871-1989, The University
of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, Tennessee.

79

Phillips’ position. Reece continued his endeavors through 1943 for a Judge Advocate
122

General appointment for Phillips to no avail.

Phillips deployed to Europe before Reece could secure a better position for him.
Reece wrote in October 1944 that he had hoped the war would have ended or ebbed to
the point that some of the older men could return to the United States. Reece attempted
to influence the war department to pass a regulation that returned district attorney’s and
other elected officials to their civil positions. Reece regretted that the war continued into
the winter of 1944 and recognized that its end would come only with a major
development. Phillips remained in Europe until the war ended and then asked Reece to
make whatever attempts possible to secure his discharge. Reece worked to gather
support from the district judge for a discharge on account of Phillips’ age, poor physical
condition, and potential service to his home state. Reece expressed a sense of obligation
to those in the service and felt he should do his part to return Phillips to his elected office,
but Phillips remained in the Army until October 1945. Reece wrote to Phillips with
gladness that he had returned to Tennessee and empathized with Phillips’ military
experiences.
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Reece’s correspondence with Phillips expressed a true concern for the welfare of
his constituent. Reece wrote to Phillips after long periods without contact, which
suggested the two maintained a good relationship. One year after Phillips returned to the
United States, he succeeded Reece as the House Representative from the First District.
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Most of the press dubbed Phillips as Reece’s hand-picked candidate, but Reece soon
learned that Phillips followed his own path. Reece and his supporters backed another
candidate who lost to Phillips in the election. The friendly correspondence of WWII
changed drastically when Reece decided to return to the House. Politics took the place of
friendship, and Reece used his work on behalf of Phillips during World War II as
political ammunition to attack Phillips’ character.
Nobody Ever Wins a War
Reece maintained a position of non-intervention as the world became embroiled
in a devastating conflict. He demonstrated this belief as early as 1937 when he signed a
bill that prevented Congress from declaring war without a national referendum except in
cases of an invasion. As Hitler moved into Poland in 1939 and began his drive to
conquer Europe, Reece expressed opposition to United States involvement. He
advocated a neutral course in which politics did not determine matters involving national
defense or foreign affairs. In a commencement address at Sevier County High School in
his home district in May 1940, Reece vowed to oppose American involvement in foreign
wars for as long as he served in the House. He warned that freedom disappeared in areas
ruled by Communists, Nazis, and Fascists. Only if the United States became threatened
by an invasion within the bases of the Monroe Doctrine zone would Reece agree to fight.
In his closing remarks, he encouraged graduates to “meet life unafraid.”124
Reece remained hopeful that the Allied forces could end the war without
American involvement. In July 1940, he assured his constituents that Great Britain
possessed the equipment and materials to successfully resist a German invasion. He
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believed Germany to be weakening and believed the nation desired peace to avoid the
harsh penalties of war. Reece felt that the Democratic administration was leading the
United States into the European conflict and that its policies toward private business
threatened labor rights and social gains. He warned that entering the war meant fighting
Germany, Japan, and Russia as well and that “it is a lot easier to get into a war than get
out of it.” He proposed aid to Britain without direct involvement as a safer alternative.125
Reece’s voting record during the early years of the war reflected his isolationist
stance. His votes mirrored the views of the Republican Party, which believed that the
United States could avoid war in Europe. Many Republicans realized that the importance
of keeping Japan’s imperialism under control meant the United States had to build a big
Navy and avoid appeasement of Japan. Reece favored a strong military for the United
States—he supported a twenty-one percent expansion of the Navy in 1938 and voted
against a motion to cancel an appropriation to improve the harbor at Guam—but he
remained opposed to direct intervention. Reece voted to retain an embargo against the
sale and shipment of arms to any belligerent and warned that Roosevelt’s policy of lendlease would result in a “New Deal dictatorship” and increase the national debt for future
generations. When Reece participated in a round-table discussion with other
representatives debating the Conscription of Industry Amendment to the Conscription
Bill in 1940, he took the position that the nation’s economy was disrupted any time a
worker was taken from his job and conscripted into the army. He warned that this small
encroachment on liberty could become dictatorial. According to Reece, the conscription
bill and the ability to commandeer plants comprised two of the steps that led toward the
125
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enactment of a Mobilization Plan, which would make the president an “absolute military
dictator.” He opposed conscription, an eighteen-month extension of the draft, and the
Price Control Act. Reece attributed his anti-interventionist stance to his experiences in
World War I and claimed many other veterans felt the same.126
As support for the war increased during 1941, Reece held firm to his belief that
the United States should not become involved. In a Mother’s Day speech, Reece related
the stress his mother experienced during World War I with two sons fighting. He
pledged to do everything within his power to prevent other mothers from having to
imagine what their sons experienced in war. Reece, along with many others, thought that
World War I had been the end of all wars and expressed sadness that “once again Europe
is wantonly squandering the blood of her men in one of her periodic wars.” He noted his
disagreement with leaders who urged participation in the war rather than patient
watchfulness to determine the reach of the conflict. He compared wars to forest fires,
spread by hate and a lack of reason. Reece avoided commenting on the right or wrong of
the war because he believed all wars ended at a peace conference. “I know that nobody
ever wins a war; that millions of humble people must weep and mourn while a few others
127

get rich.”

The day that Roosevelt declared would live in infamy was the day Reece finally
relinquished his isolationist views. Two years of indirect assistance to the Allied forces
through the cash-and-carry and lend-lease programs changed overnight when Japan made
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the fateful decision to bomb a sleeping Pearl Harbor. Reece, as a member of the
Republican National Executive Committee, stated that he had hoped the day would not
come when Congress declared war against Germany. After Pearl Harbor, he acceded that
America had to join World War II and pledge use of its full resources. Reece and other
congressmen spoke with confidence that “divine guidance” ensured the nation’s
traditions would be maintained. He encouraged unity after the attack and urged citizens
to accept responsibility and purchase war bonds to avert the danger of losing the war.
The Reece family became supporters of America’s efforts when Raleigh entered the army
in 1942 and became the fifth Reece son to serve in the military.

128

Reece took a cautionary and realistic approach to the United States’ entrance into
war. He maintained his belief that the Communist Party desired to overthrow the
government of the United States and gave an added reason to fight. In April 1942 Reece
called for the government to cut non-defense expenditures and dismantle programs
instituted to alleviate the depression. He opposed the build-up of civilian employees
because he did not think it would win the war. Reece’s first-hand knowledge of war and
the men and material required for the war effort led him to warn against the expectation
of miracles from General McArthur in the Pacific, even with McArthur’s military
prowess. He cautioned that the American military forces faced a “tremendous land
campaign” before victory would be declared. Reece attributed the lack of progress at the
end of 1942 to costly delays in decision making and a lack of total preparation. 129
The close of 1943 brought anticipation of an end to the war as Congress focused
on the post-war world. The House formed a Post-War Economic Policy and Planning
128
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Committee to serve as a vehicle to return the nation to prosperity at war’s end. Sam
Rayburn, the Speaker of the House, appointed Reece as one of its eighteen members.
The committee possessed the power to summon and interrogate witnesses, release surplus
commodities, and gather information on reemployment, foreign trade, and materials. In
1944 the committee asked governors, county executives, and mayors of cities of over
10,000 people to provide information on public-works construction planned for after the
war. The main focus of the group was to make reports to Congress rather than formulate
legislation. Reece also served on the Republican Post-War Advisory Council, formed to
address reconstruction at home after the war. Reece praised the committee and listed
post-war industry and employment, social welfare, federal administration, finance and
currency, agriculture, and international economic problems as among its chief
concerns.130
The end of World War II signaled a shift in attention to domestic political issues.
Reece’s wife, Louise, spent most of the war volunteering with Red Cross as chairman of
surgical dressings. She taught numerous classes, recruited volunteers, and chaired the
Red Cross headquarters in Johnson City. Her work increased support of Reece as a
representative dedicated to his community. Speculation arose in early 1946 that Reece
would face opposition in the primary for the first time as a result of “cross-party
friendship” between Reece supporters and the state Democratic machine led by Thad
Cox. Reece and his wife turned their attention toward local politics without two of his
ardent supporters. Reece’s mother, Sarah Maples Reece, died on March 16, 1943, after a
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long illness. Raleigh returned home from World War II but died in July 19, 1946 at the
Veterans Administration Home in Johnson City, Tennessee, built through Reece’s
131

appropriation efforts.

Reece’s return to office in 1932 should have been cause for celebration, but his
brother’s conviction, the Great Depression, and a Democratic congressional majority
tempered his enthusiasm. Reece proceeded with a degree of caution in his legislative
duties and avoided conflict with his party and his constituents. He voted along
Republican Party lines in opposition to Roosevelt’s New Deal Administration and
advocated non-intervention during World War II. He continued his work with veterans
and supported the TVA and its potential to aid his district’s economy. Although Reece
garnered little attention with his legislation, his loyalty secured the notice of prominent
Republican Party leaders.
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Chapter 4
Victory for Real Republicans
Republican without Ifs, Ands, or Buts
Republican Party members realized the importance of the 1946 congressional
elections and began working on their campaign strategy early that year. Tired of the
fourteen-year Democratic Congress and presidency, Republicans looked to the
Republican National Committee to lead the party in the right direction for a win.
Republicans needed twenty-six seats in the House and nine in the Senate to achieve a
majority. In December 1945 Republicans laid the foundation of their campaign platform
and party policy in a declaration of principles drafted by the Republican members of
Congress. Herbert Brownell, the Republican National Chairman, endorsed policies of
opposition to a “socialist planned economy,” good relations between labor and industry,
and “equal chances for all citizens, no matter where they came from or what their color or
religion.”132
By March the Republican Party chances seemed threatened as opposing forces
within the party fought for control. Brownell resigned his post as chairman in early
March to devote more time to his law firm, amid speculation that Governor Dewey would
appoint Brownell to head his reelection campaign in New York. Party leaders believed
Brownell’s successor needed a congressional background to aid in the upcoming
elections. Reece and Clarence J. Brown appeared at the top of the short list of potential
candidates. Brown, in his fourth term as representative from Ohio, previously served as
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lieutenant governor and secretary of state of Ohio. Papers described Reece as “a lawyerbanker-teacher-legislator” in his thirteenth term in office.
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By the end of the month the party divided over the leading candidates. Brown
dropped out of the running because he expressed an unwillingness to resign his seat in the
House and because John Bricker, the former governor of Ohio, emerged as a potential
candidate for the 1948 presidential nomination. The party felt that having a chairman and
presidential candidate from the same state would appear biased to voters and party
members. John Danaher, the former senator from Connecticut, replaced Brown as one of
the top two nominees for the job. A congressman from Indiana announced interest in the
position as well but posed little real threat to Reece or Danaher.
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Two powerful political figures battled over control of the Republican National
Committee and the nomination. Governor Dewey, with the support of the liberal wing of
the party, backed Danaher for the chairmanship. Dewey had lost the 1940 Republican
nomination for president to Wendel Wilkie. He won the 1944 nomination, but President
Roosevelt easily defeated him in the election. Robert A. Taft, Ohio senator and son of
former President William H. Taft, favored Reece. Taft attracted attention in Congress
immediately after his election, and his conservatism had earned him the nickname “Mr.
Republican” among fellow party members. Taft led the conservative forces of the
Republican Party behind Reece. Both Dewey and Taft held ambitions for the 1948
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presidential nomination and saw control of the Republican National Committee as vital to
securing the party’s support.
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Reece held great respect for Taft and developed a strong loyalty to the senator. It
is not certain exactly when the two first met. The relationship between the Goff’s and
William Taft most likely fostered a fast friendship. In a letter dated 1958, Reece revealed
the answer to his long-standing devotion to Taft. Reece wrote that Taft’s victory in the
1938 senatorial race over his opponent, who was supported by the party organization,
“caught the imagination of the people.” He believed that Taft became a leader “in sound
constructive thinking, reinforced by the people’s confidence “in his honesty and integrity
as well as his ability.” Reece thought that the nation needed a president who had
“developed a philosophy of government, had a clear governmental objective in mind, and
who knew government on the operating level well enough to drive towards that objective
without being dependent upon others.” Reece saw him as “the one outstanding leader of
the party over all the lean New Deal years” and “the great hope of the children in the
wilderness of the New Deal.” 136
Republicans believed the selection of a new chairman determined the direction of
Republican Party policy for the next presidential election. The young progressive faction
wanted a strong program of affirmative action and policy making. The conservative “Old
Guard” faction hoped to capitalize on Democratic mistakes to win elections. Bricker
joined forces with Taft as Reece became a front-runner in the race. At the April 1 st
meeting, Clarence Brown nominated Reece for chairman. Brown reasoned that he could
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not run because the Ohio primary election had ended and election laws prevented the
Republican Party from nominating another candidate to run in Brown’s district if he
campaigned for chairman. A small amount of time remained until the Tennessee
primary, and if Reece became chairman, the party could find another Republican to run
for congressman in his district. Reece received forty-six votes to Danaher’s thirty-one,
falling short of the fifty-three needed to win the election. The second ballot mirrored the
first. Reece supporters embarked on a heavy campaign to persuade Republicans to vote
Reece into office. On the third ballot, nine of Danaher’s supporters and three other voters
switched to Reece to give him fifty-eight votes and the chairmanship of the Republican
National Committee.

137

The following day the press scrambled to answer how a congressman known only
in Washington, D.C., and his home state of Tennessee became the national leader of the
Republican Party. A large part of the answer came from Taft’s support and the immense
influence he possessed within the Republican Party. This victory of Old Guard
Republicans gave Taft a perceived edge in directing the party to a Taft presidential
nomination in two years. The Committee decided that the chairmanship should be a fulltime position, and Reece’s independent wealth allowed him to volunteer to serve without
pay, as had his predecessor. Reece expressed a willingness to resign his seat in the House
to devote his energies to the Republican National Committee, which appealed to the
business-sense of Republicans. 138
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Reece’s selection also stemmed from a strategic move on the part of the
committee to expand the Republican voter base. The other candidates came from areas
that garnered more total votes, but Republicans hoped that the election of Reece would
break the southern block and end the one-party system of the South. Critics reminded the
committee that President Roosevelt could have been elected without a single electoral
vote from the South. Reece maintained a “guarded optimism” that he could break the
Democratic hold on the South by winning at least two states, but he acknowledged that
others before him had tried and failed to win the South.139
Many papers heralded Reece as the first southerner to hold the position of
chairman in an attempt to heighten the importance of the election. Others correctly
identified Reece as the second southerner, recalling President Hoover’s appointment of
Claudius H. Huston of Chattanooga to the chairmanship in 1929 following the
resignation of Dr. Hubert Work. Time magazine called Reece “something of a rarity in
politics: a popular and successful Republican below the Mason and Dixon line.”140
Republicans also hoped to win back much of the black vote captured by
Democrats during the New Deal administration. Reece had voted for an anti-lynching
bill and anti-poll tax bill in Tennessee and the Fair Employment Practices bill. The party
hoped his legislative support on issues important to black organizations would draw out a
larger vote. A Tennessee paper reminded voters that “colored citizens of Tennessee have
found Mr. Reece on the right side of most issues with which they were vitally
concerned.” A Mississippi delegate predicted a “general homecoming of black
Republicans in the fall of this year.” Reece’s voting history for civil rights served the
139
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Republican Party well during the elections. Their attempts to reclaim black voters,
however, later proved to be little more than campaign promises. The Democratic Party
took the lead on true civil rights reform in the 1960s, erasing and gains made among
black voters by Republicans during 1946.141
Reece’s chairmanship placed a wedge between the liberal and progressive
factions of the Republican Party. Political analysts recognized this as definitive proof
that the Old Guard Republicans held firm control of the party organization. This left
Governor Dewey “with no more than one small, well-polished shoe in the door.” Harold
Stassen, the former Minnesota governor and 1948 presidential hopeful, emphasized that
the selection of Reece did not set the party’s policy or platform. He asserted that the
primary elections and upcoming conventions would decide the direction of the party. An
open member of the liberal wing of the Republican Party, Stassen stated he disagreed
with Reece’s stand on many issues in the past but would cooperate with him as chairman.
Reece denied any party rift between himself and Stassen. “I don’t know anyone who has
been in Congress for 25 years whose record I wholly approve,” Reece asserted, “even my
own.” Reece successfully controlled some of the damage, and Stassen received criticism
142

for his public statement of disharmony with Reece.

Other liberal party members mirrored Stassen’s disappointment with the new
chairman. The lack of legislation bearing Reece’s authorship and his limited experience
in debate drew sharp criticism from those concerned with the party’s future policy
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making. Newspapers described Reece as “one of the most reactionary men in Congress,”
the least capable of the two choices, and “a man with as sorry a record as one could find
in the halls of Congress.” Party liberals, including Wayne Morse, the Oregon senator,
considered the conservative victory a “grand flop” that indicated the Republican National
Committee intended to elect a Democratic president in 1948.143
The support of Taft and Bricker became a point of contention among party
members. Critics declared Reece a “thoroughly disciplined student of the Taft-BrickerLandon school of thought in his party.” Even Reece had to recognize that Taft’s
authority influenced his selection and possibly the 1948 presidential election to his own
favor. Reece refused to be labeled a “Taft man” and replied to critics that he belonged to
no one and refused to “sharpen anybody’s ax for 1948. I am going to devote myself to
the congressional elections of 1946 and the Republican campaign for 1948.” His dry wit,
which became more noticeable in his later years, appeared in his acceptance of the
chairmanship. Aware of the dissent that followed his election, Reece thanked “all those
who voted for me on the first ballot—and also those who switched to me at the
appropriate time.”
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The committee’s choice of Reece garnered as much approval from Republicans as
it did criticism. A Kansas City paper called Reece “a man of seasoned judgment” that
did not espouse radicalism, and the Bristol, Virginia, Herald Courier described him as “a
fine type of American citizen” that rose to prominence and success “by dint of his own
intelligence and energy.” Conservatives considered Reece’s election a “victory for real
143
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Republicans and a distinct setback for the Me-Too Republicans” that wanted the party to
follow New Deal policies. Hamilton Fish—former representative and head of the 1940
Fish Committee Investigation—praised Reece’s congressional record as being in line
with his own and called Reece a “splendid choice.” Estes Kefauver of Tennessee wrote
in a newspaper column that no one could question Reece’s ability and integrity.145
Newspapers concluded that although the Republican National Committee could
have chosen a better chairman, it also could have chosen someone much worse than
Reece. Both critics and supporters acknowledged him as a party man with a conservative
voting record but ceded that the Republican National Chairman should be just that.
Reece persuaded Danaher to remain in his position as Republican National Committee
liaison with Congress to unite the party efforts in the upcoming elections. Although
many liberals would rather have seen a more liberal person elected to the chairmanship,
they could not, declared one newspaper, “lament the election of Mr. Reece.” They
acknowledged that Reece may not have been the best choice for chairman, but in the
words of one newspaper, Reece “is Republican without ifs, ands, or buts,” which was
more than could be said for his predecessors who leaned towards support of the New
Deal. Robert Taft predicted that Reece would be a “very able Chairman” because he was
“quiet and determined, and a good organizer.” Referring to Reece’s inability to speak
well in public, he ceded that Republicans needed “all those qualities rather than the
qualities of a speech maker.”146
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Reece’s resignation from Congress remained a question throughout 1946. He first
took the position that he would maintain his seat because he could be of more service to
his district in the House. By the end of March Reece reported that he was willing to
resign his seat but did not immediately offer a formal resignation. The governor of
Tennessee announced that the state would call a special election within thirty days of
Reece’s resignation to fill the vacancy. When Reece failed to give a specific date,
speculation circulated that he would keep his seat until his term expired in January 1947
since Congress expected a long summer recess beginning in June. Reece placed his
resignation at some time before the end of 1946 but later announced he would keep his
seat but not run for reelection. He cited the difficulty of calling a special election in time
to name a successor for the current session in Congress. Because of his concern for the
expense to the state, Reece decided to remain in office so that the August primary could
name his successor.

147

The Choice Between Communism and Republicanism
Former Chairman Brownell set up an effective communication network to
disseminate the party’s news and platform to other party members. The Republican
Rural News Service sent press releases and campaign material to over 4,000 small
newspapers in the country to increase the party’s exposure. Brownell wrote an editorial
in the Republican monthly newsletter—The Republican News—sent to almost 200,000
Democrats and Republicans across the country. The Republican National Committee
also sponsored The Chairman’s Letter, sent to approximately 20,000 Republican
members and contributors to provide background materials on the Republican Party for
147
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discussion and forums. Reece used Brownell’s entire network immediately after taking
148

office and greatly increased its circulation.

Reece insisted that he intended to focus on the upcoming congressional elections
before giving any thought to the next presidential campaign. His first Chairman’s Letter
noted that if the Republican Party won in 1946, it would be easier to win the presidency
in 1948. He wrote that only the Republican Party worked to defend individual liberties
against the encroachment of the federal government, an idea that appealed to his home
district. Reece asserted that the New Deal pitted race against race and class against class.
He accused Truman and the Democratic Party of campaigning on fear and dire
predictions of what would happen if Republicans won a majority. The Republican
National Committee, however, used the same tactics in its drive to take control of
Congress.149
Communism proved to be a valuable tool of the Republican Party because of the
intense hatred building in America against anything associated with the Communist
Party. The fervor sparked by the first Red Scare continued well into the 1930s.
Animosity towards the New Deal and President Roosevelt spurred Representative Martin
Dies to create the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to investigate
Communists he felt had infiltrated the government and society—“the pink fringe around
the Red core of communism that really headed America for disaster.” World War II
forced the United States to cede aid to the Soviets in order to prevent fascists from
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winning control of Europe, but Americans remained suspicious of the Communist Party’s
goals after the end of hostilities. The Dies Committee investigation ended with Dies’
resignation in 1944, but a last-minute proposal by Representative John Rankin in the
opening days of Congress made HUAC a permanent committee in 1945. The publicity
HUAC garnered in the press allowed Republicans to take advantage of the fear of
communism.150
The new chairman’s first task was to prepare Republicans for the congressional
elections in order to regain control of Congress from the Democrats. Reece and the
Republican Party had to articulate their distinctions from the Democratic administration
and New Deal policies to win. Reece immediately identified anti-communism as a major
component of the Republican platform in his first public speaking engagement at a NYU
alumni banquet. He asserted that American citizens needed to oust Democrats from
power to ensure survival of the American system of government because, according to
Reece, the Republican Party was the true liberal party. Democrats, he asserted, had
allowed Communists to infiltrate their party, and only the government plus a complete
Republican victory could save the nation.
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Reece carefully distinguished members of the Democratic Party from the
Democratic administration in his attacks. He acknowledged that not all Democrats
became Communists or communist sympathizers, but he insisted that the Democratic
administration let itself get in a position “where the communist tail is wagging the
Democrat donkey.” Reece believed that a radical fringe of the Democratic Party
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followed Communist Party doctrine and had managed “to insinuate its members in key
positions in the policy making level in the Federal Government.” Reece avoided labeling
all Democrats as subversive because he hoped to persuade a number to vote Republican
in the upcoming election. He advertised the Republican Party as the “one
uncompromising and constant enemy of communism.” 152
Republicans targeted Truman as the root cause for the administration’s failure to
prevent the spread of communism. In a speech discussing the peace conferences at
Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam and the Cairo Declaration, Reece argued that “the principles
of the Atlantic Charter were sold down the river behind the backs of the American
people.” Even though the Teheran Conference and Cairo Declaration occurred before
Truman ascended to office, Reece held him responsible for what he considered
diplomatic blunders. He believed that Truman’s desire for political support led to his
association with radicals that would destroy America’s representative government.
Reece argued that the resulting struggle among the communist reactionaries in the
Democratic Party prevented the administration from providing good government in line
153

with American ideals of freedom.

Certain members of the Democratic Party fueled the Republican charge of
subversion within the government. Henry A. Wallace served as vice-president under
Roosevelt from 1940-1944. A public disagreement with high officials led Roosevelt to
name Truman as his running mate in 1944, and he relegated Wallace to serve as secretary
of commerce. Wallace continued his discord with the Democratic administration under
152
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Truman when he openly disputed Truman’s policy towards Russia. Wallace believed
that the United States should avoid a hard-line approach towards Russia to preserve
relations. Republicans immediately pronounced this as certain evidence that Wallace
sympathized with Moscow and communist ideals and blamed Democrats for allowing
Wallace to stay in a position of power. In an attempt to salvage the party’s chances in the
1946 elections, Truman asked Wallace to resign his post on September 20th. Wallace
complied, but Reece still publicized the situation as another example of the effect of the
alliance between Democrats and communist radicals. Reece reminded voters that
although Wallace had left the government, Truman and other radical forces still held
power. Reece believed that Wallace had done more for the Soviet government than any
secret agent but conceded that only Wallace could answer if his actions intentionally
caused harm to the American government.154
Reece developed his own style of language when speaking of communism during
the 1946 campaign. He consistently spoke of the Democrat Party, rather than the
Democratic Party, because he felt that the policies and actions of the Democrats no
longer held true to American principles of liberty and representative government. He
believed that Democrats had been so thoroughly infiltrated by Communists that they no
longer constituted a democratic party in which all members held an equal vote—
Communists and communist sympathizers had taken control of the party. Reece also
spoke of Republicanism as the opposite of communism, a system in which the
government controlled not only the policies of the nation but also the lives and well-being
of its citizens. He defined Republicanism as a government in which “every citizen is free
154
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to order his own life as he sees fit . . . the worker may enjoy the fruits of his toil . . . he
may provide security for his family . . . there are no class distinctions and no distinctions
155

of race or color . . . the citizen is a free man, and not the ward of the state.”

The Republican attacks against communism in the government generated
criticism of the Republican campaign strategy. Carl Hatch, a Democratic senator from
New Mexico, called the communist platform a “phony Red Issue” and criticized the GOP
for relying on it. Papers criticized Reece for evading real issues to rely on a Red Fascist
claim without any real proof. The York, Pennsylvania, Gazette and Daily stated that
Reece “deliberately and maliciously set about a Red-baiting campaign as a substitute for
156

a program.”

Reece recognized that Republicans could not win the campaign based

solely on the nation’s fear of communism and turned to other issues, often still linking
them with communism, to increase voter support.
Reece attempted to break the Democratic stronghold on southern voters. He
appealed to the South that they had been ignored in politics during the Democratic
administration. He reminded voters that no southerner wanted Wallace in office, but
Wallace served as vice-president for four years and would have been president had
Roosevelt not replaced him with Truman. In the June 1946 issue of The Republican
News, Reece condemned the one-party system that existed in many southern states. He
claimed that the Democratic Party consisted of three elements: “the Solid South, held in
bondage by the chains of racial discrimination; the big machines—Kelly, Hague, Flynn,
Pendergast; and the radical group devoted to Sovietizing the United States.” Reece
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asserted that only a two-party system could rescue the South from this bondage and
called for the South to “cast its own votes in national politics instead of having it cast for
them by men who do not represent the real sentiment and the real feeling of the South.”
He stated that as a southerner, he understood the plight of southern states: the dominance
of the radical group in the Democratic Party left the voters with “the choice between
Communism and Republicanism.”157
Reece also validated his selection as chairman by appealing to blacks to vote
Republican. On August 27th he addressed an Elks club in Buffalo, New York. He
pleaded for black voters to support the Republican Party as their true friend on the basis
that the Democratic Party failed to look out for their interests. He stated that racism and
discrimination were still practiced in the country, but not in areas where the Republican
Party controlled the government machinery. Reece reiterated that the ex-slaveholding
South, big city machine, and red-fascist factions controlled the Democratic Party. He
advised the Elks not to make their decision on race alone but on what was best for the
country. Reece stressed that the Republican Party worked for the good of all citizens
because the nation could not exist one-half free and one-half Bilbo, a reference to
Theodore J. Bilbo, the Democratic Mississippi senator and an avowed racist and defender
of segregation.158
While Republicans hailed Reece’s address as a valid attempt to include blacks in
the campaign, others criticized it as a façade to win votes. The Chicago Times called
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Reece’s speech partisan campaigning that began candidly but became “extremely
tiresome.” The paper compared Reece’s legislative record to Bilbo and found that Reece
th

had only one chance to vote on racism in the 79 Congress—the issue of prohibiting
federal funding to schools that discriminated against race or creed in handing out free
lunches. Reece voted against the measure. Black voters also recognized that Reece made
this speech in New York, not in the South, where Republicans hoped to sway loyalties.
Blacks could have interpreted this as reluctance to upset the balance of support that Reece
obtained from Democrats in his home state of Tennessee. A letter to the editor of the
Chicago Sun in September 1946 called Reece’s attention to the fact that the New Deal
administration had enacted more permanent legislation to help blacks than any other
administration.159
Price controls and the high cost of meat became the major campaign issue as the
elections drew nearer. Fear of inflation during World War II forced Congress to pass the
Anti-Inflation Act in 1942, creating the Office of Price Administration (OPA) to establish
controls over prices and wages. Americans resented the OPA and created a black market
for goods, but the OPA enabled the nation’s economy to meet war needs. When the war
ended, demand for consumer goods contributed to high inflation. In July 1946, Congress
submitted a bill to extend the authority of the OPA to combat increasing prices. At the
last minute, Truman vetoed the bill and blamed Taft and his amendment to the bill, which
allowed manufacturers to enact price increases based on 1941 profits, for the failure of
the bill. Truman explained that this amendment would allow for billions in price
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increases and provided “a sure formula for inflation.”

The House sustained Truman’s

veto and the OPA bill went back to Congress.
Republicans quickly attacked Truman for allowing price controls to lapse. Taft
called Truman’s veto “utterly unfair” and a partisan attack. He stated that Truman
possessed the ability to prevent speculation and an increase in prices and rents but “chose
to take all the chances of chaos, followed by speculative rises in prices.” Reece, reacting
in part as chairman and in part as Taft’s confidant, responded that “the President has now,
apparently, lost control of himself.” Reece claimed that Truman’s action showed that
radical advisors dominated the White House because Truman failed to follow the advice
of his party’s leaders. Reece warned that Truman’s actions exposed veterans and other
citizens to danger of eviction and a continuation of strikes and the black market.161
Inflation immediately followed the removal of price controls, and Republicans
blamed the Democratic administration for high prices. Commenting on the inflation,
Reece asserted that “what this country needs is a good five-cent nickel,” which he
believed would not happen under a Democratic administration. High prices forced
Truman to sign a new OPA bill in August that deviated little from the first OPA bill. By
the end of September, the nation’s supply of meat dwindled, and many citizens asked that
OPA controls over scarce foods be lifted. The army placed an order for twenty-five
percent of all meat available to feed troops, and Americans cried that a meat famine
would result. John McCormack, the Democratic House Majority Leader, called for a
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temporary lift of price controls on meat, which Reece pronounced a campaign tactic since
the lift would end right after the November elections.

162

President Truman debated how to respond to the problem without damaging his
party’s chances in November. He wanted to keep controls because he viewed the meat
shortage as a result of the large slaughter of meat in July and August and the rush to the
market right before the administration restored price controls. Truman argued that had
this not occurred, the cattle would have been fattened and come to the market in
September and October at heavier weights. He accused producers of holding back
livestock in hopes of higher prices at a later date. In a fifteen-minute radio broadcast on
th

October 14 , Truman reprimanded the public for their attitude towards controls and
agreed to lift the controls on meat and other products in an orderly manner.163
Reece prepared an official Republican reply to Truman’s actions on meat
controls. Reece demanded equal response time to Truman’s price control speech because
Republicans viewed it as a clear political tactic to garner more votes in the upcoming
election. He stated that at any other time, Truman’s stabilization efforts would have been
accomplished at his desk rather than on a radio broadcast. Reece argued that Truman’s
restoration of price controls in September after he let them lapse by vetoing the first OPA
bill caused the shortage in meat supplies. According to Reece, Truman’s radical advisors
wanted to retain unjustified controls over America’s productive system. He lamented
that the meat shortage became a political issue and declared that had Truman listened to
the Republican members of Congress, the crisis would have been averted. Truman, he
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asserted, took a step in the right direction but responded too late to the problem—
164

“Truman is locking the barn door after the horse has been taken to the butcher shop.”

Reece remained steadfast that Republicans would win the elections and a majority
in Congress. He based the Republican campaign on what he called the Four C’s that
prevailed in Washington: Controls, Confusion, Corruption, and Communism. Reece
stressed that voters recognized the Republican Party as the “champion of the American
form of government.” He believed that Americans saw confusion and a lack of
leadership in Washington that led to increasing corruption. Reece claimed that voters had
become tired of controls that came directly from Moscow and had realized that elements
antagonistic to the American form of government dictated policy-making. For these
reasons, Reece avowed that voters would make a change in Congress. 165
In return for voter loyalty, Reece made numerous promises on what Republicans
would accomplish. As he traveled the nation to stump for local candidates, Reece
summarized Republican promises into eight main policies that those in Congress would
follow. Four of the policies had immediate and viewable effects on the population.
Reece promised a reduction in the number of governmental departments, an early end to
controls on production and distribution, an immediate reduction of individual income
taxes, and an end to deficit spending. The final four policies dealt more with the
administration of government than concrete issues. Reece avowed a removal of legal red
tape that hampered efforts “to exterminate the subversionist (sic) rats gnawing at the
164
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timbers of the ship of state,” opportunities for World War II veterans to gain
employment, protection of states’ rights, and an “end to secret dealings with foreign
governments which have done much to destroy respect for the American government
internationally.” Reece declared that a Republican Congress would work in areas of
production, taxes, inflation, labor, and security to “build houses instead of asking
veterans and their families to live in blueprints and on promises.”166
Reece attempted to convince the public that the Republican Party worked for the
best interests of the people. He described a liberal as “one who fought to curb the
exercise of absolute power by kings or aristocracies . . . one who is willing to fight to
protect the liberties of the citizens against actual or threatened infringements by
government.” Reece claimed his definition applied to the Republican Party, while the
Democratic Party followed the Communist Party ideology. Robert Taft supported this
idea when he agreed that a liberal was “one who opposes measures which restrict
personal freedom, grants others the right to disagree and is open-minded in his
acceptance of new ideas.” This tailored definition of “liberal” won Reece the respect of
those in his own party and earned harsh criticism from those outside GOP circles.
Democrats challenged Reece’s voting record and questioned how Republicans could
consider southern Democrats outside the liberal definition when they often voted with
Republicans in Congress.167
In the final weeks before the election, both Reece and Robert Hannegan, the
Democratic National Committee Chairman, emphasized the distinctions between the two
166
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parties. Hannegan questioned whether America would follow the progressive program of
the Democratic administration or submit to the will of a few who wanted personal profits.
Reece summarized the issues as a series of choices between “houses or blueprints, sound
currency or inflation, government by majorities or pampered minorities, abundance or
shortages, balanced budgets or deficit spending, Americanism or communism, full
production or restricted production, free economy or planned economy.” Hannegan
played a recorded voice of President Roosevelt during election speeches, which Reece
denounced as a cheap trick. One report circulated that Reece and Hannegan ran into each
other at the Press Club, where Reece inquired of Hannegan who the 1948 Democratic
presidential candidate would be. Hannegan evaded a direct answer on a specific
candidate, stating that they “may have to dig him up.” “Well, I hope you don’t do that,”
Reece countered, “He might win again.”168
Papers criticized Reece for evading real issues, but he accomplished the party’s
goal of increased publicity. Reece appeared on the cover of at least two news magazines
that characterized him as a hard worker and “master organizer.” They described his
method of concentrating on areas where Democrats won by less than five percent in
1944. Reece’s tactics worked, and in the 1946 congressional elections Republicans won
a majority in both houses for the first time since 1930. Ironically, Reece’s home precinct
voted for the Democratic candidates for governor and senator for the first time in eighty
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years. Reece had lost his political influence in the area, and the new Republicans in
169

charge proved unable to direct the vote as had Reece and his machinery.

The 1946 congressional elections focused on the shortcomings of the Democratic
Congress and administration. Republicans appealed to voters on issues of fiscal
responsibility and the need to limit the power of organized labor. Both political parties
also had the 1948 presidential election in mind. The increased role of the government in
society during the New Deal increased federal debt when paired with years of budget
deficits. Congress delegated more authority to new government agencies, and some
believed this made Congress less able to exert supervision on the agencies.

The

Republican victory forced Democrats to move temporarily to the right of the New Deal
program in order to reorganize alliances and increase Truman’s popularity. Republicans
responded in kind with a determination to enact campaign promises in order to present
their accomplishments to voters in 1948. A significant consequence of the 1946 elections
was the election of Joseph McCarthy, who would later prove to be an explosive force in
the Senate. Voters elected some of the most conservative representatives to Congress,
170

and they were determined to change Truman’s fiscal policies.

With the help of conservative forces, Reece secured the highest position in the
Republican Party. He focused intently on the 1946 congressional elections so that
Republicans could regain control of Congress from Democrats who had been in control
for over fifteen years. Reece played on the nation’s fears of communism and discontent
169
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with the slow recovery from World War II in order convince voters to vote Republican.
Republicans tried to influence southern and black voters with promises that they later
failed to keep. The outcome of the elections appeared to be a real victory for the
Republican Party and placed Reece in an excellent position to use his influence to further
Taft’s political ambitions.

109

Chapter 5
To Elect and Not To Select
Now Let’s All Roll Up our Sleeves and Get to Work
Reece rejoiced over the Republican win but cautioned against a careless attitude.
He reminded Republicans that Democrats still controlled the executive branch and that
Democratic presidents had appointed the majority of the judiciary. Reece called for
cooperation between the Democratic executive branch and the Republican legislative
branch, which he believed would happen if each avoided encroachment on the other’s
duties. The November and December Chairman’s Letter pointed out that initiating
legislation laid outside the president’s duties and that Congress reigned supreme in
matters of legislation. He asserted the president’s main duty involved execution of laws
regardless of his approval of them. Reece claimed that the legislature rather than the
Republican National Committee would set out the party program but at the same time
rallied Republicans with a cry of “Now let’s all roll up our sleeves and get to work to put
171

the Nation back in order.”

Republicans desired complete control of all branches of the government, but
Reece warned party members to put the legislative program ahead of the 1948
presidential election. Democratic Chairman Hannegan warned of the great responsibility
that came with the GOP victory. Reece considered the November elections a fork in the
road where voters turned to the right. He initially acknowledged that the Republican
National Committee could look at focusing on the 1948 election but later insisted that
171
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Republicans concentrate on fulfilling their legislative program. When questioned about a
possible candidate, Reece insisted that the function of the committee and its chairman
172

was “to elect, not select” the candidate.

Reece viewed 1947 as a foundational year to prepare for the next year’s
presidential election. The first opportunity for Republicans arrived with the mayoral
election in Chicago. Reece traveled to Cook County on January 18 to speak to
Republican precinct workers about the importance of the election and to campaign for the
GOP candidate, Russell W. Root. Papers considered the election part of the Republican
plan to gain support, and Reece called it an “important preliminary engagement” in the
battle for the White House. Reece reminded voters that the Chicago “Kelley machine”—
operating under former mayor Kelley—had a new candidate, and although he appeared
respectable, he would have to follow the directions of the machine to gain support. He
referred to Chicago as the “warming up for the big game next year.” Reece’s insistence
on the importance of Chicago turned disastrous when the Democratic candidate for
mayor won by almost 265,000 votes. Reece recanted his claim that 1948 hinged on the
Chicago election with a recollection that Chicago had a Democratic mayor for the
previous twenty-five years. He learned, however, that Republicans made a mistake by
campaigning on national issues rather than local issues and making sweeping
predictions.173
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Reece turned to the Republican legislature to restore the image of the Republican
Party. Truman opposed an immediate tax reduction in the fiscal budget to allow any
surplus to be applied to the public debt. In January, Reece sent a letter to 7,500
Republican office holders in Congress to encourage them to act on campaign promises.
He reiterated the importance of this in his Chairman’s Letter and called for the
Republican Congress to uphold campaign promises of reducing federal expenditures,
cutting individual income taxes, and reducing the national debt. Reece asserted that these
measures would prevent an economic tailspin and would return the government to one
based on law rather than on the whim of bureaucrats. He believed that the new
legislators needed to “clean up the mess inherited from fourteen years of Democrat
confusion and misrule and to set the nation on the high road to prosperity.” 174
Reece appealed to Republicans to work together through a sports analogy.
Reece’s March editorial in The Republican News likened the job of the GOP to a football
team and emphasized the necessity of working out differences “before the plays are
called.” He feared that Democrats would use dissent within the party to increase the
chances of a Democratic president in the 1948 election and to jeopardize the legislature’s
chance of enacting positive measures. This comment received wide coverage in the press
as evidence of a party split. Readers assumed that Taft bore the responsibility of
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quarterbacking the team and criticized Reece for emphasizing the party and asking
Congress members to follow the party line.

175

The most damaging criticism of Reece emerged from within the Republican
Party. Wayne Morse, the senator from Oregon, refused to stand by party decisions with
which he disagreed. Morse considered Reece’s attitude that of a “chore boy” to the
Republican Party and stressed that Reece’s attitude failed to represent that of the majority
of Republicans. He called for Republicans to move forward with Republican liberals
rather than backwards with Republican reactionaries. Reece tried to dispel rumors of a
major rift within the party by stating that although Morse did not always agree with party
leaders, there was “room in the party for people with different views. In fact, it is a
healthy thing for a party.”176
Reece received an opportunity to enhance the image of the Republican Party from
the hands of the new Democratic National Committee Chairman. In March 1947
Chairman Gael Sullivan sent Reece a draft letter that called for bi-partisan support of the
Truman Doctrine to extend aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent the spread of
communism. Sullivan claimed that Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a staunch
supporter of the Truman Doctrine, approved this measure as an incentive for Reece to
sign the letter. Although this would have seemed to be of great interest to Reece because
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of his ardent hatred of communism, Sullivan’s letter became an embarrassment to the
Democratic Party.

177

Reece chided Sullivan and his letter as a political tool to gain power. Reece noted
that Sullivan issued a statement to the press at the same time he sent the letter to Reece,
who was out of the office. He claimed that Sullivan knew that if the GOP complied and
signed the letter, it would appear to be a “me too” party. If it refused, it would suffer
criticism as being isolationist. Senator Vandenberg asserted that Sullivan used his name
without his knowledge or permission, and Truman announced that Sullivan had failed to
discuss the letter with him. Reece responded that policy must be approved by appropriate
branches of government, which excluded the national committees. He maintained that
committees served the parties as tools rather than as governors. “Since I do not own the
Republican Party,” Reece declared, “I do not propose to be put in the position of selling it
or giving it away.” Newspapers publicized the incident for days and called it a “brash
scheme” and the “No. 1 Blunder of 1947.” Reece successfully avoided forcing
Republicans to make an international commitment and at the same time debased the
Democratic Party.

178

Truman validated the Republican claim of communist infiltration of government
weeks after the 1946 campaign. He created the President’s Temporary Commission on
Employee Loyalty to set loyalty standards and establish procedures for removing disloyal
persons from federal jobs. The commission’s report caused Truman to issue Executive
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st

Order 9835 on March 21 , a measure that established a loyalty program as a requirement
for holding a federal job and commenced the first widespread investigation into possible
subversives in government. The order received bipartisan support in Congress, but Reece
uttered a backhanded compliment of the effort. He commented that if the order meant
what he hoped it meant, which was a true effort “to drive out those subversive termites
who have been using positions of power and influence under the present Administration
to undermine our form of government—then I am glad the President, however belatedly,
has adopted this important part of the program supported by the Republican Party and its
candidates in the 1946 campaign.”

179

In interviews the following month, Reece expressed doubt that Truman’s loyalty
order would be a success. He vowed that Republicans would cooperate with the
administration to purge the government of subversives, a problem that Republicans had
been complaining about for years. The responsibility for administering the plan fell on
the heads of various departments of government, and Reece claimed that these very
departments permitted radicals to infiltrate the government in the first place. Reece also
questioned Truman’s commitment to the purge since Truman wrote a letter the previous
month to George Earle, the governor of Pennsylvania, and referred to the problem as a
“Communist ‘bugaboo.’” Reece asserted that this indicated that Truman’s lack of
concern about communism being a serious issue.180
Reece continued his criticism of the Truman Administration as a means to
enhance the Republican chances in the 1948 presidential election. In January Reece
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disparaged Truman’s State of the Union address as vague with no specific
recommendations for laws to alleviate the nation’s problems. He accused Truman of
trying to appeal to the radical North and racially intolerant group of the Solid South in the
Democratic Party to get support for 1948. These were two of the divisions that Reece
asserted destroyed the Democratic Party and allowed Communists to infiltrate the
government. These were also two divisions that Reece courted to win votes for the
Republican Party. Reece touted the Republican Party as the only one that came into
being in order to abolish slavery, which he equated with communism. He argued that
thousands of fellow travelers still held positions in government office and allowed
radicals to dictate policy in order to remain in power. According to Reece, only
Republicans could restore good government.181
Republicans alleged that Truman hindered their goal of restoring prosperity to the
United States. Reece led the fight in highlighting Truman’s attempts to “sabotage”
Congress in enacting legislation it viewed as beneficial to the nation. The new Congress
suffered criticism for taking a long time to enact positive legislation, but Reece attributed
this delay to the legislators’ caution and desire to avoid hastily enacting new legislation
as the New Deal administration had done. In the April issue of The Republican News,
Reece credited rumors that Truman would veto Republican legislation to the same people
who claimed the Republican Congress had done nothing. He noted that it appeared to be
an inconsistency, “since if Congress did nothing, there would be nothing for the President
to veto.” Reece pointedly dared Truman to veto any of the legislation based on campaign
promises involving tax cuts, labor curbs, and a ban on portal-to-portal pay suits. Reece
181
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acknowledged that Truman would be acting within his rights as president but would fail
182

to discharge his duties in a proper manner since voters approved of the measures.

Truman vetoed a number of bills passed by Congress that eliminated some of the
New Deal reforms. Reece accused Truman of fighting “with every weapon at his
command” to prevent legislators from reducing high prices, expenditures, and taxes.
When Congress failed to override Truman’s veto of the tax reduction bill, Reece attacked
Truman for trying to prevent the fulfillment of a 1946 campaign promise. Reece claimed
that Truman’s veto kept the nation under a wartime economic structure even though the
war had ended. He reasoned that the treasury would not have lost money because low
taxes would have resulted in more business activity. Truman stated that he vetoed the tax
reduction bill because he feared it would bring on a recession. Reece claimed that
Truman’s veto continued the “tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect philosophy of
the now discredited New Deal” and asserted that Truman would propose another similar
reduction right before the next election.183
The most prominent attack against New Deal legislation came with the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act. A
criticism of the Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act made a closed shop illegal,
allowed states to pass right-to-work laws, and gave the president the power to call for a
cooling-off period before a strike that would endanger national safety or health. Truman
immediately vetoed the bill because he said the bill was “unfair, wouldn’t work, would
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promote strikes and labor discord, and would plunge the hand of government further into
the affairs of working people and their employers.” His veto also served as an appeal to
organized labor to support the Democratic Party.

184

Truman’s veto provoked outrage from the Republican Party. Defending his good
friend and co-author of the bill, Reece called Truman’s veto a bid for a fifth New Deal
term and an attempt to maintain an alliance with the subversive elements of the CIOPAC. He equated the worker’s right to work with the importance of a worker’s right to
strike. The House majority leader insisted that Truman had allowed radicals and
Communists who wanted to see the economy falter influence his decision. Republicans
threatened to propose an anti-lynching bill in retaliation against southern Democrats
unless they voted to override the veto. They had used this tactic when they introduced an
anti-poll tax bill after Democrats “helped kill the income tax reduction bill.” Both houses
of Congress overrode Truman’s veto the same day, and the GOP claimed victory.185
The Taft-Hartley bill became one of the crowning achievements of the 1946
Republican Congress. Taft considered the bill “an attempt to restore some equality
between employer and employee” which allowed for free collective bargaining without
government interference. Taft recognized the power of labor leaders but wanted to
prevent their power from becoming arbitrary. Hartley believed that “America wanted a
new labor law. America needed a new labor law.” Both Taft and Hartley asserted their
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bill eliminated the elements that caused industrial conflict. Reece later applauded the
inability of future Democratic Congresses to amend the Taft-Hartley bill.

186

The organizational responsibilities of his chairmanship forced Reece to turn his
attention to the selection of a city to hold the 1948 Republican National Convention.
Chicago and Atlantic City emerged as early choices, and then one congressman
telegraphed Reece that Philadelphia would be timely as the birthplace of American
independence, especially since the party was trying to make the 1948 campaign about
returning the government to the people. When the April 21st meeting arrived, the choice
had narrowed to Chicago and Philadelphia. Taft supporters wanted Chicago as the
convention site since it was nearer to his home state of Ohio, while Dewey supporters
chose Philadelphia for the same reasons. Philadelphia offered the convention $200,000
as incentive to hold the convention, and Chicago offered $100,000 plus a rent-free
convention hall with decorations. Reece claimed that he favored Chicago because it was
a more logical choice from the standpoint of geography and facilities, but in truth he
wanted to give Taft an advantage in the presidential nomination. At the vote,
Philadelphia’s large donation became the deciding factor in choosing that city over
Chicago to hold the 1948 convention. Reece’s only consolation at losing the Chicago
convention site came when the executive committee gave him the authorization to
appoint the committees on arrangement, rules, and contests for the convention, which in
essence allowed him to stack the committees in favor of Taft.187
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Price controls continued to be a source of contention for most Americans. Reece
again tried to connect high prices to communism, calling price controls a “favorite
weapon of the red fascists because it gives them power to control the lives of all people.”
He blamed high prices on the administration, reasoning that they resulted from too much
money in circulation and the increasing cost of production brought on by wage increases.
He believed New Deal programs resulted in Americans not working as hard as they used
to work because of the numerous government handouts. Reece reasoned that price
controls not only limited the price on the final good, but also controlled the price of
everything that went into making it and prevented free exchange among people. After
the president removed and then reinitiated the price control on meat, he opposed the
president’s power to fix prices and wages as a “cop in every kitchen” philosophy.188
Reece recognized that he could associate the Democratic administration with
communism only to a point before he would anger the entire voting population. He
acknowledged that not all members of the Democratic Party were Communists or
subversives and admitted that he knew many Democrats in Congress who were very
patriotic. Reece also shied away from directly charging the president with having
communist sympathies. “I am not accusing President Truman, or his immediate advisors,
of any conscious purpose to subvert our form of government or to destroy our economic
system,” Reece proclaimed. “Mr. Truman, I am sure, is no more of a communist than I
am.” Reece realized that “communists in government” allegations made issues more
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vital to the population, but accusing the nation’s leader of being a Communist made the
189

Republican Party look scandalous.

The TVA returned to haunt Reece as he campaigned for the Republican Party.
During 1947, Reece corresponded with many constituents in his home district about the
TVA proposal to build a power line through much of Johnson City. Reece’s constituents
expressed dismay that the proposed power line would take a right-of-way through much
personal property and the heart of town. They pleaded with Reece to work with the TVA
to reroute the line so that it would lessen the division of personal property. Reece,
190

however, failed to persuade the TVA to alter its plans.

Many Tennesseans feared and disliked TVA programs to improve literacy and
education because they felt it extended the reach of the federal government too far. Guy
L. Smith, the editor of the Knoxville Journal, wrote Reece that the TVA proposed
“another one of those . . . schemes to further socialize the American scene.” Reece
refused to comment on the appointment of David Lilienthal, director of the TVA, as
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission because he asserted it went beyond partisan
issues. It is quite likely, however, that he strongly opposed the appointment because of a
personal grudge against Lilienthal. By mid-1947, a story began circulating that Reece
tried to prevent TVA from building power lines in East Tennessee in 1943. The current
power provider, East Tennessee Light and Power Company, reorganized, and
communities petitioned TVA for cheaper power. Reece urged Tennessee legislators to
create a new utilities district in upper East Tennessee controlled by a board of three men,
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with Reece as chairman. This would have allowed him to keep TVA out of his district.
Lilienthal opposed Reece’s plan and helped defeat it in the state legislature. Many
credited Reece’s opposition to Lilienthal, and later that of Robert Taft, to political
retribution.191
Reece’s job of campaigning for Republican candidates became more difficult as
divisions developed within the party. In March, Reece received a letter from newly
elected Senator Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut and fifteen other new senators
complaining that Eugene Milliken, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, failed
to consult the new Republicans in policy-making. Reece replied to Baldwin with a
courteous letter that offered research and publicity facilities of the national committee.
Reece cautioned that Congress needed time to adequately consider legislation before
approval and acknowledged that Republican constituents were becoming impatient. He
offered to consider Baldwin’s ideas in founding the party program. Baldwin replied that
he was pleased Reece agreed to closer communication between the national committee
and Congress.192
Reece pacified the new congressmen with promises of things to come, but he
failed to achieve the same result with veterans of Congress. In November, George Aiken
the Republican senator from Vermont, advised Reece to resign his post as chairman of
the Republican National Committee. This followed an article in the New York Times that
labeled Reece a “Republican albatross” that was responsible for putting the party’s
“worst face forward.” Senator Aiken declared that Reece failed to win the confidence of
191
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the public and considered it a mistake to leave him at the head of the party. Senator
Charles Tobey, from New Hampshire, requested that Reece issue a manifesto assuring
the nation that Republicans were Americans first and not blind followers of the party
platform. Tobey wanted the American public to understand that Republicans would
cooperate with Democrats on matters of foreign policy. He accused Reece of discounting
the general public and using sarcasm and innuendo rather than common sense in
Republican policy statements. Aiken received little support among Republicans because
many considered him a party irregular and one of the more radical members of the party.
Reece’s victory in 1946 also gave him good standing within the party. Reece refused to
resign, and although many assumed he would be encouraged to limit his statements to
safer subjects, he prepared for the upcoming fight for the presidential nomination.193
We Are All Republicans Together
By early 1948 four men had announced their candidacy for the presidency. In late
1947 Robert Taft gathered a group together to assess the possibility of his nomination and
embarked on a trip across the nation under the obvious guise of promoting the work of
Congress. He relied on his friends in Ohio to run his campaign, and they worked to
humanize Taft to the voters. Thomas Dewey also decided to run for the nomination,
leaving Republicans with the choice between Taft and Dewey. As early as July 1947
Republicans acknowledged that the Democratic candidate would be Harry Truman and
criticized him for working on his campaign rather than running the government. Henry
Wallace emerged as the final candidate, running as a third party movement. Reece
193
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announced that Wallace’s candidacy marked the separation of the “Moscow wing” of the
Democratic Party from the “Pendergast wing.” He hoped that this division would allow
the Republican Party to win a majority of the votes and the presidency. When Truman
tried to coerce Wallace back into the Democratic Party in early January 1948, Reece
pronounced it an attempt to restore the Moscow wing of the party.194
Reece again tried to emphasize the Republican Party as a liberal party. He
declared in February that all Americans, regardless of party affiliation, lived on the same
boat. “If we go on the rocks,” Reece declared, “we all sink together.” He believed it
therefore necessary to elect a Republican president they could trust since the Republican
Party “has always defended the peoples’ rights against abuse or attempted abuse by their
government. That is why it is the Liberal Party.” Reece tried to convince the voters that
during the last two Democratic administrations the nation had become engaged in war but
lost the peace. Reece’s conservative Republican assertion that his party epitomized
liberalism convinced few voters, forcing him to utilize other tactics. 195
A number of events in 1948 increased concern over communism in the American
government. HUAC asserted that it sought to “ascertain facts relating to subversive
activities and propaganda” rather than charge any individual with a crime. HUAC’s 1948
hearings, however, became more widely publicized and sensationalized than any in its
past. Espionage hearings began when ex-communist Elizabeth Bentley testified that she
received confidential information from a government official and communist agent,
194
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William Remington. The FBI forced Remington’s ex-wife to testify and followed his
attorney to gather enough evidence to convict Remington, who was beaten to death in
prison the following year. Another ex-communist, Whittaker Chambers, identified
government employee Alger Hiss as an informant from whom he received numerous
documents. Chambers’ testimony elicited little more than skepticism until he produced
the “Pumpkin Papers,” seemingly concrete proof that Hiss had supplied him with
government documents.196
Reece and the Republicans picked up on the fear generated by these incidents to
st

attack the Democratic Party. His February 1 Chairman’s Letter proclaimed “general
agreement that the greatest menace confronting our nation today is world communism.”
He attempted to inflame the situation the following month when he predicted that if
World War III occurred, it would be between the United States and Russia. This, Reece
asserted, increased the need to remove all Communist Party members and fellowtravelers from government in order to prevent espionage. He asserted that the
administration possessed evidence of subversives in government employment but had
197

become too tolerant to do anything to combat the problem.

Reece advertised a Republican president as the only means to rid the government
of subversives. He stressed that Communists damaged a nation by destroying four
crucial elements: a worker’s job loyalty, the belief in private property, the value of
money, and the belief in God. Reece tried to reverse his isolationist label by stating that
196
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neutrality in world events had become impossible and that communism could be the
common enemy that would unite nations aside from past tensions. He defined American
support of communism as “nothing more than organized treason” and blamed the New
Deal policies and administration for the threat of advancing communism in the world.
Reece asserted that only a Republican president could meet the challenge of ensuring
safety at home and preventing the spread of communism abroad.198
Tension between the administration and Congress over subversion reached a
breaking point during HUAC’s investigation of Dr. Edward Condon. The atomic
scientist faced accusations of turning over secrets regarding the atomic bomb to the
Communist Party. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, submitted a letter regarding
Condon’s loyalty to Truman, which he subsequently refused to disclose to the
congressional committee. Reece proclaimed this to be a direct challenge to the right of
representatives in Congress to full information regarding public offices. He stated that
Congress created the FBI and considered it “completely ridiculous to argue that the
Congress which created these agencies of government is not entitled to know how they
are being administered.” Reece insisted that the issue involved the structure and powers
of the government rather than political parties, but he accused Truman of adhering to
New Deal philosophy that the “President is the government.” Although he did not
advocate impeachment, Reece listed it as among the recourses that Congress could take
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to force Truman to release the information. Truman refused to budge, and HUAC failed
to convict Condon of wrongdoing.

199

Reece recognized that some voters desired a more concrete reason to vote for the
Republican Party than a rehash of the 1946 campaign. Reece’s solution to this involved
associating the Truman administration with the Pendergast machine in Kansas City. He
accused Truman of maintaining a close association with Pendergast and hinted at vote
fraud in the 1946 election. Reece claimed that the defeat of the Pendergast-backed
congressional candidate in 1946 showed that Kansas City voters disapproved of Truman.
The March 1948 Chairman’s Letter stated that the time had come to remove the radical
Pendergast influence from the administration, as the presidential race had become one of
“Republicanism vs. Pendergastism.” Ignoring the fact that he had his own “machine” in
his home district, Reece altered his “changing horses mid-stream” adage by claiming that
the horse should have had enough sense to get out of the stream by that point. He
attempted to play on the American animosity towards politically-dominant machines to
garner votes and portrayed the Republican Party as machine-free.200
In June, Truman announced a non-political transcontinental tour through the
West. Reece immediately attacked this as a misuse of public funds and commented that
the tour was as non-political as the Pendergast Machine, a quote widely reprinted in
newspapers. Truman stated that a congressional fund established for presidential duties
funded Truman’s tour, even though Reece felt that everyone clearly saw it as a stumping
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tour for Democrats. Reece speculated that Truman would try to explain his noncooperation with Congress and his vetoes. He sarcastically remarked that Truman
omitted Kansas City on his tour schedule, even though “it might have been assumed that
the President would want to pause in Kansas City long enough to lay a few wreaths on
the tombstones of the ghosts who voted for him in such large numbers during his
campaigns for the Senate in 1934 and 1940.”201
The upcoming Republican National Convention forced Reece to turn his attention
momentarily to organizational matters. Throughout 1947 Reece attended to matters
regarding convention committees, songs to be sung, the inclusion of women and blacks,
the appointment of pages, and the use of motion picture cameras at the convention. He
concerned himself with raising money to fund the convention and the Republican Party
and promoting the party in the best light possible. The Reece archives contain countless
letters from Reece and his staff to other party members regarding participation from them
or requests to include a constituent in the convention process. Reece’s talent for
delegation allowed him to utilize his staff to respond to most of these requests.
The first real challenge to the convention came when competing Republican
factions fought for delegate seating. As early as February 1948 conflict arose among
Republicans in Alaska over the selection of delegates. Taft wrote to Reece inquiring
about the status, and although Reece omitted the nature of the conflict, he responded that
the action being taken fell in line with convention rules. In May, two Georgia
Republican factions clashed over which would be seated at the convention. One faction
favored Dewey for the presidential nomination, while the other favored Taft. Although
201
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Georgia’s Republican National Committeemen favored the Dewey faction, the Taft
faction possessed a telegram from Reece recognizing it as the official delegation from
Georgia. The following month, newspapers reported that a secret vote taken at the
convention seated the pro-Dewey faction of delegates. In retaliation, Reece accused one
of the Georgia delegates of “having tried to browbeat him in his office.”202
Reece opened the convention on June 21 with the declaration that the Republican
Party and the Communist Party formed the two most powerful political forces in the
world. He called fellow travelers the “typhoid Mary’s of communism” that assimilated
into the New Deal administration and insisted that a Republican president constituted the
first step to eradicate the problem of communism. He claimed that the current
administration had been in power too long to combat the spread of communism. Reece
acknowledged dissent among Republicans for the first time and stated that although many
disagreed on method, “they never disagree as to the final objectives.” He declared that
the Republican Party had “no radical wing, no Moscow wing, no Pendergast wing. No
right wing, no left wing.” The convention responded to Reece’s address with a fiveminute standing ovation.
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Tennessee showed its support for Reece by nominating him as a “favorite son”
candidate for the presidential nomination. Tennessee Republicans began the drive as
early as February 1947 without any outward show of support from Reece. They credited
Reece for the party’s success in the November 1946 elections and began activity on his
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behalf. Few truly believed that Reece could win the nomination and considered the
movement complimentary to show that Reece maintained control of the state. In late
April 1948 Reece had to work to repair a three-way split among Tennessee Republicans
about who would be named delegates to the state convention. The group divided over the
federal civil rights program and the federal poll tax repeal bill. The delegates decided to
back Reece on the first ballot for president but voted against the federal program because
of a fear that the federal government would extend its influence into other areas of life.204
Although Reece favored the civil rights program, he wanted his name on the
presidential ballot because of the influence it would have on his political standing if a
Republican won election to the White House. He declared that he would remain neutral
and outside of the discussion, but in the end he allowed the delegates to announce their
support for him on the ballot. The New York Times declared the move to allow the
favorite son vote a “situation without parallel in the modern history of the Republican
party.” It acknowledged that Washington recognized the absence of Reece’s presidential
ambitions but knew that Reece wanted to hold the delegation together so its vote could be
used for another candidate on subsequent ballots.
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Throughout his chairmanship, Reece adamantly declared that he remained free of
bias regarding the presidential nomination. Everyone who knew him, however,
recognized his devotion to Taft. Actions such as his support of Chicago as the
convention site and the favoring of the pro-Taft delegation from Georgia clearly
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illustrated his preference to Taft and made his proclamations of neutrality less authentic.
On the fourth day of the convention, the first ballot showed fifteen of the twenty-two
delegates from Tennessee for Reece. Dewey garnered 434 votes to Taft’s 224. On the
second ballot, thirteen of Tennessee’s delegates obediently switched to Taft, but his 274
votes failed to win him the nomination. With 515 votes, Dewey accepted the Republican
nomination for president as Taft conceded defeat. 206
True to his Party, Reece supported Dewey’s nomination and remained positive
that Republicans would carry the South and the presidency. In his last issue of The
Republican News, Reece acknowledged that the convention would be hard fought and the
voters would determine the fate of the nation in November. He pleaded with Republicans
that “when it is all over, let us remember that we are all Republicans together.” Reece
hid his disappointment at Taft’s loss to don the veneer of loyalty to the party. His
position as Republican National Chairman proved to be of little use to Taft because his
support for Taft opened Reece to more criticism than Taft supporters could overcome.207
Dewey’s nomination for president meant that Reece’s time as chairman had come
to an end. Dewey praised Reece for his effectiveness in winning the 1946 elections and
organizing the party for the upcoming presidential election. Dewey took advantage of the
option to select a chairman who would provide more momentum for his campaign.
Reece resigned from the chairmanship and planned to return to his Tennessee district.
Dewey immediately asked for his assistance in the presidential campaign and speculation
arose over the possibility of Reece running for Senator. Reece’s national prominence
ebbed, but his local dominance remained strong.
206
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You’ve Got to Measure the Cloth Before you Cut It
After his resignation, Reece initially claimed that his political career had ended.
Before the elections, he wrote to a fellow Republican that after he gave up his
congressional career for the chairmanship, his political ambition ebbed. “I am not
running for office, am not running anyone for office,” Reece asserted, “and do not expect
to ever hold office. After we win in 1948 I plan to go back to the Great Smokies and
enjoy myself for a few years.” 208 Reece made this statement at a time when he expected
to help Taft win the presidency and thus a cabinet post for himself. Taft’s failure to
capture the Republican nomination for president forced Reece to reevaluate his decision
to retire completely from public life.
Reece’s friends in Tennessee also felt that Reece needed to remain in public
politics. In January 1948 GOP leaders in East Tennessee consulted with those in West
and Middle Tennessee to discuss the possibility of Reece running in the senatorial race
that year. The idea originated with Guy Smith, editor of the Knoxville Journal and friend
of Reece. The group talked about the possibility of Reece’s candidacy without formally
consulting him regarding his intentions. Tennessee law allowed a person to qualify for a
primary without candidate consent, so the group decided to enter Reece in the senatorial
primary. After his resignation, rumors began to circulate that Reece would indeed run for
the Senate seat. When questioned about his candidacy, Reece responded that “You’ve
got to measure the cloth before you cut it . . . I’ve got to do a little measuring.”209
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Reece soon realized that the Senate seat would be his only chance to return to
Washington in 1948. The campaign for his House seat had been well under way for a
number of months, and Reece may have felt that returning to that position would reduce
his political standing more than his failure to secure the presidential nomination for Taft.
Reece had the support of the GOP for the Senate seat, but he would have to campaign
against his Republican successor in the primary and against the Democratic nominee in
November to return to the House. On July 19th Reece announced that his name would be
on the ballot for Tennessee’s Senate seat. Reece supporters immediately referred to his
service as chairman of the Republican National Committee as reason to elect him. They
noted that he left his successor $800,000 in the treasury and had become a force in the
party. These skills, they argued, would greatly benefit him in the Senate. 210
Republicans felt relatively certain of their ability to elect Reece as a result of a
split among Tennessee Democrats. Estes Kefauver, a Chattanooga attorney, first ran for
political office in 1938, when he announced his candidacy for the Tennessee state Senate.
He lost to the incumbent but remained involved in state government as Finance and
Taxation Commissioner. Samuel McReynolds, the Democratic U.S. Representative, died
in 1939, and Kefauver decided to run for his vacant seat. With the support of Memphis’
Crump machine, Kefauver went to Washington, where he made a name for himself
among Democrats by supporting TVA and the New Deal and voting independently. In
1946 Kefauver supported an anti-Crump candidate for Tennessee’s Senate seat, Edward
W. Carmack of Murfreesboro, and earned the animosity of Crump Democrats.211
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When he decided to run for the Senate in 1948 without Crump’s approval,
Kefauver braced for a fight. Crump attacked Kefauver as a “pet coon” and soft on
communism, prompting Kefauver to don a coonskin hat that he wore around the
campaign trail, giving him state-wide recognition. The Democratic primary involved
Kefauver and two other candidates—one who had lost Crump’s support because of
political blunders and another supported by Crump. Kefauver won forty-two percent of
the state vote and shattered Crump’s stronghold in Tennessee. He criticized the longstanding agreement between East Tennessee Republicans and the Crump machine that
prevented true two-party politics. Republicans saw Kefauver’s win as a great advantage
to Reece. They assumed that Crump forces would either support the Republican
candidate or stay away from the polls. In early October rumors circulated that Crump
agreed to back Reece, but Crump denied making a deal with anyone and stated that he
held no interest in politics. In the end, Crump agreed to a truce with Kefauver—Crump
denied his support but withdrew any opposition to him.212
As the campaign started in full-swing, Reece again turned to his stand-by of
communism to gain voter support. He proclaimed the foremost question to be one of
whether voters could stop the “collectivist movement in our government” rather than one
of differences between political parties. He considered liberals, radicals, left-wingers,
reds, and pinks to be all of the same camp wanting to rule the people through
Washington. He declared his opponent—Reece never called Kefauver by name during
the campaign—was held captive by left-wing forces. He accused Kefauver of being part
of the problem in Washington that led to an increased number of Communists in
212
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government offices. According to Reece, the struggle came down to a fight “between the
American way of living, the Southern way of living, and an alien force that was born
213

behind the Iron Curtain of Europe.”

Reece embarked on a cross-state tour of Tennessee with the GOP gubernatorial
candidate and country music star, Roy Acuff. Acuff brought his band, the Smoky
Mountain Boys, with them on their tour and entertained the crowds with music and antics
such as balancing his violin bow on his nose. While it would seem that voters would be
put off by such unconventional campaigning because Acuff rarely ever spoke on current
issues or his stance on these issues, these shows actually garnered more attendance than
most Democratic functions. Unfortunately for Reece, many in the crowd came more to
hear Acuff’s performance than Reece’s speeches, and some cried for Reece to finish so
they could hear the show. Acuff often played with his band in lieu of a formal speech,
and some papers actually began to consider Reece a liability to the Acuff campaign. The
only negative response the campaigners received came at a rally in Kingsport, Tennessee,
on September 7th. A few in the crowd met Reece and Acuff with a barrage of eggs,
214

tomatoes, and grapefruit, but local officials quickly subdued the disgruntled voters.

Reece encountered a number of problems when voters questioned his legislative
record. The most intense criticism of Reece came from those who accused him of
changing his viewpoints once he became a senatorial candidate. Opponents of Reece
charged him with becoming a states’ rights proponent after voting for the federal antilynching law and for the repeal of the poll tax in federal elections. The TVA again
213
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appeared in the election campaign when campaign material noted that Reece voted
against the Norris Bill. His actions to unite the Republican Party while chairman hurt
local credibility when Democrats reminded voters that although Reece claimed to be a
southerner, he declared at the Elks Club in New York that the southern block of the
Democratic Party plunged the nation into war. One local paper claimed that Reece’s
attachment to the Acuff band presented the best way for people to listen to him since he
preceded the performance. Had it occurred in the opposite order, the paper speculated,
very few would stay to hear Reece “turn his back on his Republican record in congress in
favor of his apparently recent ‘conversion’ to TVA, democracy, and other Democratic
215

principles.”

Reece recognized that the influence he carried in his home district might not
extend to the entire state, and he needed to ensure that he took the right steps to present
his record and his strategy in the best light. For the first time, Reece hired a professional
publicist to help in the campaign. His independent wealth again became a factor when
critics complained about the amount of money he spent on the statewide campaign.
Opponents publicized Reece’s votes against New Deal legislation that affected farming,
banks, and public utilities. Reece responded to his attackers by speaking against the Fair
Employment Practices Commission being imposed on states. He called it another avenue
to destroy states’ rights and a deceptive New Deal scheme. He spoke in support of the
Taft-Hartley Act and promised to work for the advancement and expansion of the TVA.
In a desperate attempt to tarnish Kefauver’s reputation, he advertised that his opponent
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voted against HUAC, the only organization trying to bring subversives to light, and also
216

took money from the CIO.

Reece requested the support of national Republicans to bolster his campaign and
his chances for election. In September Reece flew to New York to seek the help of
presidential candidate Dewey. Dewey agreed to support Reece’s candidacy, but in his
senatorial aid campaign Dewey pointedly avoided a stop in Tennessee, which many
accredited to recognition that Kefauver would win the state. To combat rumors that
Dewey responded with a lukewarm reception of Reece because of his support of Taft,
Herbert Brownell, Dewey’s campaign manager and former GOP chairman, urged
Tennesseans to vote for Reece to ensure unity between the White House and Congress.
Local papers pointed out with a hint of irony that the last time Reece requested support
from a president, he lost the campaign.217
In October Taft flew to Tennessee to remove suspicion that he blamed Reece for
his failure to capture the presidential nomination. Rumors circulated that some Taft
supporters charged Reece with not using his influence in the right way, especially after
the deciding vote for seating the pro-Dewey Georgia delegation came from the Tennessee
member of the credentials committee. Taft spoke at rallies in Nashville, Crossville, and
Knoxville and urged voters to elect Reece, who Taft claimed to have the interest of
Tennessee at heart. He accused Kefauver of being a staunch supporter of the New Deal
and working against the Taft-Hartley Act. Even though Taft’s presence garnered large
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crowds at the rallies, some citizens took offense at Taft’s appearance in a state campaign
and questioned his authority to involve himself in their election.

218

As the election neared voters questioned why the candidates had failed to
organize a joint debate. In September Kefauver challenged Reece to a public debate, but
the GOP stalled giving their consent. On September 14th Reece accepted Kefauver’s
challenge but suggested a state-wide hookup to a Nashville radio station with each
candidate paying for half of the costs. Kefauver favored a platform debate with the
opportunity for voters to pose questions to the candidates, but he agreed to a radio debate
if it could be opened to the public. Newspapers published a number of articles crediting
both candidates with a call for the other candidate to “put up or shut up,” increasing the
confusion over who agreed to a debate and what format would be used. On September
22nd, Kefauver announced he would call off the entire debate if Reece would not work on
any terms but his own. Reece, perhaps wary of having to answer voter questions without
a prepared script because of his speech impediment, avoided the public debate while
attributing the cause to a difference in the set-up of the debate platform rather than his
unwillingness.

219

When the Reece-Acuff campaign ended in Nashville, both candidates were
positive that they would win their respective offices. Papers estimated that a crowd of
6,500-15,000 attended their closing rally. The final vote crushed Republican hopes when
Acuff lost to the Democratic candidate and Kefauver defeated Reece by over 120,000
votes. Truman defeated Dewey in the presidential campaign. The Republican victory of
218

Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 34, BCR Papers, Box 43; Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 35, BCR
Papers, Box 44; Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 40, BCR Papers, Box 47.
219
Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 34, BCR Papers, Box 43;Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 35, BCR
Papers, Box 44.

138

1946 proved to be short lived when Democrats regained a majority in Congress.
Democrats maintained control through 1994, with the exception of Eisenhower’s first
term from 1953-1955. Kefauver telegrammed Reece and thanked him for the “hard clean
campaign” that he ran and his “good sportsmanship.” He requested Reece’s cooperation
as the nation united behind their new president.220
In two short years, Reece rose and fell from the highest position in the Republican
Party. His organizational skills and determination helped Republicans win a majority in
Congress in 1946, but he failed to win the presidential nomination for his close friend and
political ally, Robert Taft. Dewey’s win became both Taft’s and Reece’s loss, as Reece
resigned the chairmanship in place of someone more favorable to Dewey. He returned to
Tennessee with hopes of a return to politics through Tennessee’s senatorial race. The
machine that Reece built in the First District had saved his career a number of times in
the campaign for U.S. Representative but fell short in a state-wide election to convince
voters he was anything other than a reactionary conservative from the Old Guard. Even
the heavy machinery of Taft and Dewey failed to aid Reece any better than Hoover’s
support had in 1930. For only the second time since 1920, Reece returned to Tennessee
without any political office. Reece could neither select nor elect the winner of the
Republican nomination for president or Tennessee senator.
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Chapter 6
Morality Must Be Restored
An Almost Unprecedented Demand That I Run
Dewey’s loss in the 1948 presidential election brought turmoil to the Republican
National Committee. Anti-Dewey forces within the Republican Party blamed Reece’s
replacement as chairman, Hugh D. Scott, Jr., for the defeat. Rumors circulated in late
December 1948 that Reece might consider an attempt to regain the chairmanship. Scott
refused to resign his position on the basis that he received a four-year appointment. By
January 1949 an increasing rift in the party became apparent as Taft and other
Republicans censured Scott for the amount of money he spent in what they considered a
“me too” campaign. They also condemned Scott for staffing the executive committee
with Dewey supporters, a violation of his former pledge of neutrality. The New York
Times quoted an editorial in the Chicago Tribune that “Scott is through” and that “the
man to replace him is Carroll Reece, the only National Chairman in twenty years to lead
the party to victory in a national election.” Senator Taft, however, recognized the
improbability of reinstating Reece as chairman.

221

A formal movement to replace Scott as chairman made his position increasingly
tenuous. Reece and Harrison E. Spangler, a former national chairman from Iowa, both
announced their belief that Scott should resign. They criticized him for maintaining his
seat in the House of Representatives while he served as chairman. Scott retorted that
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perhaps Reece regretted his mistake in resigning his own House seat. At a special
th

meeting on January 27 , the motion to remove Scott from his position failed by a vote of
50 to 54. As a compromise, Scott agreed to revise the make-up of the executive
committee and included Reece as one of the new members. Reece charged that the
Dewey cabinet failed to give adequate support to senatorial campaigns, including
Reece’s, in the individual states. Supporters of Scott claimed that the National
Committee gave Scott’s program too little time to work.222
The turmoil over the chairmanship prompted Reece to assure his former
th

constituents of his desire to remain in East Tennessee. At the 100 birthday celebration
of Boone, North Carolina, friends of Reece attended with the expectation that during his
speech Reece would announce plans to regain his old seat in the House. The celebration
turned into a rally as all but one of the attendees belonged to the Republican Party. Reece
avowed that living among the people of East Tennessee could not be duplicated in any
other part of the world and that no position could induce him to give up living among the
people in East Tennessee and western North Carolina. When an empty treasury
motivated the GOP to remove Scott from his post, Reece refused to let his name be used
in connection with the chairmanship. He participated in conferences to discuss Scott’s
replacement and helped secure the selection of Guy G. Gabrielson—Taft’s favorite
candidate—as Scott’s successor. Reece called Gabrielson “a man of demonstrated
capacity who will make a great chairman” and lead the party to victory in 1950.223
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Reece’s lack of public office allowed him to focus more time on civic activities.
In August 1949 as a member of the Industrial Committee of the Board of Directors of the
Carter County Chamber of Commerce, Reece helped influence the American Lucoflex
Company and the E.L. Cournand Company to locate new plants in the county. The
Chamber of Commerce sent Reece to New York to keep the E.L. Cournand Company
interested in the town of Elizabethton after negotiations with local bankers failed. The
E.L. Cournand Company made plexi-glass airplane turrets for the Air Corps, and the
American Lucoflex Company manufactured synthetic materials. Together, both plants
would employ almost 500 people. Reece began speaking at a number of civic events and
local festivals, and in November 1949 Carson Newman College named him as a trustee.
The next month the American Lucoflex Company elected him chairman of its board of
directors.224
Reece also increased his personal business activity during this time. Between
1939 and 1945, Reece helped found four regional banks: Carter County Bank in
Elizabethton, First National Bank of Jonesborough, Farmers Bank of Blountville, and
Sullivan County Bank. In late 1949 he announced a branch of Carter County Bank that
would open at Roan Mountain in March 1950. On February 21, 1950, Reece purchased
the Bristol Herald Courier, an independent Democratic newspaper operated in the city of
Bristol on the Tennessee-Virginia border, for the sum of $500,000. Reece promised to
keep the current staff and operational policies of the paper. He also purchased half
interest in the Virginia-Tennessean, which then acquired half interest in the Bristol
Herald Courier through a special merger arrangement. Each paper owned half of the
224
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other paper in a joint operating company. This allowed them to remain competitive
editorially with the Bristol Herald Courier printing the morning edition and the VirginiaTennessean printing the evening edition. Reece upheld his promise to allow the paper to
remain an independent Democratic publication, and the staff reserved the right to
disagree politically while acknowledging his business acumen.225
Throughout the early months of 1950 residents in the First District anxiously
awaited a formal announcement from Reece confirming the long-circulated rumors that
he would run in the election for his old House seat. In February, the Carter County GOP
split into two sets of Republican Party officers—one supporting Reece and the other
supporting the current First District Representative, Dayton Phillips. By March, a
number of other counties endorsed Reece for the Republican nomination. At the April
21st state GOP meeting, Reece remained cool towards Phillips because of his refusal to
consider two of Reece’s nominations for patronage positions. The generosity Reece
showed Phillips during his attempts to be discharged from the army during WWII had
disappeared. Guy Smith, who had become the state GOP head, recognized the Carter
County faction that supported Reece, even though Carter County was Phillips’ home
226

county.

On May 20th Reece ended speculation and announced his candidacy for the First
District Seat in the House of Representatives. Phillips also simultaneously announced his
intentions to run for reelection. In a speech announcing his candidacy, Reece stated that

225

Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 42, BCR Papers, Box 48; “Reece Purchases Paper,” New York Times,
22 February 1950, p. 20. Reece sold the newspapers to General Newspapers, Inc. in April 1951 for an
undisclosed amount in order to devote more time to his official duties and the “emergency confronting our
country.” Newspaper Article dated 2 April 1951 in Scrapbook 44, BCR Papers, Box 49.
226
Newspaper Articles in Scrapbook 42, BCR Papers, Box 48.

143

he resigned his seat in 1946 to devote time to leading the party in efforts to regain control
of Congress. He noted that at the time he resigned his chairmanship in 1948, “it was not
my purpose to run for Congress again, and in no way did I attempt to influence the
selection of my successor. But now there appears to be an almost unprecedented demand
that I run.” He accredited the petitions generated in the district with convincing him to
enter the campaign. Reece pointed to his experience as congressman and his
chairmanship of the GOP as distinct advantages to the district. He asserted that as
chairman he “led the fight against Communist infiltration in our government” and that the
world approached a “showdown” between “freedom under a system of government
which protects the liberty of the individual, or serfdom under a system of government in
which the individual has no rights except those bestowed by the state.” Reece accused
Phillips of departing from Republican leadership by voting against the Taft-Hartley Act,
and in an indirect slur, pointed out that when he volunteered for WWI he “asked no
favors of my Congressman, nor anyone else, and I received none.”227
Reece’s announcement immediately provoked responses from the conservative
th

and liberal factions of the Republican Party. On May 27 former GOP Chairman Scott
criticized the Republican Party in the South and what he described as the “hard-bitten
professionals” who ran it. He hinted at deals made with Democratic leaders and accused
Reece of maintaining an alliance with Democrat boss E.H. Crump. Scott pointed out that
Reece even published a Democratic newspaper. He claimed that actions such as these
damaged the Republican Party in the South. Reece attributed Scott’s remarks to Reece’s
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involvement in the movement to replace Scott “after he needlessly led the Republican
Party to its political Waterloo in 1948.” Crump denied making any deals with
Republicans and Taft came to the defense of Reece and southern Republicans. “No one
with any sense would question Carroll Reece’s Republicanism,” Taft declared. “In 1948
he put on the most strenuous Republican campaign Tennessee has ever seen.” In a letter
to Reece, Taft expressed delight that Reece entered the campaign and said he looked
“forward to welcoming you again here in Washington. Hugh Scott is and always has
been a complete screw-ball.” 228
Reece campaigned on the assertion that a radical element was trying to take
control in America. He stated that deficit spending would be the downfall of the nation if
continued and that “destructive taxation will ultimately destroy the principles of
government.” He pronounced the concessions at Yalta and Potsdam as the causes of the
Iron Curtain. Reece asserted that if he had been in Congress, he would have voted
against the Korean Aid Bill, which he believed could have prevented the Korean War.
He called attention to the fact that the bill was defeated by one vote and that Phillips
could have tied the vote had he been present. He cited numerous absences of Phillips for
three months during important votes and lamented that because of Phillips’ lost vote “our
boys are over there being shot down with materials sent from the United States.” Reece
also blamed spies like Alger Hiss and William Remington—people he claimed to have
named as subversives when GOP Chairman—for leaking secrets and a soft policy
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towards Russia for the current crisis. He said that Republicans like him, who opposed a
229

soft policy, faced labels of “reactionaries, conservatives, isolationists, and what-not.”

Reece also campaigned on the need for a two-party system to defeat the radical
element. He declared that his record showed him as “a Republican, first, last, and
always.” He stressed that he had never and would never run as an independent because
the two-party system could not be maintained when candidates failed to “accept the
decision of the people as expressed in legalized primaries.” Although directed as a
comment against his former opponents to confirm his voting record as a Republican, this
230

statement would also indict his current opponent for future actions.

Reece’s voting record in Congress and his independent wealth served as Phillips’
main political ammunition. He accused Reece of voting against the TVA and defense
measures and of getting rich from his pension. Reece attempted to defend his position on
the TVA and control damage on this sensitive issue with claims that he foresaw the
possibilities of developing the Tennessee Valley and sponsored the movement in the
early 1920s to prevent the Federal Power Board from issuing permits to construct private
dams on the Tennessee River. He stated that he voted for the original TVA Act and
appropriations for every TVA dam since. He asserted that he voted against all measures
that did not accomplish the vital purposes of making power available to the military in
times of war and to local communities via locally controlled power authorities, while at
the same time using the nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals to produce cheap fertilizer for
farmers. Reece replied to attacks about his personal wealth with the statement that “I
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certainly hate to think that I have not attained at least a small measure of success in the
231

past 30 years.”

The primary race in the First District overshadowed all of the other Tennessee
races. In 1949 the Tennessee state legislature removed the poll tax requirement, making
the 1950 primary the first vote without this encumbrance. A high number of voters
arrived early at the polls, with the final turnout reaching over 56,000. Reece won the
First District Republican primary by less than 2,000 votes, and in what had to seem like a
bad case of déjà vu, Phillips immediately charged Reece with fraud and spending
excessive money in the campaign. He claimed that Reece borrowed $1.5 million from
the Republican Finance Committee for the election, a charge that Reece vehemently
denied. Phillips asked for an investigation into voting irregularities and called Estes
Kefauver, the Democratic senator, to discuss the possibility of running as an independent.
GOP Chairman Guy Gabrielson asked Phillips to refrain from entering the November
election as an independent. Phillips probably hoped for an outcome similar to the 1930
election, but his hopes faded when Democrats in the First District refused to pledge
support for an independent candidate over their own candidate. Phillips would have
needed these votes to defeat Reece. In addition, Phillips’ former law partner and his
Greene County campaign manager pledged support for Reece.232
Phillips continued his independent campaign after a congressional sub-committee
conducted a full hearing in Knoxville on Phillips’ charges and absolved Reece of any
guilt in voting irregularities. A letter to Reece acknowledged “minor irregularities which
231
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would be found in any primary election anywhere, and do not in any way reflect on the
candidates for office.” Phillips continued his barrage against Reece and noted that he had
won twice over Reece-backed candidates. His supporters said that Reece made a bad
political blunder by purchasing the newspaper because it made it difficult to explain how
the former GOP head published a Democratic newspaper. Phillips drew criticism,
however, when he pronounced that he wanted only the votes of the common men, not the
millionaires. Phillips forgot that residents of Appalachia resented wealth only when it
was flaunted in their faces, not when it was used for good purposes, as Reece had been
233

doing in his recent business ventures.

Once Congress cleared Reece of wrongdoing in the primary, other prominent
Republicans came to the First District on his behalf. Reece and the Second District
Republican candidate, Howard Baker, attended a GOP reception in Knoxville on Friday,
October 13th, for Joseph McCarthy, characterized by local newspapers as the man who
had exposed Communist infiltration in the State Department. McCarthy predicted that
once more men like Reece and Baker entered Congress, “there will be a general exodus
of the present State Department personnel.” McCarthy described Reece as a “starspangled American and one of the first to warn the nation of the Communistic
infiltration.” With McCarthy at the height of fame, his endorsement proved invaluable to
Reece’s campaign against subversion. Harold Stassen, the former presidential hopeful,
arrived one week later to make his first political speech in the South at Johnson City,
Tennessee. He called for support for both Reece and Baker and blamed the
administration directly for the Korean War. Guy Gabrielson, the GOP Chairman, spoke
233
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days before the November election in Kingsport, Tennessee, and echoed Stassen’s
charges on the Truman administration. Democrats countered by bringing in Speaker Sam
Rayburn, Senator Estes Kefauver, and Governor Gordon Browning

234

The Reece campaign efforts succeeded, and he returned to his old seat in the
House in 1950. In a record off-year vote, he won by more than 12,000 votes over Phillips
and the Democratic candidate. The Democratic candidate had hoped to win because of
the split among Republicans, but Reece’s control of the Republican organization in the
First District and party loyalty proved too daunting. He did create a modicum of
resentment among Republicans in the Second District, who felt that he “engineered” the
primary to the benefit of his friend, Howard Baker. Reece immediately affirmed that he
would “advocate a firm policy toward the communists in foreign affairs.” He had also
taken steps to ensure that he would no longer have to face independent challengers in
future campaigns. In late October, Reece and Guy Smith proposed a measure to the state
legislature that would prohibit a candidate who lost the primary election from running in
the November election on the basis that it made the primary worthless if the loser refused
to accept defeat. The measure gained widespread notice even though the state tabled the
235

issue until the following year.

Democrats maintained a majority in Congress in the 1950 elections but suffered
losses in both Houses. Republicans campaigned on issues of high inflation and the
spread of communism to gain seats in the House and Senate. Taft faulted the
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administration for high taxes and the loss of China to communism. He also blamed
Truman for the conflict in Korea. Truman’s Fair Deal program was threatened by the
236

upswing in Republican support.

In his first year back in the House Reece continued his efforts to enact legislation
that benefited his district. The president of the Great Smoky Mountain Conservation
Association presented a plea to Reece to construct a much needed road to Gatlinburg.
That May, Reece announced that following a four-year delay, Congress had made funds
available for a four-lane road to the Great Smoky Mountain National Park from Banner
Bridge to Gatlinburg. That July, he and Estes Kefauver began a three-month campaign to
construct a Navy guided-missile plant in East Tennessee. By August, newspapers
reported that the region just west of Bristol, Tennessee, would receive a contract for the
plant that would employ 1,500 people.237
Reece also continued his focus on legislation to strengthen the nation’s defense.
In January 1951 he was appointed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which gave
him a base to pursue Communists. In April 1951 he proposed a bi-partisan National
Commission of Security and Peace to clarify foreign policy and give access to Truman’s
files. The measure failed to pass but won support among those fearing the spread of
communism. In August Reece proposed an additional $350 million cut to Truman’s
foreign aid bill. The House passed the bill at $690 million less than Truman had wanted,
and Reece reasoned that “America simply cannot carry the rest of the world on its back.”
In September Reece wrote two letters to the secretary of defense asking about money the
United States had paid to France in order to build military roads. He questioned why the
236
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United States would pay French taxes on supply roads built to defend that country. His
letters prompted that House to approve a military spending bill the following month that
included a ban on paying taxes to foreign governments.

238

Reece’s private life flourished during his return to Congress. Sullivan County
Bank named him Chairman of the Board in early 1951. On April 1st he announced the
engagement of his daughter to Lt. Colonel George W. Marthens, II of the United States
Air Force. The two married on September 8th in Johnson City in a ceremony that papers
described as “marked by great music.” The bride looked “exquisite” and the reception
“perfectly carried out.” With his personal and political life secured, Reece once again
239

involved himself in the national arena.

The Minks, the Pinks, and the Stinks
After the November 1950 elections, thoughts turned toward the presidential
election of 1952. As early as November 24th, newspapers predicted that if Taft won the
Republican nomination for president and named Reece as his vice presidential choice that
Truman would run with Kefauver to counter the southern vote. The Republican National
Executive Committee decided in December to start an immediate campaign to break the
South through publicity and organized voting drives. Robert Taft remained influential in
Congress and in 1951 organized a presidential campaign team. Dwight D. Eisenhower
emerged as Taft’s Republican opponent for the primary nomination. Eisenhower had
evaded many questions about his political affiliation but declared through Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, his recognized chief of staff, that he would be receptive to the Republican
238
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nomination “if he did not have to campaign adequately for it” and if he could retain his
duties as Supreme Commander. Taft became more cordial on the hill and tried to
minimize the differences between himself and Eisenhower to win support. As part of his
strategy, Taft named Reece his southern campaign manager on October 25, 1951.240
Reece immediately began an arduous crusade to win votes for Taft. He faced
more difficulty than in previous elections because many in the area resented what they
considered Taft’s interference in previous Tennessee campaigns. The Knoxville News
Sentinel stated that Reece “worships at the Robert Taft Throne, and owes his political life
to Taft’s influence.” Reece asserted Americans would get a voice in politics only if Taft
secured the nomination. He felt that Taft had been one of the few politicians who
discussed political issues honestly in the 1950 election. Reece believed this led to Taft’s
reelection “by the greatest majority ever given a candidate for Senator in the State who
had real opposition.” He expressed great confidence that Taft would be elected as he
traveled over much of the South. He predicted that Taft would get at least 200 votes at
the convention from southern states and the majority of delegates in all of the southern
and border states. Reece declared that the South would stand solid for Taft, and
Tennessee complied with this directive in February 1952 when the Republican state
convention instructed its delegates to vote for Taft.241
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Reece drew much of his campaign material from criticisms of the Truman
administration and what he perceived as their failure to halt the spread of communism. In
early November 1951, Reece added a fifth “C” his platform of the “Four C’s” used
during the 1946 campaign—confiscation. He argued that “Washington’s master planners
are floundering in a sea of controls, confusion, corruption, communism, and
confiscation” as the South stood helpless while the Democratic Party violated the party
system to maintain control in the government. “Our people,” Reece declared, referring to
conservative Republicans, “have already determined to drive out of Washington all of the
minks, the pinks and the stinks who are destroying the moral fiber of our nation . . .
Morality must be restored.” He blamed the president directly for the Korean War and
called it a “Truman war.” Reece attempted to justify his comment by tracing the
withdrawal of United States troops out of Korea as the instigating factor for communist
invasion. He even went so far as to blame the Roosevelt Administration during the
Normandy invasion of World War II, asserting that if the United States had demanded a
definite location of Russia’s western frontier that the communist threat to Europe would
242

have been erased.

In his condemnation of Truman, Reece managed to disparage Taft’s Republican
opponent as well. He accused Truman supporters of backing Eisenhower because they
believed it would be an easier win than against Taft. He called it a Democratic attempt to
name the Republican nominee. Reece also condemned the reduction of the nation’s air
power between 1946 and 1950, citing Eisenhower’s 1949 plans under Truman to reduce
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military spending. He acknowledged that Eisenhower may have been in favor of air
power but as a member of the military he acted under orders of his commander in chief
and refused to fight for air power at the cost of losing the support of the Truman
administration. In Reece’s mind, the administration “was able to employ General
Eisenhower to cover up its fatal gambling with our security.” He acknowledged
Eisenhower as “a great general, but that doesn’t mean he could succeed in other lines of
work.”243
The struggle between Taft and Eisenhower split the Republican Party in the
South. In March the Shelby County Republicans scheduled a meeting at 2:00 pm to
choose a delegation for the state convention. Eisenhower supporters planned to arrive at
noon to fill up the small room, but Taft supporters arrived at 10:00 am and refused to
move the meeting to a larger location to house all of the delegates. A similar occurrence
happened at the Texas state convention, and Taft supporters accused Eisenhower
Republicans of influencing Democrats to enter the primary to manipulate the Republican
nominee. Reece later told Taft that Eisenhower supporters had as much right to “take the
Texas delegation” as he had “to go in the corncrib at two o’clock in the morning and
carry a man’s corn off on my back.” A publication by the Taft Committee declared the
Texas convention proper and legal and cited other states where Eisenhower supporters
supposedly acted dishonestly. Reece characterized the incident as an attempt of
Eisenhower forces to “ride rough-shod over all opposition when they are in control in a
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state but are unwilling to accept the decision of the majority when that majority is against
244

them.”

At the Republican National Convention Reece assumed Taft would win on the
first ballot. Recent articles predicted that although a number of Eisenhower backers
criticized Reece’s tactics and rivaled Taft delegates in some states, Reece most likely
accomplished his task of getting the South behind Taft. Reece made a critical mistake,
however, in assailing the patriotism and integrity of Eisenhower and his role in reducing
the nation’s air power. This proved to be an unpardonable charge among some
Republicans, and one newspaper labeled Reece “one of the obstacles to building a
respectable Republican Party in the South.” At the national convention in Chicago,
Eisenhower won the nomination over Taft.245
Most scholars agree that Eisenhower had a distinct advantage over Taft. The
general entered the presidential nomination campaign first and “was a military hero
whose popularity was almost legendary.” In the contest for state delegates to the national
convention, Eisenhower’s candidates are described as “men of state-wide reputation who
could be expected to poll a considerable vote in their own right.” Taft’s main advantages
over his opponent were the willingness to campaign and the support he received from
national newspapers and local politicians. Some scholars credit Taft’s loss to his
appearance as “stiff and humorless,” while others believe that he “failed to impress voters
looking for positive, constructive reasons” why they should support Taft for president.
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Taft focused much of his campaign on criticism of the Democratic administration and
Eisenhower’s work for it. Television increased exposure of the candidates and although
not a decisive factor in the election, it may have propagated the image of Taft as stiff
while voters continued to view Eisenhower as a hero and “father symbol.”246
Many blamed Reece for Taft’s loss at the national convention. Citing convention
controversies in Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana, critics blamed Reece for jeopardizing fair
play. Rumors circulated that Taft had fired Reece as a top advisor but refused to publicly
admit it out of consideration for their friendship. This is most likely untrue, because Taft
wrote to Reece shortly after the convention to thank him for his help in the campaign and
for his “extraordinary job” in the South. Taft expressed deep disappointment with the
new control of the Republican Party and with the time and money “spent vainly in my
behalf.” Taft credited his defeat to the “unholy strength of our opponents.” In an
unpublished memorandum dictated by Taft after his loss he charged that the influence on
“New York circles” and the newspaper support given to Eisenhower contributed to the
general’s win. Taft believed that underlying causes that developed before the
convention—such as his inability to afford a “real campaign” in Pennsylvania, New
York, and Michigan—explained his defeat. He feared his lieutenants would be blamed
wrongfully for the outcome. Taft informed Reece that Eisenhower wanted to meet with
him, but Taft wanted Eisenhower to agree to certain stipulations first, including an
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adherence to conservative principles. Reece believed that had Taft won the nomination
247

in 1948 or 1952 he would have won the presidency by a huge margin.

Reece set aside his personal disappointment over Taft’s loss and hit the campaign
trail for the Republican Party. Before Eisenhower’s national headquarters could get
organized, Reece, Representative Baker, and Guy Smith took over the Republican
campaign in Tennessee. One paper noted that all had favored Taft—who if chosen
probably would have placed Reece in a cabinet position—but they settled for distributing
patronage positions. Eisenhower had little choice but to work with a less than friendly
Reece faction. Reece spoke at rallies in Florida and Tennessee on behalf of Eisenhower,
and in the election Eisenhower won Tennessee. Reece was reelected with little
campaigning. Republicans captured only a narrow majority in Congress, but Eisenhower
won a sweeping victory over Adlai Stevenson. The discontent over Korea, high prices,
and accusations of corruption in the federal government all contributed to the Republican
win. Reece pointed out the “tremendous responsibilities” faced by both Eisenhower and
the Republican Party to regain the nation’s trust. Eisenhower thanked Reece for his
support by inviting him to his 1953 inauguration. Vice President Nixon wrote Reece to
thank him for the “personal support you extended to me during the campaign—you can
be sure that it will never be forgotten.”248
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Eisenhower’s win signified a victory for middle-of-the-road Americans. During
his presidency he accepted the social welfare influence of the New Deal and Fair Deal
policies, disappointing many Republicans. Eisenhower had promised “not tot turn the
clock back—ever,” and scholars assert that during his presidency social welfare
legislation became an “accepted part of American history.” Taft most certainly would
have renounced at least a portion of the Democratic legislation, but Eisenhower managed
to maintain the policies and keep his support. Eisenhower took a middle-of-the-road
stance on most issues, failing to satisfy both liberals and conservatives. He retained his
popularity because Americans wanted to avoid extremes and maintain security at home
and abroad. Fears about the Korean War and the Cold War created a desire for peace.
Eisenhower used this in his 1956 campaign. Scholars initially criticized the Eisenhower
presidency for submerging the problems arising in the civil rights area, but revisionists
are taking a less critical look at his accomplishments and perceived mediocrity.249
Reece lost a degree of his national influence after Taft’s defeat for the party
nomination.

The New York Times predicted a decline of Reece’s influence in shaping

national policy, even though it conceded he most likely would remain prominent in
Tennessee politics. Reece attained a small victory over doubters in July 1953 when the
new Republican National Chairman announced that patronage in Tennessee would be
handled through the Reece organization rather than Eisenhower supporters. He also
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secured a position on the House Rules Committee in 1953, a coveted position since the
Rules Committee effectively determined what legislation made it to the House floor.

250

Increasing division marked Reece’s return to Congress and politics. The split
among Republicans intensified after Dewey’s loss to Truman in 1948. Reece’s political
organization and civic activities sustained his influence among people of the First District
and earned their support in his 1950 bid to return to the House. He campaigned against
the radical element of the party and accused his successor of deviating from his
Republican loyalty. Reece received support from both local and national Republican
leaders and overcame his Republican opposition in the primary to win the election. His
political authority grew so strong that he was able to spend most of his next term in office
campaigning for Robert Taft’s presidential bid and still win his own congressional
election without opposition. He based his campaign strategy on the increasing fear of
communist infiltration of the American government and criticism of the Truman
administration. He suffered great disappointment when Taft lost the Republican primary
but campaigned for Eisenhower, the Republican nominee for president, across Tennessee.
Eisenhower’s win was a victory for the Republican Party, which also won control of
Congress, but signaled a loss of Reece’s standing in national politics.

250

Newspaper Article in Scrapbook 43, BCR Papers, Box 49; “Political Eclipse Faces Taft Aides,” New
York Times, 12 July 1952, p. 6.

159

Chapter 7
Un-American and Subversive Activities
Purposes Not in the Interest or Tradition of the United States
In the midst of Taft’s crusade to win the Republican nomination, the fight against
communism surged forward with increasing speed. Politicians soon realized that the
panic created by the investigations of HUAC and the Senate Internal Subcommittee
(SISS) and the unfounded accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy could be manipulated
to accomplish other political goals. Campaigners accused their opponents of being
Communists or not working hard enough to fight subversion. Legislators, such as
Democratic Representative Eugene Cox, viewed this fear as a path to pursue personal
vendettas by incorporating it into bills or proposed inquiries. An anti-Truman Democrat,
Cox introduced a resolution on August 2, 1951, to investigate tax exempt organizations
for un-American activities. The Rules Committee reported the resolution on August 15 th,
but it died on the House calendar. On March 10, 1952, Cox again introduced his
th

resolution, reported from the Rules Committee on March 18 . The House passed the
measure on April 4, 1952, by a vote of 194 to 158. He requested funding of $100,000 to
conduct the study, but the House allocated only $75,000 for the investigation.251
Cox asserted that some non-profit foundations and philanthropic organizations
had been taking advantage of their tax-exempt status to promote and finance communist
activities. The House appointed a bipartisan committee headed by Cox on April 30,
1952, to investigate these charges. The members included Democrats Donald O’Toole of
New York, Aime Forand of Rhode Island, and Brooks Hays of Arkansas, along with
251
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Republicans Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Angier Goodwin of Massachusetts, and
Reece of Tennessee. Reece’s appointment furthered his belief that the spread of
communism threatened the nation’s safety. One month before the investigation started,
Reece made the audacious charge that Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, allowed
Communists to leave the United States in order to attend an international communist
conference in China. Reece was convinced that a number of Communists ran the State
Department. The committee confronted well-placed criticism that it would spread
hysteria and fear as it began its official investigation on November 16th.252
The Cox Committee had little time to conduct an investigation and prepare a
report for Congress. If it did not make its final report by January 1, 1953, it would
automatically end unless recreated by the new Republican controlled Congress. The
committee felt that questionnaires presented the best method to accomplish its goals in
such a short period. They sent over 1,100 questionnaires to major foundations and
determined from the responses and additional data gathered that 67,000 foundations
operated on $7.5 billion of resources within the United States. The questionnaire asserted
that the committee would conduct a full investigation of tax-exempt educational and
philanthropic foundations and “other comparable organizations” in order to determine
which used their resources “for un-American and subversive activities or purposes not in
the interest or tradition of the United States.”253
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The questionnaire used by the Cox Committee, while impartial in theory,
presented very little useful information. The committee expected the form to provide
data that otherwise would have had to be obtained through subpoenaing witnesses and
records. The five-page form contained questions regarding the name of the foundation or
organization, its nature, incorporation, and other basic organizational and financial data.
It then asked a series of questions about foreign activities, grants made to subversive
organizations as defined by the United States Attorney General, and whether
governmental regulation of organizations was necessary. It allotted minimal space for
each answer with an indication that additional pages could be provided. It served as a
quantitative method that could not begin to answer such a complex question.

254

The Cox Committee’s final report found little fault with existing foundations.
George B. de Huszar organized the responses to the questionnaires in a volume with his
interpretive observations on the major foundations, including the Ford, Rockefeller,
Carnegie, Guggenheim, and Field Foundations. Huszar concluded that only a small
percentage of total grants went to “subversive individuals, causes, and organizations” and
an even smaller amount to “pro-American projects, organizations and causes and
persons.” His most damning conclusion was that foundations had failed to develop a
balanced program, which he viewed as a “violation of public trust, for this money ought
to be spent on representing the views of all the people and not only the liberal, socialist,
and international segment.” He considered it a moral obligation to support an equal
number of pro-conservative programs to balance against any socialist activities. Despite
this condemnation of foundations, the final report of the Cox Committee concluded “little
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basis for the belief expressed in some quarters that foundation funds are being diverted
from their intended use.” This positive report of the Cox Committee resulted because
Representative Cox died during the investigation on December 24, 1952.

255

Cox was determined to stem the flow of foundation money to civil rights
organizations in the South. He was surrounded with “less dedicated colleagues” on the
committee, therefore the hearings proceeded fairly. Although some reports insisted Cox
experienced “some change of heart,” had he lived he might have been able to prolong the
investigation. The main concern for Cox in 1952 involved foundation support of what he
viewed as un-American activities. This included grants to programs that investigated
abuses of civil rights. The Democratic-controlled House prevented Cox from presenting
a significant barrier to foundations, but he might have been able to intimidate foundations
enough to stem the flow of money to organizations in the South that upset the “natural”
balance.256
Personal matters prevented Reece from attending many of the Cox Committee
hearings. His daughter Louise gave birth to his first grandchild on Memorial Day in
1952, and Louise Reece Marthens was baptized on December 28, 1952. Reece’s wife
underwent an undisclosed operation in 1952 and experienced an extended illness that
took Reece away from Washington for much of 1953. Reece signed the final report of
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the committee with the reservation that the committee lacked enough time to complete its
job. He strongly believed that the matter warranted further investigation.

257

A More Comprehensive Study
Shortly after the Cox Committee investigation ended Reece announced his
intention to reopen the inquiry through Congress. At a meeting in July 1953 with Joseph
Martin, Jr., the Speaker of the House, Reece broached the subject of a new investigation,
and Martin suggested that Reece wait until the middle of July to bring forth a proposal.
Reece reported this news to the Cox Committee’s research analyst, George de Huszar,
with whom he had carried on a correspondence since April about the possibility of
getting another resolution passed to investigate tax-exempt foundations. Reece also
received encouragement from Father Edward A. Keller, Director of the Bureau of
Economic Research at the University of Notre Dame. Heartened by the support Reece
felt he had for his proposal, he introduced a resolution for a new committee in July
1953.258
Before the House could vote on his resolution, Reece first had to move his
proposal out of the House Rules Committee. Most members felt that the Cox Committee
had sufficiently investigated the matter and were unwilling to support another
congressional inquiry. A bill to extend the excess-profits tax came before the House
Rules Committee, and Reece saw this as an opportunity to move his resolution to the
House floor. President Eisenhower wanted to extend the tax, but the House Ways and
Means Committee had delayed action on the proposal. The Rules Committee countered
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this tactic by bringing out its own bill to extend the excess-profits tax. Reece opposed the
extension, but he made a bargain with Eisenhower Republicans who wanted their bill to
go to the House. He agreed to report the excess-profits bill out of the Rules Committee in
return for a vote on his investigation of tax-exempt foundations. Reece’s resolution
passed the House by a vote of 209-163 on July 13, 1953. 259
Reece’s success derived in part from the support of Democrats in the House.
Although Republicans maintained a majority, few Republicans or Democrats normally
would have voted for a resolution proposed so soon after the Cox Committee. The bill
received support from southern Democrats, upset at the rumor that the Fund for the
Republic planned to use a large part of its funds to study race relations. The Southern
Regional Council (SRC) grew out of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation
established after World War I. Its board requested grants from the Ford, Rockefeller, and
Carnegie foundations for its programs. In 1954 the Fund for the Republic gave the SRC
$150,000 in support of its educational programs in southern states. These actions caught
the attention of southern Democrats, including Eugene Cox, and influenced the 1952 and
260

1954 investigations into foundations.

Reece and his committee paid little attention to the Southern Regional Council,
but other southern congressmen became increasingly upset at the council’s progress. The
council began with the premise that racial problems of the South could be solved only by
looking at the political, social, educational, and economic problems of the area. It soon
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realized that race relations stood at the root of all problems. By 1948 the SRC had
published documents that urged “abolition of the white primary, equal educational
opportunity, publicly financed low cost housing, adequate public health agencies,
improvement of the courts, and fair employment practices.” In 1951 it publicized its
stance against segregation. These activities did little to endear the SRC to Southern
Democrats.261
Anti-communism came to be a valuable tool used by many against undesirable
organizations. In 1948, the much stronger and more politically-active Southern
Conference for Human Welfare had succumbed to red-baiting and disbanded. The SRC
managed to avoid scrutiny until its brief mention during Reece’s investigation. He
condemned the Fund for the Republic’s 1954 grant to the SRC, and in 1955 the
committee’s general counsel accused the SRC of including “21 members with proCommunist affiliations” on its board of directors. Southern Democrats practically
jumped at this opportunity to dismantle an organization that had become increasingly
active in promoting civil rights for blacks. 262
The one area in which Reece could herald some independence in thought from
that of the Republican Party was in the area of civil rights. He voted for both the antilynching and anti-poll tax laws and recognized blacks as a valid part of the American
voting population. Reece, a seasoned veteran of Congress in 1954, could hardly have
been so naïve as to be oblivious of the motives of Southern Democrats in supporting his
261
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committee. They, in fact, had forced Reece to make a choice between his political desire
to gain power and recognition through his anti-communistic hunt and the advancement of
civil rights for blacks. In that moment, Reece chose to pursue foundations. Decisions
such as his relegated the importance of improved civil rights to another decade. Had he
lived, it is unlikely that Reece would have proved to be a powerful figure in the civil
rights movement—his attachment to the Republican Party and his desire for seniority
prevented that—but he could have prevented Southern Democrats from using his
committee to destroy the work of the Southern Regional Council.
Even though Reece had attended only three of the Cox Committee meetings
because of his wife’s illness, he criticized the entire proceedings of the committee. Aaron
M. Sargent, an attorney whom the Cox Committee had considered for its general counsel,
served as Reece’s source of information. A former member of the California UnAmerican Activities Committee, Sargent remained close to the Cox investigation without
an official appointment on the committee. On June 21 st, Sargent sent Reece the records
of the Cox Committee in a locked filing case. Sargent claimed that a cursory
investigation of the records proved that the committee lacked sufficient time to fully
investigate foundations. Reece agreed and prepared a statement to present to the
House.263
In a speech introducing his resolution to the House, Reece cited faults of the Cox
Committee as justification for a renewed investigation into foundations. Reece noted that
he had signed the Cox Committee report with reservations that the inquiry would be
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continued if Congress desired “a more comprehensive study.” Reece believed that the
need stemmed from five flaws that he identified with the prior investigation. He asserted
that the Cox Committee had inadequate time to complete a thorough investigation. In
addition, argued Reece, foundation officers excused grants to communist organizations as
an unintentional oversight without further examination into these statements. The
committee failed to require those who testified to give their statements under oath, which
Reece believed made the statements less valid. He claimed that the committee failed to
ask foundation representatives why they supported subversive propaganda through their
grants and lastly, that the committee failed to make full use of the documentary evidence
264

it possessed.

House Resolution 217 officially created the Special Committee to Investigate Tax
Exempt Foundations during the Eighty-third Congress. The resolution read very
similarly to the one that had created the Cox Committee the prior year. The committee
possessed authorization to investigate educational, philanthropic, and any other
foundation exempt from federal income taxation in order to determine if these
foundations used their resources “for purposes other than the purposes for which they
were established” or more specifically for “un-American and subversive activities; for
political purposes; propaganda, or attempts to influence legislation.” Reece chaired the
committee, composed of Republicans Jesse Wolcott of Michigan and Angier Goodwin of
Massachusetts and Democrats Wayne Hays of Ohio and Gracie Pfost of Idaho.
Representative Goodwin had served on the Cox Committee with Reece. Representative
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Hays, the minority leader, voted against the formation of both committees. Reece
requested an appropriation of $125,000 to conduct the investigation, but the House cut
265

his allocation to $50,000, the same amount spent by the Cox investigation.

Representative Hays proved to be the foremost dissenter on the committee. He
came from a family of staunch Republicans, with the exception of his grandfather.
Disappointed with Hoover and his failed policies, Hays voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt
in 1932 and supported the New Deal legislation. He continued his independent nature as
a high school history teacher in Flushing, Ohio. A member of the Board of Education
reprimanded Hays for failing to put enough emphasis on the accomplishments of the
Republican Party, but he refused to change his teaching methods. He later was elected to
the Board of Education and served as mayor and state senator within a two-year period
before his tenure in the House. The Reece Committee formed before Hays had amassed
great influence in the House, but his strong personality still presented an effective
opposition. Hays expressed “considerable disgust” to the House minority leader, Sam
Rayburn, that “no one was able to stand up to McCarthy,” and he felt someone should.
Rayburn responded by appointing Hays to the Reece Committee, telling him that “you
have been complaining about the McCarthy tactics around here, and here is a chance to
see what you can do about it.”266

265

House Resolution 217, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, undated in BCR Papers, Box 15:8; Helen Hill Miller,
“Investigating the Foundations,” The Reporter 9 (24 November, 1953), 40.
266
“The Man Who Talks Back,” The New Republic 130 (28 June 1954): 12-13; Frank K. Kelly, Court of
Reason: Robert Hutchins and the Fund for the Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1981): 49. By 1976
Hays had secured the position of chairman of the House Administration Committee, which controlled
members’ allowances for office and travel expenses. He had become one of the most powerful leaders in
the House. Later that year, he faced accusations of misappropriating funds to pay the salary of a woman he
formerly dated. Hays denied the allegations, but the public, fresh from the Watergate Scandal, could not be
convinced of his innocence. He resigned three months later. Warren Weaver, Jr. “But He Also Knows
How to Say ‘Yes’ to Win Support,” New York Times 22 February 1976, p. E4; “Text of Hays’s Statement

169

A New Kind of Blank Check
Once news of the second investigation reached the public, critics immediately
questioned the committee’s motives. Many had come to view the Cox Committee as a
means for Taft supporters to label Eisenhower and his term as president of Columbia
University as internationalist, a dangerous label at a time when anti-communism was at
its height. Papers attributed these same motives to Reece’s investigation once his targets
became apparent. Paul G. Hoffman, former head of the Ford Foundation, took a leave of
absence from the foundation to work on a pre-convention campaign for Eisenhower in
1952. Hoffman wrote to Earl Hall, a newspaper editor in Iowa, in September 1953 that
he had not seen Reece in years but heard that Reece held him responsible for “having
busted up his ‘procurement’ of southern delegates for Mr. Taft.” Hoffman assumed
Reece wanted to teach him a “good lesson” and to smear the liberal wing of the
Republican Party as a “preparatory step” for the Old Guard to take over after Eisenhower
stepped “out of the picture.” Henry Ford II and the Rockefeller family, operators of two
of the biggest and most high-profile foundations, also supported Eisenhower’s campaign.
Skeptics reported that Reece harbored bitterness that Taft had been robbed of the
nomination because he believed he would have received a cabinet post with Taft’s
election.267
Reece insisted that his investigation would differ significantly from the previous
one. He believed that the inquiry carried on after Cox’s death had been too gentle on
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foundations. Reece noted that HUAC and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
(SISS) were confined to the investigation of subversion as defined by the federal
government. Reece inferred that the House gave him “a new kind of blank check” by
approving his resolution. The Reece Committee, he asserted, would focus less on
subversion and more on the extent to which money had been used for propaganda and to
“influence public opinion for the support of certain types of ideologies that tend to the
left.” Reece argued that foundations gave money to liberal institutions promoting
internationalism but avoided grants to conservative institutions that promoted
nationalism. To secure House funding for his inquiry, he had to assure the congressmen
that his committee would avoid an investigation into the tax-free status of foundations,
since that fell under the jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee.268
Reece announced the necessity of a preliminary investigation before the
committee organized open hearings. He turned to Aaron Sargent for advice on selecting
the general counsel for the committee. Sargent, an attorney from California, had been a
consultant to the SISS in 1952. He had represented a number of organizations in public
hearings concerning education, and Reece recognized him as having experience in
investigations involving education and subversion. He informed Sargent that he hoped to
gather some of his friends together to analyze and chart the course of the investigation.
Sargent recommended an attorney named Rene Wormser to assist the Reece Committee.
Wormser and Arnold T. Koch operated a law firm in New York, but he had few
credentials to offer. Reece later described Wormser as “widely recognized in America
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and Europe as outstanding in the field of estate planning and taxation,” a considerable
stretch of the truth, but Wormser admitted never having tried a tax case. He had written
Reece in April to offer his observations on foundations. Wormser believed that
foundations violated the law, had unreasonable accumulations of income, and caused a
tax loss to the government. Although few instances of direct subversion actually existed,
he felt the law governing foundations might need to be strengthened to avoid subversion.
These beliefs appealed to Reece, who named Wormser General Counsel to the Reece
Committee. Other staff members included Arnold T. Koch as Associate Counsel,
Norman Dodd—a Yale graduate and former banker—as Research Director, Katharyn
269

Casey as Legal Analyst, and John Marshall Jr. as Chief Clerk.

The preliminary investigation lasted ten months but gathered little original
information. Norman Dodd conducted the majority of the research during this period,
which entailed gathering information on foundations that Reece considered suspicious.
Dodd gathered information on the Kinsey Report, a study on sexual behavior by Dr.
Alfred Kinsey published in two books in 1948 and 1953. A grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation made the studies possible, but the foundation discontinued funding after the
published report generated much controversy. Dodd gathered medical opinions,
international articles, and statistical information about the Kinsey studies. Dodd’s actions
caused some to believe that the research staff had converted the investigation into an
ideological attack on education. Reece recognized Dodd’s motives but did nothing to
limit his activities. He wrote to Wormser that Dodd appeared to be convinced of “a
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conspiratorial influence” that had “a concentration of evil men” who had exploited
“foundation funds in the field of education for a number of years.” Reece wrote that
Dodd’s opinion was “in line” with what they believed had been the situation “in most all
phases of the activities of the foundations.”270
The committee staff immediately identified four major foundations of interest to
the investigation. All of the foundations—the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation,
Carnegie Foundation, and Fund for the Republic—possessed immense resources, and the
list surprised few people. Rockefeller’s support of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
Carnegie’s underwriting of Gunner Myrdal’s study of race relations, and Ford’s creation
of subsidiary foundations to study civil liberties garnered much attention. President
Eisenhower made the preliminary investigation easier in February 1954 when he allowed
the Reece Committee to look at tax returns filed by charitable, educational, scientific,
religious, and other organizations that claimed exemption from income taxes. By law,
the Treasury kept these forms secret unless the president authorized their disclosure.271
Reece held particular interest in the Fund for the Republic, created through a $15million grant by the Ford Foundation in 1951. The foundation became incorporated in
December 1952 and received a temporary certificate of tax-exemption in March 1953
along with $2.8 million of the promised funds. The Fund for the Republic received its
permanent tax-exempt status and the remaining $12 million in January 1954. The
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foundation was established to defend the first ten amendments of the Constitution and to
help “roll back the tide of McCarthyism.” Its first action, a grant of $25,000 to the
American Bar Association (ABA) to study congressional investigations and their possible
infringement on civil liberties, raised the indignation of Reece and other congressmen.
Many of these congressmen asserted that the ABA intended to investigate Congress and
compared this grant to the “meager” amount allocated to committees such as McCarthy’s.
In his address to Congress Reece stated that Robert M. Hutchins, an associate director of
the Ford Foundation and future president of the Fund for the Republic, “consistently
expressed” concern for the civil rights of Communists. Since Hutchins’ concept of civil
rights mirrored that of Communists, Reece argued, this foundation naturally would “aid
the communist conspiracy” and “try to discredit all those” who fought it.272
Reece failed to grasp the absurdity of attacking the character of the men at the
head of the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. Paul Hoffman dropped out
of college but worked his way up from car salesman to president of the Studebaker
Corporation. He was a Rotarian, Mason, Republican, director of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, and member of a number of other civic and charitable organizations.
By 1950 he held twenty-seven honorary doctorates. Scholars considered him a “middleof-the-road conservative and a vigorous anti-communist . . . famous as the man who
made the Marshall Plan the economic miracle it was.” He requested a three-month leave
from the Ford Foundation to campaign for Eisenhower’s presidential nomination in 1952.
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Hoffman, aware of the threats presented by communist witch hunters, advocated creation
of the Fund for the Republic to protect civil liberties.
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The Fund for the Republic named directors who were prominent in their field of
study in hopes of withstanding attacks from McCarthy. The first president, Clifford
Case, “vigorously supported” Eisenhower in 1952 and resigned in 1954 to run for the
Senate at Eisenhower’s behest. Robert Hutchins was an ambulance driver in Italy during
World War I, attended Yale Law School, and taught at a boys’ school. He became dean
of the Yale Law School, and Franklin D. Roosevelt once considered appointing him to
the Supreme Court. For twenty-two years he served as head of the University of
Chicago, where his ideas on education—eliminating compulsory attendance and
abolishing some classes as well as intercollegiate football—raised both controversy and
admiration. He told the Illinois commission investigating subversive activities that he
refused to “dismiss any teachers because of their ideas or associations, and the trustees of
the university had stood by him.” While at the Ford Foundation Hutchins’ “brilliance
was unquestioned. The programs he had created at the Ford Foundation had produced
repercussions around the world.” He succeeded Case after his resignation and moved the
Fund’s focus away from investigation of communism into other areas—the federal
security program, a study of extremist groups, community relations, legal rights of aliens,
blacklisting in entertainment, and an examination of the mass media. At the time of
Wormser and Dodd’s inquiry the changes in the structure of the foundation had prevented
it from moving far on its goals, but its potential was evident.274
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Thousands of other foundations escaped scrutiny during Reece’s investigation.
The investigation looked at larger foundations that had a greater effect on government
and politics, and herein lay the main fault of the Reece Committee. Reece specifically
targeted large foundations for their involvement in politics because of a political grudge
he held against them. The Pew family of Philadelphia controlled Sun Oil, along with
other mineral and industrial enterprises. The foundation created by the family
contributed financial support to the Republican Party and identified with the conservative
wing of the party. In his study on foundations Waldemar Nielson concluded that the Pew
Foundation therefore had “considerable” political influence and directed many of its
grants “almost exclusively to anti-communist organizations, some religious and others
military in orientation, and to groups advocating lassiez-faire economics.” The Pew
foundation obviously met with Reece’s approval, as it was not investigated. Reece later
wrote to the Pew family for assistance in publishing books and financing projects.275
The focus of the investigation on a few foundations drew criticism from the
public. Newspaper editorials accused Reece of perceiving little difference between
liberalism and communism. Many recognized the danger inherent in an investigative
committee given wide authority through a vague resolution that created it. Reece’s
committee targeted foundations that contributed money to social science programs and
drew sharp disapproval from those outside the conservative camp. One journalist
accused Reece of initiating a second investigation because the Cox investigation failed to
explain how so many things he disliked could have occurred. The article described
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Reece as a man who disapproved “of every major social change since 1932.” Reece
recognized that he might have made a mistake by identifying specific foundations and
attempted to control the damage to his investigation. He told the Washington Post that it
was “usually bad business to name certain things” because it implied the exclusion of all
others. Reece wanted to remove the perception of bias and insisted that “the major part
of the [committee’s] work” would be “outside of those [foundations] which were named”
in the press.276
The world of academia presented a promising arena to dispel suspicions of
subversion, but for that very same reason it was subject to close scrutiny. Most
universities depended on public funding and discouraged radical thought to save their
reputations and contributions. Once the FBI, HUAC, or SISS noted an employee as a
possible subversive, many universities automatically began an investigation. While some
survived the purge from teaching, they were often left with high legal expenses. Few
came out in defense of those who lost their jobs. The academic community
“administered the economic sanctions” of McCarthyism. The American Association of
Universities met in February 1953 to issue a public statement—financed by the
Rockefeller Foundation—on the rights and responsibilities of universities, but many
faculty refused to support and sign the statement over fear of losing their jobs. Those
who signed faced accusations of radicalism and subversion.277
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Reece’s attack on foundations proved more irrational than an investigation into
education. Those named by Reece were run by Republicans, and his past voting record
supported businesses such as the ones that had created these foundations. The two main
things held in common by the foundations named were that they supported Eisenhower
and advocated that communism was a declining threat. Supporting Eisenhower over Taft
took away Reece’s connection to national power and prominence. Reports that
subversion presented little danger “seemed to be taking away the public support on which
they [Reece, HUAC, SISS, etc.] depended for appropriations to sustain their
investigations.” Foundation studies challenged the notion that taking the Fifth
Amendment was un-American. While politicians did all they could to enflame fears of
communism for political gain, foundations worked just as hard to dispel the fears and
rumors. The donations to foundations were outside the control of Reece and other
politicians, so the only avenue of attack that seemed available was the use of these grants
in education.278
Reece’s investigation contributed to the increasing pursuit of subversion.
Representative Harold Velde of Illinois headed HUAC in 1953. An ex-FBI agent, he
directed HUAC to increased identification of subversives and “traveled the country
widely, getting banner headlines for its ‘exposure’ of the Red Menace in education, the
church, and the Democratic Party.” The SISS, led by Senator William Jenner of Indiana,
held “extensive hearings in 1953 on subversion in government.” Few were outside the
reach of Joe McCarthy, who attacked “liberal, non-communist Johns Hopkins professor
Owen Lattimore,” Secretary of Defense George Marshall, and Secretary of State Dean
278
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Acheson. In 1953 McCarthy managed to obtain a seat on the Committee on Government
Operations and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which gave him broad
powers to explore almost any organization he deemed suspicious. The Institute of Pacific
Relations had already become a target of both the Senate and the House in 1951, and
McCarthy named Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Ford Foundation, as a member of his
public list of those “soft on communism.”279
The open hearings of the Reece Committee commenced at a less opportune time
for anticommunist investigations than Reece had hoped. The outbreak of the Korean War
changed America’s attitude on communism from confidence to fear, and Joseph
McCarthy rode this fear to new heights of power. Republican strategy had been to
support McCarthy quietly while assisting his crusade. Many politicians disapproved of
his tactics, but if his accusations proved true, they recognized the political rewards. If the
accusations proved false, Republicans could quickly disown him. McCarthy manipulated
the press to his advantage and remained on the front pages of newspapers from 1950 to
1954. Two of the staff members on McCarthy’s investigative committee—Roy Cohn and
David Schine—toured Europe in the summer of 1953 under the guise of collecting
information on communism in American locations overseas. Their audacious behavior
created a sensation in newspapers abroad and in the United States and greatly
embarrassed McCarthy. Reports characterized the two as a “Laurel and Hardy” as they
traveled to libraries and cultural centers and demanded to be shown the collection of
communist authors. A plethora of reporters followed the two wherever they went, and
one German newspaper reported that Schine chased Cohn around a hotel lobby, “swatting
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him on the head with a rolled-up magazine.” Shortly thereafter, the army drafted Schine,
which set into motion a series of events that almost completely overshadowed Reece’s
280

investigation.

The Army-McCarthy hearings commenced three months before the Reece
Committee began its open investigation. Fueled by his perceived power and recent
embarrassments, McCarthy attacked General Ralph Zwicker for signing an honorable
discharge for a person later accused of holding communist sympathies. This incident
culminated a series of events that led Congress to initiate a public investigation into
McCarthy’s charges. The death of Robert Taft in July 1953 removed the only
Republican powerful enough to temper McCarthy. Republicans had stood silently in the
background of McCarthy, but by this time they recognized the folly of letting him
proceed unchecked. Network television stations broadcast the Army-McCarthy hearings,
which gathered a larger television audience than either the Brown v. Board of Education
decision or the fall of Dien Bien Phu. By the time Reece commenced testimony on
subversion in foundations, McCarthy had captured the attention of America and gravely
281

injured the cause of anti-communism.
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Chapter 8
A Labor of Love
Some Sections of the General Subject of Foundations
The Reece Committee hearings began on May 10, 1954, with a review of the
findings of their preliminary investigation. Reece announced that money limitations
forced the committee to confine itself to “only some sections of the general subject of
foundations,” such as the work of the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in
social sciences. Research Director Dodd testified first and provided a summation of the
Cox Committee and its methods. All of the committee members attended the first day to
hear Wormser question Dodd about the findings with occasional interruptions by
Representative Hays. The first day of testimony adjourned because Dodd failed to
provide a hard copy of his data to the committee members. On the second day of
hearings, Dodd included Reece’s resolution to introduce new hearings into the record.
Reece defended his criticisms of the Cox Committee as part of its overall report to the
House. Dodd quoted passages out of Gunner Myrdal’s book on race relations and the
charter of the Carnegie Endowment to provide illustrations of subversive motives. He
asserted that Myrdal’s book criticized the Constitution and read what he considered the
Carnegie Foundation’s attempt at a disclaimer. The book acknowledged a grant from the
foundation but added that the “corporation is not, however, the author, owner, publisher,
or proprietor of this publication and is not intended to be understood as approving by
virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed therein.” Dodd insisted
this provided evidence of the foundation trustees to “abdicate responsibility” of the use of
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their grants. Representative Hays, the minority committee member, accused Dodd of
taking these quotes out of context and thus altering their meaning.
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Dodd’s testimony marked the beginning of lengthy criticism of the committee’s
procedure. Newspapers reported that Dodd accused foundations of focusing on social
science programs that he felt could change American thought towards an international
viewpoint. Dodd feared that foundation grants allowed schools to become less
accountable to the surrounding community, which he considered a natural safeguard, and
altered curriculum to the point it denied what he defined as American principles.
Representative Hays protested that the group’s approach implied that the committee
would focus only on foundations that Republicans considered “Red.” Dodd provided the
committee members with a written copy of his findings before the third day of hearings,
but Hays accused Dodd of editing the version of his testimony that he provided to the
press. The committee called its legal analyst, Katharyn Casey, to testify about the
different versions, which she explained as the result of a clerical error. She said that the
staff had prepared stencils for copying too soon and had to edit them for the official
version. The staff intended to destroy all copies of the old version because they
contained errors, but Hays managed to obtain one. He accused Dodd of tempering his
harsh remarks because they suggested that foundations had become dedicated to a new
idea of socialism, which very likely would have resulted in a cry for the end of the
investigations. The Washington Post called Dodd’s preliminary report a “relatively mild
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playback of Reece’s own charges, coupled with an emphatic comment that they have not
by their repetition as yet been proved.”

283

The committee called members of the academic community to give evidence on
the nature of research conducted with foundation grants. Dr. A.H. Hobbs, assistant
professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, seemed an ideal witness for the
committee. Hobbs called himself “the oldest assistant professor east of the Rockies,” a
condition he attributed to his criticism of methods used in social science research founded
by foundations. The committee believed Hobbs’ dissidence and independent mind
resulted in the “suppression of academic freedom.” He charged that foundation grants
adversely affected morality, politics, and the country’s military policy. Citing the Kinsey
Reports on sexual behavior of men and women, the volumes written by social scientists
on “The American Soldier,” and Stuart Chase’s “Proper Study of Mankind,” Hobbs
attacked the foundations that sponsored these studies, the scientists who conducted them,
and the methodology behind the studies. When Representative Pfost questioned the
relationship of the Kinsey Reports to the investigation, Wormser pointed out that the
Rockefeller Foundation sponsored the study through a grant to the National Research
Council’s committee on sex. He also justified Hobbs’ testimony as an example of the
effect that such publications have on the public, especially through television and the
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radio. At this point, Representative Hays announced his concern about foundations
284

having a chance to respond to these accusations.

The next witness before the Reece Committee sparked heated controversy
between the Democratic members of the committee and Reece. On May 24th, Aaron
Sargent testified before the committee as an “expert” on school textbooks and foundation
operations in education. Representative Cox had approached Sargent about serving as
counsel to his committee in 1952 but never officially offered him the position.
Representative Hays grilled Sargent about his assertion that the Cox Committee had
offered him the job and accused Sargent of perjury. Hays then questioned Sargent about
his own definition of socialism and asked about his position on the TVA, which Hays
knew would provoke Reece. Reece interrupted with a summary of how he viewed the
development of the TVA. He described how the question arose of who should distribute
power generated at the dams and stated he opposed the federal government establishing a
“sprawling power distributing system” in favor of local authorities distributing the power.
Reece noted that the federal government generated the power and sold it wholesale to the
municipalities for distribution. He pointed out that although the government owned all of
the facilities, they could be privately owned if desired. Hays commented that the TVA
had provided much for East Tennessee, including food on the tables and shoes on the feet
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of many. Reece interjected that that “some of them wore shoes down there before
285

TVA.”

Sargent intimated that the research he conducted on radicalism in education
qualified him to judge the influence of foundations on schools. He accused foundations
of sponsoring subversive teaching and charged Senator Paul Douglas with spreading
socialism while in college. Sargent also indicted Cordell Hull, the former Secretary of
State, for sponsoring the 1913 income tax law, which Sargent considered a socialistic plot
to socialize America through taxing and spending. Representative Hays objected to
Sargent’s testimony because he read from a prepared statement that he had distributed to
the press but not to the committee members. Reece took responsibility for having
Sargent prepare a written statement, but Representatives Hays moved for a closed hearing
so that the committee could be informed of Sargent’s testimony. Minority committee
member Representative Pfost agreed, but Reece had the proxies of the other two
Republicans on the committee, who were absent, and voted against the motion. Hays and
Pfost then walked out of the investigation in protest over the conduct of the inquiry. The
two accused the committee of allowing witnesses to charge foundations without the
committee having prior knowledge of the content of the testimony and of allowing
witnesses to drop names that cast a derogatory implication at public figures. Their
actions forced the committee to adjourn hearings because House rules required a quorum
with at least one Democrat in the absence of all Republican members.286
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The hostility continued the next day. All Republican members of the committee
attended the hearings in order to prevent the Democrats from forcing an end to the
hearings. Hays reiterated his objection that Sargent had failed to prepare a written
statement for the entire committee, as directed by the rules of the committee. Reece
ignored Hays’ objection and wanted to move forward with testimony. Hays observed
that Reece refused to uphold any point of order with which he disagreed, regardless of the
rules. He warned Reece against interrupting him and expressed fears of a “Republican
dictatorship.” Hays then called for another point of order that the committee had failed to
appoint a staff member for the minority members of the committee. Reece noted that
Hays had recommended the stenographer hired by the committee. The official record
deleted the next exchange between Reece and Hays at the request of Reece, who later
recounted that Hays accused him of breaking his word and double-crossing Hays. When
Reece refused to respond, Hays taunted Reece that he “thought they had more guts in
East Tennessee.” Reece ignored the comment and resisted Hays’ provocation.
Representative Wolcott tried to resume the hearings and Sargent’s testimony as a visibly
angered Hays informed Wolcott that he would “interrupt whenever” he wanted, so
Wolcott “might as well save” his breath.
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Reece faced accusations of tailoring the committee to target specific foundations.
The New York Times reported that Congress conducted so many investigations that the
Reece Committee had met in virtually every room except the boiler room. Sargent
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testified for two more days amid countless interruptions by Hays. He emphasized that
foundation grants influenced education, textbooks, and authors. Hays accused Reece of
directing the hearings against foundations and of omitting witnesses for foundations.
Hays asserted that Reece knew that the House would refuse further funds for the
committee and intentionally delayed calling rebuttal witnesses for the foundations. Reece
expressed his belief that there would be enough funds for the entire hearings and agreed
to Hays’ request that Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, be called to
testify. Reece stipulated, though, that the committee needed to hear all criticism against
foundations before allowing them to respond. He then announced a one-week “cooling
off recess” for the committee before the next hearing.

288

Three of the next four witnesses called by the committee proved to be less
enthusiastic about denouncing foundations. The assistant commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service informed the committee that only a fraction of one percent of the 32,000
educational foundations had strayed from the regulations that allowed them to maintain
tax-exempt status. He added that in the past two years the government had withdrawn
tax-exempt status from fifty-five organizations in a thorough review. Since the
government granted tax-exempt status without legal definitions of “educational” and
“propaganda,” the Reece Committee faced making conclusions without established
guidelines. David Nelson Row, from the department of political science at Yale
University, testified as an expert on the Far East. The recipient of several foundation
grants, Row believed that foundations erred only when they deviated from established
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methods of reviewing grants. Professor Kenneth Colgrove, a retired political science
professor from Northwestern University, professed his hesitancy to appear. He feared
that much of the public received the impression that witnesses desired to smear
foundations and their officers because he believed that newspapers misquoted testimony.
Colgrove announced his respect for foundations and gave a balanced overview of their
operation. His only criticism pertained to the fact that grants may have leaned more
towards internationalism and globalism than would be desired.289
The testimony of Thomas M. McNiece, the committee’s assistant research
rd

director, inflicted untold damage to Reece’s crusade. On June 3 , McNiece read from an
initial staff report given to all committee members and quoted excerpts from books
regarding the relationship between foundations and education. He linked grant money
used by educational foundations to “a movement to socialize” the country into a
“collectivist state.” Hays contended that some of the evidence the staff used was twenty
years old and that the problems McNiece mentioned had been rectified by the New Deal.
McNiece continued reading excerpts when he resumed his testimony on June 9th. Tired
of what he viewed as a Republican tactic of quoting passages out of context to prove
subversion, Hays took action that made front-page news. Hays read three passages to
McNiece and asked his opinion on them. McNiece likened the passages to some
communist literature he had read, and Hays then revealed the source of the writings—a
papal encyclical of Pope Leo XIII in 1891 and Pope Pius XI in 1931. McNiece realized
immediately the enormity of his mistake. He wrote to Reece less than two weeks later

289

C.P. Trussell, “Tax-Free Funds Backed at Inquiry,” New York Times, 3 June 1954, p. 21;“Transcript of
Hearings,” Volume 11, June 4, 1954, pp. 1154, in BCR Papers, Box 21:3; “Transcript of Hearings,”
Volume 12, June 8, 1954, pp. 1232-1233, in BCR Papers, Box 21:4.

188

that Hays’ misuse of quotes had little effect on the evidence he had submitted and assured
Reece that Hays’ failure to further examine the quotes “established no weakness or error”
in his testimony. McNiece’s attempt at an explanation proved futile, as newspapers and
magazines widely circulated the incident to the detriment of the committee.290
Only two other witnesses appeared before the Reece Committee during the open
hearings. Kathryn Casey testified again to summarize the activities of the Carnegie
Corporation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rockefeller
General Education Board. She stated that a number of foundations, including Carnegie
and Rockefeller, overrode state control of education by using grants to force their own
views into curriculum. The President of the Social Science Research Council of New
York came as a witness in favor of foundations and accused the hearings of attempting to
characterize the educational and scientific progress of the last fifty years as a socialist or
communist conspiracy.291
The animosity between the Democratic and Republican members brought the
committee to a virtual impasse. Representative Pfost argued that the Republicans treated
the Democrats like visitors to the committee. The Americans for Democratic Action
called for the committee to disband because of its members’ ignorance about foundations.
Representative Hays described the proceedings as an “Alice in Wonderland
investigation” because he felt the other members of the committee had come to a verdict
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about foundations before any evidence was presented. Quarrelling between members of
the committee progressed to the point that witnesses had little time to testify. On June
th

17 Reece called for a two week cooling-off period in what he described as an attempt to
maintain the dignity of the committee.292
The tempers of the committee members calmed during the two weeks, but that of
the public became incensed. Many found the tactics of the Reece Committee unfair and
its accusations against foundations absurd. Business Week agreed that the growing
number of foundations presented a need for closer monitoring and analysis of their
financial power. It warned, however, that regulation of intellectual activities fell outside
the government’s authority. The magazine predicted that the investigation would yield
little value other than some mistakes made by foundations in granting money to a few
people who later turned out to be communist sympathizers. It applauded Representative
Hays for trapping McNiece in his own device of reading selective excerpts from books.
The New Republic concurred with this evaluation of Hays, calling him the stabilizing
factor in the committee. It praised Hays’ legislative record and hailed him as a man who
challenged Reece’s direction of the committee and the predetermined conclusions of the
293

staff.

The growing discontent with the conduct and investigation of the committee
prompted Reece to offer a request that altered the committee’s procedure. On June 2 nd
Representative Pfost made a motion to suspend the investigation until all the committee
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members felt fully informed on the nature and projected length of the hearings. Reece
denied any attempt to keep the Democratic members uninformed about the progression of
the investigation and voted against her motion. Representative Goodwin and
Representative Wolcott—through proxies given to Reece—also voted against Pfost. By
the end of the two-week recess, Reece recognized the animosity against his committee
and proposed to end open hearings. With a vote of three to two, the Republican members
decided that foundations could present their cases through sworn statements or briefs that
would be made public at a later date. The committee denied foundation representatives
the opportunity to testify in public about the charges brought against them.

294

A Very Unpleasant and Distasteful Duty
Foundations immediately denounced Reece’s actions to close public hearings.
They protested that Reece ended the hearings just as they had begun to make their
rebuttals. Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller Foundation and Rockefeller General
Education Board, wanted to be heard in full regarding any charges brought against his
foundation. Rusk complained that the foundation had refrained from commenting on the
allegations because they expected to be able to attend the public hearings. Charles
Dollard, president of the Carnegie Foundation, criticized the end of the hearings for the
same reason. Dollard claimed that the committee questioned the corporation’s
“Americanism” and made unfounded charges with factual errors. He argued that the taxexempt status of the foundation did not give Congress the right to censor the recipients of
research and educational grants. Dollard defended the actions of the Carnegie
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Foundation and asserted that putting education in the hands of the government was more
295

akin to Russia than America.

Reece justified his motion to close the hearings based on Representative Hays’
actions towards the witnesses. He reasoned that Hays’ continual interruptions, his
treatment of witnesses, and his constant vilifying of the staff and other members of the
committee made it impossible to continue the testimony. During the initial days of
testimony Hays’ interruptions seemed to have come from a genuine desire to add balance
to the hearings. As Reece overruled Hays’ objections and continued an obviously onesided investigation, Hays felt forced to adopt obstructionist tactics. His objections and
interruptions became extreme in an attempt to prevent Wormser and Reece from
railroading the committee and press to accept their foregone conclusions. Reece and
Hays appeared on NBC’s radio program, American Forum of the Air, on August 8th to
discuss the investigation. The moderator questioned Hays and his reported interruption
of Aaron Sargent 246 times during a three-hour testimony. Hays replied that his staff
reviewed the transcripts and found that Hays interrupted Sargent more than 600 times
during his entire testimony, which Hays believed was insufficient because of Sargent’s
insinuation that more than 650 Americans were guilty of subversion by association. Hays
explained that he read the papal quotes to demonstrate the danger of lifting passages out
of context rather than to embarrass the Reece Committee. 296
Both Reece and Hays criticized each other’s actions as being responsible for the
hostility present among committee members. Reece reproached Hays for calling him
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various names during the hearings, and Hays explained that he only made assertions
about Reece’s actions. Hays insisted he “called a spade a spade” and interrupted
witnesses only when necessary. He professed admiration for Reece and agreed that some
of the smaller foundations did need to be investigated. Hays’ main contention with the
investigation was that he believed the committee focused only on Ford, Carnegie, and
Rockefeller and omitted all other foundations. Reece spoke before the House on a “Point
of Personal Privilege” to defend himself against Hays’ accusations. He explained that the
initial study of foundations caused the delay in starting the hearings and criticized Hays’
“ungentlemanly behavior” towards himself and witnesses. Reece insisted that “great
provocation and a sense of patriot duty” forced him to speak against Hays. He
considered it “a very unpleasant and distasteful duty” because of his friendships with
both Democrats and Republicans but felt he needed to express his feelings on the
matter.297
Reece continued to defend the investigation conducted by his committee. In
response to Hays’ accusation that the committee only looked at large foundations, Reece
stated that the committee looked at small foundations as well, some of which would be
investigated by the government. He described many smaller foundations as “tax
dodgers” and recommended that the IRS remove the tax-exempt status from a number of
them. He considered the investigation a fair and objective vehicle used to determine if
foundations promoted socialism through their grant money. Reece maintained that the
only federal control of foundations advocated by the committee was in respect to
compliance with tax-exempt statutes. He attacked the press for being overly critical of
297
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his inquiry and stated the press misrepresented the actions of the committee to the public
in a “smear campaign against a Congressional committee.” He explained the conduct of
the press as a ploy by large foundations to prevent any further inquiry into their social
and political activities. Citing Hays’ “rude, unreasoning and ruthless attitude” as the
reason for halting testimony, Reece described him as having “the personality of a kid in a
schoolyard who yearns to fight but can’t find anybody he can lick.”298
The written responses submitted by the foundations lashed out against the
committee’s decision to close the hearings. Charles Dollard defended five specific
studies funded by the Carnegie Foundation, asserting that texts presented during the
hearings had been taken out of context. Reece reasoned that the Carnegie Foundation
simply feared an investigation because it had allowed Alger Hiss—“a proved traitor”—to
serve as president of the foundation. Hiss served a brief term as president of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in 1947, but this organization existed apart from the
actual foundation. The League for Industrial Democracy criticized the committee’s
tactics as unfair and un-American. Paul Hoffman accused Reece of slander for a speech
made before the House in which he implied that the Fund for the Republic was
subversive for granting money for the inquiry into congressional investigations. Hoffman
described the research as an expression of freedom of thought.299
The most severe condemnation of the Reece Committee came from the Ford
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., president of the Ford
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Foundation, denounced the end of hearings as an act of injustice. He asserted that all
Ford Foundation money had been spent to ensure a stronger American society and free
world and that most foundations worked to ensure freedom in many areas as an
alternative to communism. Gaither believed that the conspiracy theory propagated by the
committee could harm the usefulness of the foundations and urged the committee to
dispel the irresponsible testimony from the final report and show the good done by
foundations. Dean Rusk responded directly to Reece and expressed his disappointment
with the committee. Rusk telegrammed Reece that since the committee prevented the
foundations from replying he assumed no adverse opinion would be given to Congress.
He submitted a written statement that he expected to be made public. Reece replied to
Rusk that the Rockefeller Foundation would be given the same opportunity to submit
statements for the record as they would have been given in open hearings. The
Rockefeller statement defended its grants and announced its goal to fight any attempt to
use taxation as a means to curb intellectual freedom.300
Reece’s motives in closing the open hearings became readily apparent to much of
the public when criticized by one of America’s most powerful men. John J. McCloy was
assistant Secretary of War during World War II and president of Chase Manhattan Bank
from 1953 to 1960. He served as trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation for a number of
years and later as chairman of the Ford Foundation. McCloy wrote to Reece, who said he
had “known John for many years,” that he found the conduct of the committee during the
investigations depressing and hoped that the report would do justice to the foundations.
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He complained that the committee failed to give foundations the opportunity to refute the
“nonsense” that had been presented and advised against the staff preparing the report.
McCloy agreed that some of Hays’ comments had been extreme but allowed that the
staff’s conduct gave Hays a “barn door opening.” Reece replied that McCloy failed to
understand the staff’s approach because of biased newspaper reports. He defended the
staff and Dodd’s initial report and credited Hays with a suspicious attitude and distrust of
the Republican members of the committee from the start of the hearings. Reece pointed
out that the initial report acknowledged the studies were exploratory rather than factual.
McCloy considered this disclaimer as proof against the procedures employed by the
301

staff.

The Reece Committee created such a disturbance that some members of Congress
feared the final report would be tainted, but Reece wrote to George B. de Huszar that the
closed hearings would prevent anyone from impeding the development of the final report.
He stated that “worrying with Hays” had become too much bother. Representative Jacob
K. Javits, a liberal Republican from New York, recognized the potential danger of
allowing the staff to pronounce a verdict against foundations and submitted a resolution
to establish a legislative oversight committee over the Reece Committee and its
upcoming report. Reece reasoned that Javits’ request stemmed from the mention of his
name during the investigation of the League for Industrial Democracy and apologized to
Javits for any embarrassment this caused. Javits assured Reece that the mention of his
name had nothing to do with his resolution. He explained that he felt obligated to take
action because the committee had created such dissatisfaction that it threatened the
301
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prestige of all congressional investigations and foundations. Javits declared his motives
were to serve the public interest. The House failed to take action on the resolution, but it
302

revealed the Reece Committee’s loss of credibility among the House.

The Reece Committee’s hearings fell directly during the months when the 1954
campaigns began in full force. In the summer of 1954 the House and Senate conducted
three other separate investigations into education, including one in the House and one in
the Senate that looked at alleged Communists on teaching staffs and one headed by
Representative Ralph W. Gwinn on trends in teaching and possible harmful influences on
the government. The conduct and procedures of the Reece Committee generated much
more publicity and criticism than the other investigations. Some newspapers linked the
increased number of congressional inquiries to political motivations. The New York
Times anticipated negative responses from the public and predicted that the Reece
Committee would wait to issue its final report until after the November elections to avoid
damage to Republican candidates.303
Reece’s preoccupation with his investigation prevented him from actively
campaigning for reelection to the House in 1954. Talk of opposition to Reece in the
Republican primary circulated as early as February 1954, but few were willing to “stick
their own necks out” or give support to another candidate. Rumors circulated that since
Reece bought a house in Florida to help his wife recuperate from an illness that he would
resign in 1954 because of his extended absences from the House to care for her. Local
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papers gave little credit to the rumors since, as they noted, Reece had missed a number of
quorum calls in the House in his previous terms and remained a congressman.
Republican Hassell Evans, superintendent of Unicoi County Schools, announced his
candidacy against Reece in the primary. He described Reece as an enemy of the TVA
and claimed Reece’s “dictatorial methods” of the last thirty-four years exceeded those of
Crump’s machine. On June 5th Reece revealed his intention to run for reelection because
his wife’s health had improved, and he desired to continue serving his district. He also
claimed to be in a better position to accomplish things for the district with the
Eisenhower administration, to which he professed a “strong sense of obligation.”

304

Reece’s absence from the First District became the focal point of the primary
campaign. Evans accused Reece of residing in Florida and only coming to the district
every two years right before the election. He questioned Reece’s loyalty to the
Eisenhower administration and his legislative record. Reece ‘s campaign manager, C.L.
Marshall, noted that if Congress’ session continued through the primary election Reece
most likely would have to remain in Washington. The Reece campaign attributed his
absence from Tennessee before the primary to the “demanding pressure of the legislative
program” in the final days of the congressional session. Reece lauded the
accomplishments of that session in ridding Washington of Communists. He called for
another Republican Congress to purge the government entirely of Communists. Reece’s
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domination of local politics once again proved effective, and he won the primary,
carrying all but one county.

305

Low Democratic opposition in the First District assured Reece of his reelection in
November. Reece failed to return to his district during the campaign because he felt
needed to ensure the Republican Congress continued to drive “the minks, the pinks, and
the stinks” out of Washington. He expressed little concern about his Democratic
opposition in the November election, even though President Eisenhower telegrammed
that his schedule prevented him from making a campaign stop in Tennessee. Criticism of
Reece’s investigation did not hurt him in Tennessee, and he won the November election
easily over the Democratic candidate, Arthur Bright.
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An Anchor to the Windward
The Reece Committee published its report after the fall elections. The Senate also
delayed voting on the censure of Joseph McCarthy until after November in order to avoid
harming Republican chances in the elections. After the vote, McCarthy lost all measure
of support and suffered virtual exile under the Senate’s censure. He vowed to return to
his fight against communism, which had lost much of its appeal to the public. Democrats
won control of the House and the Senate in the 1954 elections, creating an even more
hostile atmosphere for the Reece Committee report. Republicans on the committee made
it obvious that they agreed with the initial staff findings on foundation grants, so
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Democratic members, anticipating an unfavorable final report, requested time to prepare
a minority report of the committee.

307

The Majority Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt
Foundations turned into an ordeal almost as big as the actual hearings. The committee
released the report on December 20, 1954. It included two sections on the committee and
investigation, a minority report written by Democratic members of the committee, and a
supplemental statement by Representative Angier Goodwin. Goodwin had reservations
about the majority report after he signed it and requested permission to include a side
report. The entire report consisted of over 1,500 pages, and its enormity forced most
media to print only excerpts and summations of the official texts. Representative Hays
became indignant over the content of the report and protested that the minority members
received only a few copies. He also became angered that someone outside the committee
had reviewed Part Two before he had an opportunity to look at it. Wormser worried
about Goodwin’s “mysterious separate statement,” but he realized omitting or altering it
would have turned the report into an even greater debacle. Goodwin’s report arrived too
late to be included in the initial report so the committee added it as a supplemental
308

statement.

Part One of the official report offered an explanation of the committee’s
procedures and the need for a subsequent investigation. Its authors—the staff members
of the committee—began with a summary of House Resolution 217 that created the
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Reece Committee and a review of the Cox Committee and its shortcomings. The staff
explained the discontinuation of hearings “with deep regret and only through necessity.”
They acknowledged the negative effect that witnesses created about foundations but
argued that the situation permitted no other recourse but to close the hearings. In an
attempt to defend the committee’s actions, the staff asserted that closing the hearings had
little effect on the inquiry because oral testimony held “far less importance than
research.” They claimed that the committee had full knowledge of the good rendered by
foundations to many fields of research but asserted that certain dangers necessitated an
investigation. The authors lamented the lack of funds which forced the committee to
focus on the social science area and justified the inquiry because of the federal laws
related to tax-exemption. They cited specific examples of unfair business activities by
foundations, most notably the creation of the Ford Foundation. The authors insisted that
the family could have donated money directly to charitable organizations, but the family
wanted to retain voting control over the stock and avoid taxes on a large inheritance.309
The second part of the report, published in a separate volume, established fourteen
main conclusions drawn by the committee. The staff considered the investigation more
of a “pilot study” because of the time and money limitations placed on the committee and
encouraged further investigation based on these findings. Half of these conclusions
closely resembled the findings of the Cox Committee and revealed little new information.
The report detailed the dramatic increase in the number of foundations within the United
States, the positive impact of foundations when they operated in natural sciences, the
enormous power wielded by large foundations and their influence on national politics,
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and the necessity of monitoring the professional class of administrators and public funds
used by foundations. The remaining conclusions identified criticisms that conservative
members held against large foundations. These criticisms, unproved by the hearings,
included: foundations had influenced the media and government to the point that
objective criticism had become nearly impossible; foundations controlled the direction of
research and emphasized empirical over theoretical research; this new research supported
theories slanted to the left that were detrimental to the religious and moral fiber of
America; and foundations worked in tandem to exercise control over America’s foreign
policy. The final conclusion of the report noted that foundations avoided directly
supporting communist organizations “with several tragically outstanding exceptions.”
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Reece added a supplemental statement to the majority report to offer a rebuttal to
criticisms of the committee. Reece felt it necessary to excuse the committee in closing
the hearings by demonstrating how the minority leader tried to disrupt the hearings.
Reece denounced Hays’ interruptions and his use of the papal readings and explained the
preliminary investigation as the fairest way to let foundations know what evidence would
be brought against them in order to let them reply appropriately. The amount of
justification presented in the lengthy report immediately alerted any reader that some
grain of truth had to be present in the many criticisms of the investigation.311
The final pages of the report contained Representative Goodwin’s dissenting
views and the minority report. Goodwin explained his position that the Cox Committee
had fully answered any questions regarding the tax-exempt status and activities of
foundations. He pointed out his disagreements with the Reece Report and cited the Cox
310
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report as evidence. The minority report condemned the Reece report as a “complete
waste of public money” in five specific areas: prejudgment of foundations, a lack of
factual basis, denying a fair hearing to foundations, the nature of the public hearings, and
the report itself. It criticized Reece for attacking newspapers and described the report and
proceedings as having a “monstrous nature.”312
The Reece Committee placed responses from foundations at the end of Part Two.
The Ford Foundation called the investigation “biased from start to finish.” The
Rockefeller Foundation considered the study “discredited in advance” because of the
biased nature of the preliminary investigation. The Reid Foundation offered similar
criticism of the committee, and the Meyer Foundation described Reece as a “classic, if
minor, illustration of men who believe in operating congressional committees according
to personal whim and arbitrary prejudice.” The foundations asserted that they operated
within the limitations of the law and encouraged growth and research in many fields of
education.313
Condemnation of the Reece Report began in earnest immediately following its
publication. Dean Rusk and H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. charged in a joint statement to the
press that the committee failed to print their entire answers to testimony given against
them even though the final report contained almost all of the accusations against
foundations. They reiterated their belief that the committee conducted a biased
investigation with unfair methods that resulted in false findings.314
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The media echoed the sentiments of the major foundations regarding the Reece
Committee. The New York Times announced that the report received more attention than
it deserved because of its outright charge that foundations supported subversion and
considered it best if the report were soon forgotten. It claimed that if this charge were
true, Reece would have recommended that the tax-exempt status of foundations be
revoked, not that tax laws be changed. The paper labeled the findings as the “ReeceWolcott report” and pointed out that majority applied new definitions to terms such as
“subversion” to prove that foundations failed to fund research that supported their
isolationist views. One newspaper noted that the Reece investigation and report would
prevent foundations from being regulated in the public interest, which they should be
considering their growing power. It compared Reece with McCarthy and concluded that
the “superficial emotion” inherent in the investigation allowed the real problem to
“escape study.”315
Criticism of the report and Reece continued well into the next year. Time
attributed Reece’s resentment against foundations to the 1952 campaign when Henry
Ford II and Paul Hoffman supported Eisenhower over Taft. It asserted that Reece
suffered “from a delusion that he would have been Secretary of State if Bob Taft had
been elected President.” It criticized the excessive cost of the investigation and report
and Reece’s assumption that he was qualified to distinguish between good and bad
research. Referring to Representative Goodwin’s side report, Paul Blanshard, writing for
The Nation, considered the committee to be divided two and a half to two and a half.
Blanshard agreed with the minority report and described Reece as a “bitter-end Taft
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Republican.” He characterized the staff as unsuitable because they lacked experience in
education and social science and criticized the choice of “professional” witnesses for the
committee. A writer for Harper’s Magazine pointed out that the committee failed to
present any new witnesses, but rather used witnesses from the Cox Committee hearings
who supported the staff’s theory of subversion. He asserted that the committee operated
under a theme of conspiracy among foundations and scholars. The writer commended
Hays for trying to bring out facts during the hearing and credited Reece with not only
convicting based on guilt by association, but also “guilt by distinction and guilt by
316

advanced education.”

Reece defended both the Committee’s procedures and its final report. He
responded to the editorials and articles condemning the investigation in a letter to the
New York Times. Reece felt that the press failed to explain why he decided to close the
hearings and again cited Hays’ interruptions and abuse of witnesses as the mitigating
factor. He referred to two undisclosed letters he received from two “professors of
standing” that complained about Hays’ conduct toward the witnesses. Reece felt the final
report stood on its own merits and pointed out that foundations made statements that
appeared in the Congressional Record and most likely received more attention in the
papers than anything published against them. Reece attributed much of the criticism to a
philosophy of attacking the messenger when one cannot attack the message. He
considered the attacks directed against him for having a “personal plot against the
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foundations” unfounded since the House had passed the resolution authorizing the
317

investigation.

Hays maintained his position that the Reece Committee failed to provide an
adequate forum for foundations to be heard. In a letter to the New York Times, Hays
contended that Reece stopped the public hearings when a witness for the foundations
attacked the facts presented by the committee. Hays defended his actions and his
interruptions as an attempt to balance the obviously biased proceedings. Reece
responded to Hays’ letter to defend his position, but the editor of the New York Times felt
that publishing a second letter from Reece would simply prolong the controversy. Rene
Wormser had actually written the letter for Reece. Wormser accused Hays of creating an
atmosphere of fear for witnesses and added “a plug” for himself at the end of the letter.
The letter called Wormser a “respected attorney of national reputation, a man of high
character and unquestioned integrity.” Wormser wrote that this characterization gave
him publicity for his law practice and helped the cause in general because he felt himself
“difficult to attack.” His encouragement of Reece to respond to Hays’ letter had as much
318

to do with personal gain as defending the investigation.

Reece stood by the veracity of his committee’s report. He wrote to Norman Dodd
that although the committee had been confronted with numerous obstructions he was
determined to do a good job and reach his objectives. He conceded that little good would
result immediately from the report but felt that over the coming years it would “furnish
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an anchor to the windward” and “the many sound Americans” who desired to “keep this
country on an even keel.” He later acknowledged that the report had several faults but
maintained that it was a “competent one” and would stand as the first effort to alert the
nation to the possible threat of some forces within foundations. By July 1955 Reece had
been able to forget enough of the criticism to relate that the committee received “a very
good reaction to the report.” He admitted that the report received some negative
responses but maintained that its influence would endure.319
Reece felt that he had truly served the American public in his investigation of
foundations. Speaking before the Commonwealth Club of California and the National
Press Club luncheon, Reece admitted that the committee erred only in making known the
nature of the inquiry before the hearings, allowing foundations to smear the investigation
before it began. He maintained that foundations favored socialist and leftist ideals and
prevented professors who refused to “follow the liberal lead” from receiving foundation
grants. Reece described his efforts as “purely a labor of love.” Confident in his
committee, Reece reported that he had become “pretty much immune to criticism”
following the disparagement of the Reece Report. He insisted that his actions followed
320

his conscience and reinforced his patriotism and objectivity in the investigation.

Reece’s motivations in proposing a new investigation into the tax-exempt status
of foundations most likely included a desire to vindicate Taft’s loss to Eisenhower at the
1952 Republican convention and a personal vendetta against what he viewed as an attack
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against conservatism within foundations. When Taft died, Reece turned to his hatred of
communism to justify another congressional inquiry and used his position on the Rules
Committee to ensure its vote before the House. The staff of the Reece Committee
reinforced the campaign against large foundations under the guise of violating rules that
governed tax-exempt organizations. The nature of the preliminary report and the
hearings supported claims that the committee was biased against foundations from the
start. The Reece Report read like a diatribe against foundations rather than an objective
summary of findings. Faced with intense national criticism and minimal support for the
report, Reece once again held firm to his beliefs and his conservative Republican
viewpoints. Reece believed that one day his findings would be appreciated as a warning
against the communist threat to America. The Reece Committee served only as a
warning against unfounded accusations and investigations into foundations. Later
references would characterize the committee as a debacle and one of the most poorly
conducted inquiries in Congress.
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Chapter 9
Our Enemy, the Communist
Honored to Have Been Selected
At the same time he scrutinized foundations for possible subversion, Reece
became president of a newly established foundation. Taft’s death in 1953 left the
Republican Party without one of its most powerful members. Shortly after his death,
supporters began raising funds for a memorial foundation in Taft’s name. In August
1954 the Robert A. Taft Memorial Foundation, Inc. named Reece president of the nonprofit organization formed to “perpetuate the ideals” of Taft. While the Reece
Committee prepared the final report, Reece himself contemplated how best to honor the
former senator. The foundation considered a physical memorial, an institute to study
policy, and grant money for scholarships and research activities as possible benefactors
of foundation funds.321
The obvious contradiction in Reece’s actions and his investigation raised probing
questions among the public. Reporters asked Reece how he planned to avoid the
“socialistic matters” in the work of the Taft Foundation that he had criticized in other
larger foundations. Reece responded that the Taft Foundation would avoid promoting
propaganda and any efforts to influence legislation and would concentrate on matters
acceptable to both political parties. He insisted that he directed his criticism of
foundations toward their administration rather than the organizations themselves. He
hoped for the Taft Foundation to preserve the “American way of life as exemplified by

321

“Reece in Taft Memorial Post,” New York Times, 8 August 1954 (p. 36); “Memorials to Taft,” New York
Times, 9 September 1954, p. 33.

209

Senator Taft.” Reece declared that he felt “honored to have been selected” as president
of the foundation, which would “always be open to inquiry” as long as he maintained his
connection with it. The Taft Foundation decided in October 1957 to build a bell tower in
Washington, D.C., and to establish the Taft Institute for Government in New York to
provide lectures, publish books, and conduct research in line with Taft’s ideals.322
Reece declared that the Taft Memorial would stand as a lasting monument to his
name and the principles for which he stood. He lauded that the Taft-Hartley Act had
withstood attempts to change or abolish it and credited this to Taft’s prominence. By
April 1959 the foundation completed work on the Taft Memorial Bell Tower. Presidents
Hoover and Eisenhower attended the dedication ceremony. In his dedication speech,
Reece commended Taft as one of the noblest Americans of all time. He stated that Taft
possessed “the three infallible signs of greatness—generosity in design, humanity in
execution, and humility in success.” One newspaper called the monument a tribute to
those “who never quite made it.” The Taft Institute opened two years later in 1961.323
Another memorial project also captured Reece’s attention shortly after the end of
the Reece Committee. Reece had long admired former President Andrew Johnson. In
1955 two barefoot Tennessee residents visited Reece in Washington to propose a bust of
Andrew Johnson to be located in Washington, and the visit prompted Reece to renew his
efforts to erect a memorial to Johnson. Reece had spoken to Congress in March 1941 on
a motion to appoint a commission that would formulate plans for a suitable memorial, but
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involvement in World War II postponed action on the bill. Reece collected information
on Johnson, including Confederate Bond sheets, notifications of Johnson’s funeral
services, and information about Johnson’s impeachment to use in a book on the former
president. In April 1958 his efforts paid off when the city of Greeneville, Tennessee—
Johnson’s home town—opened Johnson’s restored home and tailor shop and unveiled a
statue to stand in the city. Reece spoke at the dedication ceremony, calling Johnson “the
greatest martyr and unsung hero in American history.”324
Blastings [of] Half-Truth
Although the Reece Committee officially ended its investigation with the final
report in 1954, Reece continued to express interest in the crusade against communism for
a number of years. Many considered him to be a relative “expert” on the subject of
foundations and continued to seek his advice. The Reece investigation failed to garner
any concrete evidence of subversion among foundations, but it managed to increase the
caution of Americans about receiving their funds. Supporters of Reece brought to his
attention acts they felt qualified as subversive. He thanked all of the writers for their
information, but he kept his responses to writers who held extreme opposition to all
foundations brief. Physicians even wrote to Reece about foundation grants to hospitals
and their programs, questioning the advisability of accepting the money. Reece or an
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assistant responded with a general form letter approving these types of grants. General
R.E. Wood, Chairman of the Finance Committee at Sears, Roebuck and Company,
forwarded Reece a copy of a letter he received from Dean Rusk regarding the work of the
Rockefeller Foundation. In the letter Rusk emphasized that the fund refused to support
communist agendas because of the United States government’s opposition and because
communism prevented free investigation in research. He stressed that Rockefeller grants
supported true investigation and research. Reece had to believe that this letter resulted
from his committee’s work in exposing subversion. In late 1955 Reece diverted some of
the information he received to HUAC, who he felt might serve as a better vehicle for
325

investigation.

The Reece investigation increased caution among educational institutions
receiving and foundations giving grant money. Newspapers sought Reece’s reactions on
new grants, validating his belief that the committee had served a valuable purpose. In
December 1955 the Ford Foundation gave half a billion dollars in grants to schools and
hospitals. Reece approved of the foundation’s gift to deserving institutions, particularly
those in Tennessee, for research outside the social science field. Carson-Newman
College received a portion of these funds, which Reece deemed appropriate. He insisted
that only some of the actions of the Ford Foundation seemed tainted, whereas the grants
given to educational institutions were acceptable. The SRC noticed the Ford
Foundation’s grant. George Mitchell, the executive director of the SRC, copied an
editorial from the Atlanta Journal and Constitution in which the author criticized
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politicians for labeling foundations communist. The author insisted that this resulted
when a “shyster politician” came upon a “large amount of money in a foundation” and
realized he was unable “to graft, steal, appropriate, or take any of it for his own profit.”
Mitchell called the editorial a “pleasant letter,” indicating his opinion of Reece and his
investigation.326
Although many of Reece’s remarks regarding foundations became tempered, the
hostility between Reece and the Fund for the Republic persisted. Robert M. Hutchins,
president of the Fund for the Republic, spoke at a National Press Club luncheon in
January 1955 attended by Representatives Wayne Hayes and Gracie Pfost, the Reece
Committee’s minority members, and Reece. Hutchins opened with a disclaimer that his
remarks represented his views only and not those of the Fund for the Republic or the Ford
Foundation. The Reece Committee’s methods, he declared, exploited public concern
about Communists in order to further political ambitions. Hutchins stated that Reece had
managed to harass foundations and subdue any courage to forage new research “without
firing a single serious shot, without saying a single intelligent word.” Hutchins accused
the Reece Committee of achieving “some of its gaudiest effects by the simple process of
giving old words new definitions and the pinning the old words on the foundations.” He
asserted that the committee defined subversion as “a promotion of tendencies that may
lead to results that the committee will not like.” Thus, supporting the New Deal and
many other reform efforts became labeled communistic. Hutchins called the appendix of
the majority report “an endless carnival of good clean fun” and insisted the committee
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held no more “than symbolic or symptomatic importance. Its wild and squalid
presentation affords a picture of the state of our culture that is most depressing.” In short,
Hutchins concluded, “the Reece investigation in its inception and execution was a
fraud.”327
Reece replied to Hutchins’ charges at the February National Press Club luncheon
and before Congress. He announced that he had received so many letters about the Fund
for the Republic’s grant to investigate congressional committees that he felt compelled to
make a public statement. The content of the remarks given at the luncheon and before
st

Congress on July 21 was much the same. Reece accused the foundation of participating
in political propaganda and attacking the security system of the United States government
by distributing copies of Edward R. Murrow’s interview with Dr. Robert Oppenheimer,
who had been dropped from the atomic energy program as a security risk. Reece asserted
this gave Oppenheimer a chance to defend his associations with Communists. He also
stated that Robert Hutchins’ dual position as president of the foundation and chairman of
the editorial board of the Encyclopedia Britannica gave him too wide of an influence and
mixed politics with private gains in the management of a tax-exempt organization. Reece
claimed that an “intellectual cartel” existed and that it tried to influence public opinion by
directing foundation grants. He complained that the Ford family had avoided paying
income tax on ninety per cent of the profits it received through the Ford Foundation, yet
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no one challenged this grossly inaccurate statement. He insisted that the investigation
was directed not against foundations but their use of resources.

328

The animosity Reece maintained against the Fund for the Republic carried over in
dialogue with its president. In October 1955 the Harvard Law School requested that
Reece appear with Hutchins at its forum. Reece agreed but informed the program
coordinator that Hutchins probably would hesitate to appear. In January 1956 the
program coordinator announced that Harvard had to cancel the forum because Hutchins
would be unable to appear and because they had failed to find another speaker of Reece’s
“stature.” Reece replied with regrets for the cancellation but noted that he expected
Hutchins to decline to appear after his recent speech at the National Press Club, which he
claimed “contributed considerably to the widespread comment of an unfavorable nature
about the Fund for the Republic in the magazines and news columns.”329
Reece and Hutchins continued their public debate through private
correspondence. In March 1956 Reece responded to a comment made by Hutchins that
communism had failed in the United States. Reece requested clarification on Hutchins’
definition of communism—if he meant the overthrow of the American government or the
rise of socialism and Marxism. Hutchins responded with a brief note that he meant
communist political organizations had failed to achieve their goals. The letters seemed to
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be a continuation of Reece’s interest in foundations, but accompanying letters from
Richard Rimanoczy, the educational director of the American Economic Foundation,
proved otherwise. Rimanoczy advised Reece on how to phrase his responses in order to
elicit an answer from Hutchins and possibly entrap him.330
Although the press labeled the Reece Committee inefficient, the investigation
prompted action among the public and foundations. Reece received countless requests
for copies of his speech on the Fund for the Republic. Many even contributed money to
help with the cost of printing additional copies. The head of the American Legion asked
for a boycott of the Fund for the Republic and its programs after Reece’s speech. The
Rockefeller Foundation responded to public disapproval when it announced it would
support legislation that required tax-exempt foundations to report to the public. In
November 1955 the Ford Foundation yielded sixty percent of its voting power so that
Ford stock could qualify for listing on the New York Stock Exchange. The Ford family
claimed that they had been working on the idea for the last five years, although it had
become a “prime objective” within the last year. This action made the foundation
responsible to public scrutiny, a perceived victory for Reece, who believed his
observation on the tax savings of the family prompted the move. Going public, however,
raised the price of Ford stock and made the foundation the first to possess over one
billion dollars in assets.331
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Reece maintained his stance that foundations posed a threat amid continued
criticism of his committee. In a radio broadcast on March 28, 1955, Reece responded to
the assertion of Adlai Stevenson that his investigation warned against developing new
ideas by describing Stevenson and foundation presidents as “egg heads” who refused to
give support to conservative ideas or theories. Reece encouraged freedom of action
among foundations as long as they promoted projects the general public—meaning
conservatives—wanted. Reece inserted an article from the June 1955 issue of the
American Legion magazine in the Congressional Record that praised the work of the
Reece Committee and its staff. The author insisted that opponents, especially
Representative Hays, deliberately tried to hinder the investigation and that even though
the Reece investigation produced solid evidence, its reward had been “the smear” of its
name and the “blastings [of] half-truth” regarding its findings. Speaking at the
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons meeting in Columbus, Ohio, Reece
insisted that the “intellectual aristocracy” desired an “America governed by social
scientists.” He believed his investigation “incontrovertibly established” that Moscow
directed Communists to infiltrate foundations in order to use their funds for the
promotion of communism in the United States. He pleaded with trustees of foundations
to monitor their own organizations in lieu of legislation.332
American Way of Life
Reece and Rene Wormser hoped to disseminate the findings of the Reece
Committee in a more accessible format than the voluminous final report. In late 1955
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Rene Wormser reported to Reece that he had already begun making notes for a book
about the Reece Committee and requested information on the Cox Committee to include
in his book. Wormser originally planned to write the book in collaboration with another
writer but decided to finish the book on his own. He sent a draft of the book to Reece in
February 1956 for review. Wormser secured a publisher for his book but feared that
marketing would become a challenge. He asked Reece for assistance in advertising the
book, and Reece agreed to do whatever he could to help.333
Reece and Wormser developed a close friendship as they collaborated in
promotion of Wormser’s book. Throughout 1957 Wormser continued work on his
analysis of the Reece Committee and invited Reece to visit him to discuss the book.
Reece remained steadfast that foundations had failed to fund research in natural sciences
to the detriment of young scholars. The Devin-Adair Company published Wormser’s
book in 1958. Reece wrote numerous letters trying to publicize it and obtain reviews. He
expected bad reviews of the book but concluded that bad reviews were better than none
since they created a sensation that could sell more books. Reece wrote to the publisher
and related his disappointment that “intellectual liberals” had conspired to discourage
reviews of this important book. Wormser hoped that his book would tell the “true story”
of the Reece Committee and questioned why fewer congressmen expressed indignation at
the treatment Reece received. He told Reece that he felt Reece had received “one of the
dirtiest deals in Congressional history.”334
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Foundations: Their Power and Influence echoed much of the information detailed
in the Reece Committee’s controversial final report. Reece wrote an introduction to the
book, repeating the reasons behind a second congressional investigation into foundations.
Wormser began the book with an explanation that a liberal movement had “captured”
foundations and led them to use public funds to finance political goals, resulting in
increased power in social science research and education. He described the growing
activity of foundations in foreign affairs and lamented that boards of trustees, which he
described as responsible and well-meaning, failed to realize the effect grants could have
“in the world of men’s minds.” The book argued against the right of a foundation to
discriminate among certain groups on the basis of their philosophies or religious
persuasions, meaning those with a conservative viewpoint. Wormser specifically
identified the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic as examples of foundations
that had become liberal, which he believed had come to interfere with government
programs, and practiced “international dogooding.” Wormser ended with an assertion
that the operation of foundations created problems that could cause further injury to
society.
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Wormser’s book received little recognition when it appeared in bookstores. He
expressed dismay with sales of the book and blamed the publisher for insufficient efforts
to find sales. Reece understood the plight of the publisher as a result of the resistance
made against the book and the investigation and believed they should have prepared for
low sales. His friendship with Wormser led him to continue his efforts at promoting the
book as “an accurate and dispassionate review of that hectic episode which was probably
335
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the most maligned, misrepresented, and malreported investigation ever conducted by a
336

Congressional committee.”

Reece’s concern about the communist influence in education increased during his
last terms in office. In 1955 he began a three year campaign to produce a textbook used
in schools that outlined the differences between democracy and communism. Professor
Kenneth Colegrove—the same man who testified before the Reece Committee—began
writing such a book, and Reece publicized it in Congress. Reece was unable to persuade
Congress to mandate the insertion of Democracy versus Communism into school
curriculum, but he maintained his support of Colegrove and his efforts to reform
education. In 1956 Reece also began supporting a book written by Father Edward A.
Keller, the director of the Bureau of Economic Research at Notre Dame University. He
agreed to look for funding in order to finance distribution of the book, which he viewed
as an aide to help maintain the “American way of life.”337
Reece feared that intense focus on social sciences would eventually threaten the
safety of the nation. In a speech titled “American Crisis in Education,” he lamented that
in the last twenty-five years educators had been preoccupied with social sciences to the
point that Americans had been “unequipped” for the problems “of national survival and
constructive citizenship.” He insisted that “our enemy, the communist” had taken
advantage of this preoccupation to focus on other areas that could threaten national
security. Reece asserted that foundations contributed inadvertently through their grants
336
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to educators who wanted to “reshape the social and economic structure of the United
States into a semi-Socialist welfare-state pattern” that they felt was superior to capitalism.
He reasoned that changing human behavior prevented social sciences from becoming an
exact science. He felt that the damage could be reversed only through increased private
funds and the integration of economic principles.338
Reece’s investigation marked the third time Congress probed the activities of
foundations. None of the investigations brought about new legislation. The 1934 change
in the requirements for income tax exemption that prohibited propaganda or influence in
legislation can be traced to the Walsh Committee Hearings of the Progressive Era, but
this required interpretation by the courts as to what constituted propaganda and influence.
The politically-motivated Cox and Reece Committees had little to no bearing on public
support of foundations or their treatment under the law. A Gallup poll conducted shortly
after the Reece hearings revealed that “if anything, [the hearings] increased the popularity
of the Ford Foundation.”339
Although most foundations refused to be intimidated by men like Cox and Reece,
they became wary of supporting unpopular ideas. By the early 1960s foundations had
become more organized and professional. An analysis conducted in 1962 revealed that
few projects sponsored by foundations failed, which suggested that little to no risky
grants had been allotted. One scholar pointed to unadvisable trends among foundations,
including an aversion to the interdisciplinary studies that had been favored a few years
before, “a penchant for the safe bets,” and a reluctance to deal with controversial issues.
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The press recognized the Reece Committee as “the most totally mismanaged
Congressional investigation of the McCarthy period,” but it contributed to the retreat of
foundations from “risk zones.”

340

Representative Wright Patman presented the next challenge to foundations. A
Democrat from Texas, Patman used a small business subcommittee to look into the taxexempt status of foundations beginning in 1961. He accused foundations of “being vast
concentrations of wealth controlled largely by easterners, and of being guilty of abusing
the sanctuary of tax exemption at the expense of the common man.” The eight-year
investigation garnered little notice until the late 1960s, when the House Ways and Means
Committee began an inquiry into foundations. Patman, who was quite unpopular in
Congress, attacked any large concentration of wealth and wanted a “25-year death
sentence” placed on foundations. A study of his inquiry pronounced it misleading and
“rabble-rousing,” but it did reveal a number of abuses of the tax-exempt laws that forced
the IRS to investigate. Patman uncovered foundations illegally lending money for
speculation in the stock market and the use of foundations as fronts for the Central
Intelligence Agency to channel funds to other organizations. These irregularities
appeared almost entirely in smaller foundations, however, rather than the larger
foundations attacked by Cox and Reece. 341
Reece’s willingness to serve on the Taft Foundation revealed his prejudice toward
the foundations he investigated. His inability to produce any credible evidence against

340

Waldemar A. Nielsen, “How Solid Are the Foundations?” New York Times, 21 October 1962, p. 243.
Will Lissner, “Patman Inquiry on Funds Assailed,” New York Times, 22 December 1968, p. 28;
“Witness Walks Out at Patman Inquiry,” New York Times, 14 November 1967, p. 34; Eileen Shanahan,
“Foundations Face Sweeping Inquiry by a House Panel,” New York Times, 17 February 1969, p. 1; Reeves,
Foundations Under Fire, 19-25.
341

222

them left a bitter memory that resurfaced in his interactions with Fund president Robert
Hutchins. The strength of both the foundations and their leaders prevented any
permanent damage to their operation or reputation. The committee report and Wormser’s
book soon became difficult to find, not because of their huge demand but because of a
lack of their credibility. Time clearly revealed the political motivations behind both the
Reece and Cox investigations. Reece, however, desperate to maintain standing, clung to
the issue of subversion among foundations until his death.
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Chapter 10
Tennessee’s Mister Republican
Private War on Communism
The negative response Reece received from his committee investigation had little
effect on local elections. Speculation circulated that Reece would retire from Congress in
1956, but he announced that he had “no alternative” but to run after an expression of
confidence from those who knew him. He asked for a sixteenth term because of his
devotion to his constituents and because he felt that he could better serve the people in
office during the “troubled days” of the nation. Reece announced that his wife agreed to
his candidacy but lamented that his vote in Washington prevented him from returning to
the district to campaign. He offered his legislative record as evidence of his devotion to
the interests of his district. Reece won the Republican primary without any opposition.
Arthur Bright won the Democratic primary to challenge Reece in the November
elections.342
In October Reece committed a true act of kindness that helped ensure his victory
over his Democratic opponent. A woman in Johnson City, Tennessee, gave birth to
conjoined twins and shortly thereafter her husband died suddenly. She faced caring for
the twins as well as her two other children, so Reece arranged for the twins to be admitted
to the National Institute of Health for observation and later separation. Local papers gave
ample space to the story and the successful separation surgery. No paper interpreted
Reece’s act as an election ploy, most likely because Reece held little concern about his
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opponent. Bright ran as the Democratic nominee against Reece in 1952 and 1954.
Reece’s victories gave him confidence that he would defeat Bright once again, which
343

allowed him time to focus on the national campaign.

Reece faced a much tougher challenge in securing Tennessee’s vote for the
Republican ticket. He admitted that although he loved Eisenhower, he disliked many of
his policies. He assured voters, however, that he supported Eisenhower through his first
four years in office and pledged his support in the next four years after his reelection.
Reece praised Eisenhower for ending the Korean War and organized the Republican
Party in Tennessee to support the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket. Democrats mounted a strong
campaign in Tennessee because Estes Kefauver ran as the vice presidential candidate on
the Democratic ticket with Adlai Stevenson. The Democratic machine had declined with
the death of Crump in 1952, leaving Democrats free to decide their own vote. Many
disliked Kefauver but voted Democratic because they felt the Republican Party had failed
to do enough for the state. But still, Republicans triumphed in Tennessee and the nation
and returned both Eisenhower and Reece to Washington.344
Reece’s adept political maneuverings helped maintain his popularity within his
district. In 1957, the city of Johnson City dedicated their newest government building,
the Carroll Reece Post Office. In April 1958 Reece announced his candidacy for another
term in office. He invited Vice-President Nixon to visit the Rhododendron Festival at
Roan Mountain that June, proving his ability to bring attention to his district. The
following month John B. Waters, Jr., an attorney who lived in Sevierville, announced that
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he would challenge Reece in the Republican primary. Waters expressed his concern of
what he viewed as the deterioration of the Republican Party and Reece’s bossism of the
First District. Waters put on an elaborate campaign. He paraded through towns with
three elephants to advertise his dedication to the Republican Party and his platform of
higher teacher salaries, road improvement, and attracting tourists to the area. He charged
Reece with being an absentee congressman who spent more time at his home in Florida,
his hotel in West Virginia, and traveling in Europe than in his district. Waters ran an
advertisement in the Knoxville Journal the day before the primary that recalled Reece’s
1920 campaign slogan: “Ten Years in Congress is a long time. It is long enough for a
good Congressman and too long for a poor one.” He reminded voters that Reece had
served for almost forty years and asserted that Reece had lost touch with the people. He
asked for support from the thousands of people he met in the district.345
Reece placed little emphasis on Waters’ challenge and informed his constituents
that the Middle East crisis in Lebanon prevented him from returning home to campaign in
his district. A local newspaper ran an article that supported Reece and justified his
absence from the district. The article asserted that for Reece, Tennessee came first. It
related that after his rise from “Tennessee hill boy” to chairman of the Republican
National Committee, he made the decision to “hold back a bit” and represent the people
of his district rather than rise higher in the GOP. The article declared that Reece had
successfully combined national party interests with “day-to-day details” of his
constituents, revealing the key to holding long tenure in office in the First District.
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Residents wanted their politicians to remain faithful to their hometowns as Reece did by
attending numerous local festivals and proposing legislation to directly benefit his
346

district. Reece defeated Waters in the primary by more than a two-to-one majority.

Reece won the 1958 primary without an official campaign but had to modify his
strategy for the November elections. He had been able to write only a few letters asking
for support to win over Waters, but the Democratic candidate, Mayne Miller, used
Reece’s legislative record as political ammunition. In October Reece announced that he
would return to the district in the coming weeks to campaign. Miller attacked Reece for
his 1954 investigation, his isolationism, and his opposition to Eisenhower. Miller pointed
out that Reece had failed to sponsor any important national legislation and only
concerned himself with legislation for his district. He considered Reece to have a
complacent attitude on national defense and claimed Reece had called the TVA “unAmerican.” Miller attacked Reece’s personal character by calling him selfish and cynical
and insinuated that he used his influence to transfer federal funds to his own banks and
get a post office named after him.347
Reece recognized Miller’s candidacy as the first serious attack in years and
understood the need to return to his district to defend his record. Reece’s supporters ran
an article that claimed Reece was responsible for TVA electricity being distributed by
locally-owned organizations. It asserted that Norris had intended for the federal
government to distribute power, which they believed challenged his legacy as the father
of the TVA. Reece wanted the power to be available to municipalities for local boards to
346
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distribute and thus should be credited with the current format of the TVA. It alleged that
Norris agreed with this sentiment. The fact that the city of Norris and Norris Dam were
named after the senator disputes this assertion. Reece and Representative Howard Baker
proposed a bill that would allow for self-financing of the TVA, but it failed to make it to
the House floor. Days before the November election, Reece called their plan a sound
business venture and believed it would have passed. He promised to reintroduce his
proposal at the next congressional session if elected. Reece remained confident that he
would defeat Miller, and he won the election with more than a 12,000 vote majority.348
Reece began his seventeenth term in Congress with a continued focus on the
dangers of communism but expanded his concern to its international implications. He
credited disquiet in Latin American nations during Nixon’s good will tour to a
“communist menace” present in those countries and stated that the United States had
been a good neighbor, even if it had made a few regrettable mistakes. He specifically
pointed to Cuba and the Fidel Castro regime as a menace to the world. Reece threatened
that the United States could remove the United States sugar quota, cut off aid to the
nation, and impound Cuban funds as incentives for Cuba to return to a democracy so that
the “cancer” of communism would not spread to other nations. Reece warned fellow
Congressmen to be careful during heated debates so that they avoided words or actions
that “Iron Curtain countries” could use to embarrass representatives to the United
Nations.349
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The fight against communism, according to Reece, began with every individual
and their own actions. In a 1959 article Reece wrote for The American Mercury—an
extreme right-wing publication that described itself as “a militant, 100 percent American
magazine”—he reviewed the recent seizure of power by Communists in Czechoslovakia
and warned that American citizens needed to do more than just oppose communism if
they wanted to help save America from the same fate. Reece detailed a list of activities
that Americans could follow in order to actively fight communism that included: read
more to understand the subject; take an active interest in local and national affairs; refuse
to agree with communist opinions; supply evidence to lead others to identify
Communists; attend and support church; examine schools; and advocate the principles of
Americanism, including free speech, religious freedom, and free enterprise. These steps
would help Americans fight the “private war on communism.” 350
Public responsibility played a large role in what Reece felt had gone wrong in
America. At the May 1959 commencement ceremony at Virginia Intermont College in
Bristol, Virginia, Reece spoke on the problems of American citizens. He felt comfortable
about speaking on this subject because of the immunity to criticism he declared he had
built up during his lifetime. Bad government, asserted Reece, came from the bad
judgment of people. He laid the blame for inflation on the desire of people who wanted
the government to do things that could be accomplished only with inflationary spending,
and he attributed unemployment to a low customer base of companies, which prevented
them from hiring more employees. Reece condemned what he viewed as a lack of
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patriotism when compared to prior generations and criticized the “beat generation” for
complaining about hard work and the responsibilities of freedom. He equated
communism with “mama-ism”—an emotional dependency on another with security
through obedience—and asserted that Christianity could combat communism because it
advocated self-reliance. Good government, insisted Reece, depended on the good
character of its citizens.351
Reece maintained that America had become better equipped to withstand the
increased threat of communism. While serving on the Armed Services Committee, he
stated that although Russia had made “some disturbing progress,” the United States had a
strong defense and great retaliation powers, which would deter large-scale war. He
hoped that foundations, which had amassed millions though tax-exempt exceptions,
would aid in the study of pure science rather than social science. Reece believed that
communist governments lagged behind America in military equipment and in economic
security and that this ensured America’s defensive position.352
A Man of Great Courage and Dignity
The importance of education to his home district forced Reece’s hand on a bill
brought before the Rules Committee. The Thompson Education Bill came before the
House in May 1960 with provisions to appropriate $975 million for school construction.
Reece opposed the bill because it excluded Catholic schools, but he pledged to Tennessee
educators that he would not be the person to obstruct its passage in the Rules Committee.
The twelve members of the committee split over the decision, and Reece broke the
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deadlock by joining the six Democrats voting for the bill to reach the House floor. He
noted that his vote did not signal support of the bill, but he felt that the committee should
not stand in the way of the full House voting on it. The next month, the House and
Senate presented very different bills, which forced a joint conference to work out a
compromise. Reece and Representative William M. Colmer, a Democrat from Michigan,
switched their earlier vote in favor of the bill to vote against a Senate-House conference,
effectively blocking the bill from going to the House. Reece successfully kept his
promise to his district while preventing the Thompson Bill from passing.353
During his next-to-last term in office Reece finally received recognition for work
on the TVA. In May 1960 President Eisenhower signed the TVA self-financing bill
passed by Congress the prior year. The measure allowed the TVA to issue bonds to pay
for new projects, but it established limits on its territorial expansion and required TVA to
begin repayment of money that the United States government had invested in it over the
last twenty-five years. Eisenhower credited both Reece and Baker with their “behind-the
scenes” work on behalf of the bill for easing his doubt about it. He had worried that the
measure allowed the TVA to by-pass him and the Budget Bureau in submitting programs
to Congress. After years of struggling to prove that he supported the TVA project, Reece
finally had a tangible law as evidence of his endorsement.354
That same month, Reece announced his candidacy for the fall election and
another term in Congress. He again issued a statement that expressed his devotion to the
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district and the benefit of his service in Congress. As in the previous campaigns, Reece
insisted that the nation’s business prevented him from leaving Washington to return home
for an extended campaign. This bothered his constituents little, as the town of Roan
Mountain declared June 25th “Carroll Reece Day” that year as part of their annual
Rhododendron Festival. Any potential challengers most likely realized the strength
Reece held in a district where he could win Republican primaries without even
campaigning. No candidate came forth in the 1960 primary to oppose Reece, who
considered this friendship and confidence in his ability “the highest compensation a man
355

in public life” could receive.

Tension between the United States and Soviet Union encompassed the 1960
presidential and local campaigns. The U-2 incident in the early summer heightened
distrust between the two nations, but Reece justified the flight with the argument that had
the United States had a similar flight over Japan before Pearl Harbor, the outcome would
have been drastically different. Reece argued that Richard Nixon, the Republican
candidate for president, was better equipped to deal with the threat of Russia than John F.
Kennedy, the Democratic candidate. He believed few could imagine “young Jack
Kennedy” in vital negotiations with Khrushchev, especially after Kennedy remarked after
the collapse of the Summit Conference that Eisenhower should have apologized or
expressed some regret for the U-2 incident. 356
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Reece placed all his efforts into campaigning for Nixon in Tennessee. He
predicted a Republican president and Congress would be elected and credited Eisenhower
with ending the Korean War, which helped strengthen America’s military prowess and
thus “insured the peace of the world.” Reece pointed out that Lyndon B. Johnson,
Kennedy’s running mate, had voted against Kennedy in the Senate 238 times since 1953.
In an attempt to divide Democrats, he argued that if Kennedy were elected he would
overrule Johnson when their opinions differed, leaving Johnson without a voice.
Utilizing a tactic that had been so successful against him, Reece accused Kennedy of
voting against the TVA and then changing his opinion. Reece asserted that Kennedy
thought it took industry away from the New England area. He introduced Nixon at a
rally in Memphis, where he declared that Nixon would carry the state. His predictions
proved correct, and Nixon won over Kennedy in Tennessee by a large margin, marking
the third successive presidential election that Tennessee voted Republican. His win
suggested that Tennessee was becoming a two-party state, but others credited the win to
the large number of Protestants in the state. The nation felt otherwise, and Kennedy
became the first Catholic president. Reece once again won reelection to serve what
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would be his last term in office.

Illness prevented Reece from becoming involved in the new session of Congress
early in 1961. Reece’s wife clipped a newspaper article that claimed British researchers
had related exposure to gas attacks in World War I to lung cancer, tuberculosis, and
bronchitis. A study conducted in the United States concluded that the study could not be
proven, although World War I veterans did have higher incidents of lung cancer. Mrs.
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Reece most likely saved this article because Reece experienced increased lung problems
in January 1961, when he entered the hospital for treatment. Reece tried to maintain an
st

appearance of health, leaving the hospital on January 31 to vote against a measure
before Congress that proposed adding more people to the House Rules Committee. He
left a back row seat after casting his vote to return to the hospital. In early February 1961
Reece’s wife reported that he had undergone surgery for a lung condition after having
been hospitalized for pleurisy. Press releases stated that the surgery had been for
physicians to examine his lungs and determine the exact cause of his illness.358
Reece’s condition seemed to improve, and his family kept positive about his
condition. He left the hospital in late February and returned to his temporary home at the
Mayflower Hotel. Reece received continued treatment but wrote a letter to the publisher
of the Johnson City Press-Chronicle that stated the doctors were confident of curing his
illness within a short time. On March 9th, however, Reece returned to Bethesda Naval
Hospital, where x-rays revealed malignancies in his lung. He underwent radiation and
cobalt treatments, but he continued to lose strength and became worse day by day.
Reports to the media omitted details of his treatment and maintained hope that Reece
would improve. Reece’s death from cancer on March 19, 1961, seemed sudden to many
who were unaware of the seriousness of his illness.359
The following day, papers all over the nation reported the news of Reece’s death
and paid tribute to his distinguished career. Editorials commended his service to the
nation and his district and tried to pinpoint the reason for his success. One article
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attributed it to his “astute opportunism, a sixth sense of sorts . . . his boundless energy
and tireless pursuit of a goal . . . his ability to organize and direct men . . . his wealth” and
“his resolute and full use of power available to him.” The Knoxville News-Sentinel called
Reece “a man of great courage and dignity” both in war and in his adherence to his
principles. Another local paper described him as “Tennessee’s ‘Mr. Republican,’” a
reference to the popular nickname given to his longtime friend, Robert Taft. Even those
opposed to Reece and his political maneuvers related their respect for him as a citizen.
George McCanless, Tennessee’s Attorney General, gave a somewhat humorous but
accurate portrayal of Reece when he declared that “a sixth grade student could make a
better speech than Carroll. But Carroll could get things done.” Senator Kefauver
announced Reece’s death in the Senate by describing Reece as “a man who always kept
his word, and a man of exemplary character.” Other Congressmen described Reece as a
“man of conviction,” “an honest conservative,” and a “sturdy oak.”360
Shortly after his death, residents of East Tennessee worked to ensure that his
name would be remembered. Before the end of March, a memorial fund had been
established to pay tribute to the legislator. Less than a week after the funeral, papers
printed editorials calling for Mrs. Reece to run in the special election to fill her husband’s
vacant seat. Louise won by a two-to-one margin in a race reminiscent of those run by her
late husband and carried all counties in the district. The newspaper headlines once again,
and for the last time, proclaimed a Reece victory. Louise finished Reece’s term and
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announced in 1962 that she would resign from office at the end of her term. She
endorsed James H. Quillen, a good friend of the family and Tennessee state
representative, as her replacement. Quillen easily won election to Congress, continuing
the Republican tenure in the First District. He credited Reece with his success, recalling
that as a young man Reece told him that if he ever ran for public office to remember that
if it was important enough for a constituent to write or visit about a matter, then it was
important enough to do something to help.361
Conclusion
The hostile reaction to the Reece Committee Report marked the end of Reece’s
strong presence within the Republican Party and the House. Party members sought his
favor but recognized that with the death of Taft, new figures such as Eisenhower and
Nixon sustained the majority of the power within the party. Reece continued his vendetta
against foundations, proving that his animosity stemmed from something deeper than a
desire to punish those who supported Eisenhower over his beloved Taft. Reece observed
that Old Guard conservative Republicans were losing ground to liberal Republicans, and
he fought desperately to prevent this loss of power by any means possible. He believed
that he could reinforce conservative Republicans by preventing foundations from funding
programs he viewed as slanted to the left. Reece’s local prominence ensured his
reelection to Congress, and he remained faithful to the Republican Party in presidential
campaigns until his death. The social and political backlash from Senator McCarthy’s
unfounded accusations, the investigations of HUAC and SISS, and congressional
inquiries such as Reece’s damaged the public’s perception of red-baiting as an acceptable
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basis for a political agenda. This contributed to Eisenhower and Nixon’s reluctance to
rely on communism as the cornerstone of their national agenda. Civil rights problems
had been overshadowed for a number of years by anti-communist rhetoric. The problems
increased during the Eisenhower Administration and forced civil rights to the forefront of
politics. Communism became relegated to a Cold War with Russia—an external threat
associated with the escalating involvement in Vietnam.
The death of B. Carroll Reece ended the reign of an Old Guard conservative, but
Republicans continued to dominate East Tennessee politics. His successor, James
Quillen, served in the House for thirty consecutive years. The twelve members of the B.
Carroll Reece Memorial Committee, formed at his death, built a museum at East
Tennessee State University in Johnson City, Tennessee, to honor Reece. On October 10,
1965, the college dedicated the Carroll Reece Museum, which housed Reece’s private
papers and public documents. Reece’s wife published posthumously two of the books
Reece had written—the one a biography of Andrew Johnson, and the other a collection of
speeches Reece gave concerning the displacement of German citizens after World War II.
Reece’s friends ensured that his name would survive in the First District. Forty years
after his death, the mention of Reece’s name to residents of the area brings a pause to
recollect why the name rings familiar, even if their knowledge of the man goes no
further.362
Reece’s life contained seemingly unexplainable contradictions. He came from
one of the poorest and most obscure areas in Tennessee, but he became the national
leader of the Republican Party and won election to eighteen terms in Congress. He
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placed emphasis on the importance of family but opposed his father-in-law during his bid
to win the nomination for president. Reece lost his seat in the House because of his
support for private ownership over government operation of Muscle Shoals, yet he
attacked foundations funded by large businesses—including Ford, who earned Reece’s
support for operation of Muscle Shoals—for what he considered grants to subversive
organizations. He identified himself as a southerner, but he often voted against other
southern congressmen in favor of civil rights for blacks.
Reece’s sense of loyalty defined the actions he took in his political career and
personal life. The Reece family supported the Republican Party, and he continued this
tradition when he decided to run for political office. He rarely deviated from the
Republican Party platform, and when Robert A. Taft decided to run for national office
Reece found a leader to whom he could devote his support. Regardless of his somewhat
liberal views regarding civil rights, Reece still held an overall conservative political
philosophy that opposed big government interference in everyday life. Robert Taft and
Old Guard Republicanism provided an outlet for Reece to act on his beliefs and try to
preserve politics and the government in the manner he felt they should exist.
Reece’s experiences in World War I contributed to his intense aversion to
communism. When he met Louise, her father’s hatred of communism and socialism
influenced Reece to become more dedicated to its eradication. Reece thought that anyone
who showed a less zealous attitude towards eliminating this threat failed to do enough.
The governmental proposal to operate the power plants at Muscle Shoals seemed too akin
to governments in communist nations, prompting Reece to support private ownership of
the facility. Reece’s determination to prevent Communists from having the opportunity
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to enter any part of the government caused him to take a stand on an issue that threatened
his career in the House. Tennessee wanted the benefits that the Muscle Shoals plants
would bring, and his determination to submit a bill for private ownership appeared to his
constituents to be a delay in resolving the issue. The TVA continued to be a concern and
a tool used against Reece in later elections, yet he stood by his decision and insisted that
he based his actions on what he felt would benefit the people of Tennessee.
Reece’s loyalty to the Republican Party and his district secured his position in
Congress. He learned that a representative from East Tennessee had to know how to
effectively balance national issues with local desires. The aversion to long tenure
propagated in the First District came about only when politicians failed to convince
voters that they acted on behalf of their interests. Congressmen usually wrote legislation
to appease voters, but Reece used his increasing national prominence and his attachment
to Taft to convince voters of the good he could accomplish on their behalf. His loyalty to
the Republican Party also earned him the position of chairman of the Republican
National Committee when the Old Guard Republicans tried once more to buttress their
dwindling power within the party. Reece’s banking background and organizational skills
proved invaluable to the committee, and he helped place Republicans in a place of power
once again by winning control of Congress.
Taft soon became the central influence in Reece’s political career. Reece
campaigned for Taft in hopes of helping him win the elusive Republican nomination for
president. Many came to view Reece as little more than a mouthpiece for Taft in the
southern states. He earned a position on Taft’s national campaign team in 1952, when
Republicans determined to take control of the presidency from the Democrats. Many
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blamed Reece for Taft’s failure to secure the nomination, but in reality, the nation had
moved away from the conservative Republican stance taken by both Reece and Taft.
Taft never blamed Reece publicly for his loss and his letters to Reece evidence that their
personal friendship remained strong through all their political turmoil.
McCarthyites successfully infiltrated Hollywood and blacklisted a number of
those in the entertainment industry. They penetrated the sanctity of universities to
influence the dismissal of a number of professors and administrators and curb the
enthusiasm of others from deviating from the accepted bounds of anti-communism.
Reece exposes another level of the intrusiveness of communism into politics and
everyday life. While many others had used communism in individual campaigns to win
votes, Reece enlisted the help of Republicans across the entire nation to support his
platform against communism. In 1946 he led the Republican charge against Democrats
based on subversion and infiltration of the American government. This was the election
that put Joe McCarthy into office. This set the stage for later campaigns centered on
communism and made anti-communism a viable political tool and issue. He incorporated
his redefined language on Democrats as a vital part of the campaign against communism.
The history of the 1950s centers on men who wielded more power and influence in the
national arena, but it neglects Reece’s role in uniting what he defined as liberalism with
anti-communism and the Republican Party. The gains he made in 1946 allowed men like
McCarthy to become powerful. The predecessor of HUAC had long been investigating
subversion, but it was not until after the 1946 elections that it, along with the SISS,
became widely known, publicized, and feared.
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Reece’s fierce devotion to the Republican Party, to Taft, and to the fight against
the spread of communism merged at a time when America’s fears began to overcome its
confidence. Martin Dies, Pat McCarran, and Joseph McCarthy had all begun their own
personal hunt for subversion within the government, and the few instances of subversion
that their investigations uncovered amplified the actual threat that existed. Family illness
prevented Reece from attending the Cox Committee investigation into foundations during
1953. He may have viewed this investigation as an opportunity to weaken the liberal
wing of the party through Eisenhower, to inflict retribution on those who had gone
against Taft in the prior election, and also to determine if Communists had penetrated
foundations. Cox’s death turned the tide of the investigation, and Reece felt the resulting
investigation accomplished none of his hopes for the committee. He felt his only choice
was to propose a subsequent investigation to succeed where the prior committee had
failed.
Reece struggled to find an issue that could give him influence in the House. He
first tried the TVA but failed, and Taft’s death removed his national connection. The
work of foundations in dispelling fears of subversion threatened to remove the only topic
he believed he could employ to gain power. He had successfully manipulated fears of
communism in 1946 to win control of Congress, and in 1952 the Republican Party won
the presidency and control of Congress again on a platform of anti-communism.
Foundation reports put this perceived tool in peril as they pushed it aside for the more
pressing issue of civil rights.
The Reece Committee faced numerous troubles from its inception. Few believed
Reece’s assertion that foundations fostered subversion within education through their
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grants. Most recognized the grudge Reece held toward liberal Republicans and his desire
to avenge Taft’s loss. The staff chosen to work on the committee increased its
ineffectiveness by their obvious bias towards the foundations targeted. The hearings
became disastrous as Representative Hays refused to allow the committee to assassinate
the character of foundations without evidence and without allowing foundations ample
time to respond to the criticisms presented. The lengthy report, which Reece believed in
and stood by, went out of print shortly after its appearance and received little more than
cursory notice from Congress. Reece maintained his belief that foundations adversely
influenced education, and subsequent investigations by Congress into foundations in the
early 1960s must have seemed to Reece justification of his vendetta.
The continued animosity toward large foundations has often prevented American
society from wholly accepting the philanthropic deeds of such organizations. Jealousy,
greed, and political motivations often thwart the well-intentioned foundations from
providing aid in areas such as education, immigration, and international politics. The
Reece Committee, whether intentional or not, played a large role in the continuing
suspicion against large foundations. Following so closely on the heels of the Cox
Committee, the Reece Committee ensured a long-lasting animosity toward large sums of
money “hoarded” by eastern foundations.
Reece’s life and career open a window into an aberration of politics that existed in
Tennessee after the close of the Civil War. A pocket of Republicanism in the eastern part
of the state had little influence on the mostly Democratic state. Republicans could,
however, wield their power over their district representative to Congress. This led to an
understanding between the party leaders in the state that often became the source of
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criticism from both parties. Reece exploited this agreement and his position in office to
remain in office and also gain patronage for his district. His career revealed the complex
dynamics that developed among mountain Republicans who disliked a strong central
government but desired the advantages that such a government could provide. He built
the party up enough to capture the state’s vote for the Republican candidate for president
in the last three national elections before his death.
Reece held firm to his convictions even when he misplaced his loyalties. In his
campaigns for reelection, supporters publicized numerous bills that he proposed to
benefit his district. None of these bills passed, which papers often omitted, but Reece
demonstrated to his district his desire to use his office for their advantage. He never
wrote any major legislation, but he managed to associate himself with issues important to
his district, such as better roads, money for education, and patronage. His devotion to
Robert Taft and the conservative branch of the Republican Party encouraged him to begin
an ill-fated investigation into large foundations in America, and he maintained his belief
that his actions served to protect the nation’s security. He considered himself immune to
criticism, a trait which he believed all politicians developed after a time. Whatever
criticisms applied to his 1954 investigation or his actions in regard to Muscle Shoals, he
remained, as he once described himself: Republican, first, last, and always.
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Figure 1. The Reece Family, appearing in a local newspaper. From left to right:
John Isaac Reece, Sarah Maples Reece, James Lafayette Reece, Wilson Landrine Reece,
John Eggers Reece, Walter Jacob Reece, Joseph Isaac Reece, Amanda Catherine Reece,
Asa Clayton Reece, Brazilla Carroll Reece, Lemuel L. Reece, Millard Brown Reece,
Laura Ruth Reece, Anna Reece, and Raleigh Valentine Reece.
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Figure 2. The basketball team at Carson-Newman College, circa 1913-1914. Reece is
second from the left on the back row. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the
Archives of Appalachia.

Figure 3. Military photographs of B. Carroll Reece, circa 1917-1919. He used the
photograph on the left as his campaign picture during the 1920 elections. Courtesy of the
B. Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.
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Figure 4. B. Carroll Reece, undated. This photograph, taken early in Reece’s career,
replaced his military photograph in campaigns after 1922. Courtesy of the B. Carroll
Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.

Figure 5. B. Carroll Reece and his wife, Louise Despard Goff Reece, undated. This
photograph appears to be sometime after their marriage in 1923. Courtesy of the B.
Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.
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Figure 6. B. Carroll Reece with his collection of elephants. Courtesy of the B. Carroll
Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.

Figure 7. B. Carroll Reece with his collection of elephants. This publicity shot appeared
on the front cover of Time magazine during his chairmanship of the Republican National
Committee. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.
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Figure 8. B. Carroll Reece and his daughter, Louise Goff Reece. Louise earned her
pilot’s license and often flew her father to political events. Courtesy of the B. Carroll
Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.

Figure 9. B. Carroll and Louise Reece. This photograph was taken late in the Reece’s
life at their Johnson City home, Bois d’Ormont. They are standing in front of a picture of
their daughter. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.
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Figure 10. B. Carroll Reece campaigning. The location of this photograph is unknown,
but the newspaper in the gentleman’s pocket at the front left is the Elizabethton Star,
suggesting Reece was at an informal meeting in his home district. Courtesy of the B.
Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of Appalachia.

Figure 11. B. Carroll Reece at a campaign rally. The location of this photograph is
unknown, but it is most likely in the First District. Notice the gentleman to the right of
Reece who unwilling to have his photograph taken. Large crowds usually gathered to
hear Reece in his home district. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives
of Appalachia.
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Figure 12. B. Carroll Reece. This photograph served as Reece’s political photograph
later in his career. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the Archives of
Appalachia.

Figure 13. Louise Despard Goff Reece. Courtesy of the B. Carroll Reece Papers at the
Archives of Appalachia.
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Figure 14. The B. Carroll Reece Museum on the campus of East Tennessee State
University, 2007. The museum was dedicated in 1964.

Figure 15. Sign for the B. Carroll Reece Museum, 2007.
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